Richardson v. Means

• Decision Date: 31 March 1856
• Citation: Richardson v. Means, 22 Mo. 495 (Mo. 1856)
• Parties: RICHARDSON AND WIFE, Appellants, v. MEANS, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

22 Mo. 495

RICHARDSON AND WIFE, Appellants,

v.MEANS, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1856.

1. Where a slave is conveyed to a trustee to be held in trust for the use of a married woman for life, (she being entitled by the deed of conveyance to the possession of the slave,) and upon her death for the use of the children; held, that the wife can not in her own name and that of her husband maintain an action for the conversion of the slave. An action for the protection of the legal ownership should be brought in the name of the trustee, or in case of his death or refusal to act, or the existence of any obstacle to the ordinary legal remedy, a proper case for equitable relief might be made and such relief furnished.

Appeal from Mississippi Circuit Court.

This was an action commenced June 17, 1853, by Maria L. Richardson (the husband having afterwards been made a party by an amended petition) for the recovery of a female slave and her two children, alleged in the petition to have been wrongfully taken by the defendant, May 1, 1849, and unlawfully detained by him.

Defendant, in his answer, denied the title of plaintiff, and claimed title in himself, and relied upon a bill of sale to himself, dated May 1, 1848, of the negress and one child, executed by Thomas R. Richardson, husband of plaintiff, Maria, and co-plaintiff in this action.

To sustain the wife's right, she relied on a deed of gift from her father, William C. Bruce, dated April 1, 1845, by which, in consideration of love and affection toward the plaintiff, his daughter, he conveyed the female slave in controversy to one Littleton Jozner, “upon trust that the said Jozner, his executors, &c., shall permit my said daughter to hold possession of and take the use, hire and profits of the said Maria and her increase to her sole and separate use during her life, independent of her said husband; and at the death of my said daughter, the said Maria and her increase to be equally divided between her children,” &c.

The bill of sale mentioned above, dated May 1st, 1848, was introduced and proven by defendant.

It is unnecessary to set forth the instructions given to the jury, as the decision of the court rests upon grounds entirely unconnected with the instructions given.

The jury found for the defendant, and judgment was given accordingly. Plaintiffs appealed.

Cates, for appellants.

1. By the deed of trust, “the use and possession” of the slave vested in the wife during life, to the exclusion of the husband and Jozner, the trustee. The latter was a mere trustee, to support and maintain the remainder vested in the children; neither the husband nor trustee had the power to limit or control the action of the wife in the use and possession of the slave; she had the power to sell or dispose for the term of her life; in other words, she had a life estate, free and independent of all persons, and any violation of her estate was personal to her. Hence, she was the real party in interest, and, by the code, had a right of action for the wrongful conversion and detention. (See Code, art. 3, § 1 and 2; 18 Mo. 565; case of Rankin, 19 Mo. 493; 2 Kent. Com. 162.) The doctrine of the case of Gibbon (20 Mo. 468) is not opposed to the view here contended for. 2. It is a fixed principle of law that in all separate estates of the wife, created by trust deed, with or without the intervention of a trustee, the husband takes the legal estate, and is treated in equity as trustee for the separate benefit of the wife. (Hill on Trustees, 588, 609, and notes...