Richardson v. Metropolitan District Commission, CIVIL ACTION No. 3-00-CV-1062 (JCH) (D. Conn. 7/23/2003)

• Decision Date: 23 July 2003
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION No. 3-00-CV-1062 (JCH).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: TAMMY D. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION, ET Al., Defendants.

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TAMMY D. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION, ET Al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION No. 3-00-CV-1062 (JCH).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

July 23, 2003.

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 62] AND MOTION TO STRIKE [DKT. NO. 69]

JANET HALL, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns claims for money damages and equitable relief brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), and the state common law of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff, Tammy D. Richardson ("Richardson"), alleges that the defendants, the Metropolitan District Commission ("MDC"),¹ unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of her race, religion, and sex.

On August 7, 2002, the court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants on some of the plaintiff's claims. [Dkt. No. 58]. The plaintiff subsequently moved for reconsideration of the court's grant of partial summary judgment for the defendants. [Dkt. No. 59]. In its ruling on the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the court found that the earlier dismissal of the plaintiff's section 1983 sexual discrimination claim was in error. The court found that the issue of sexual discrimination under Section 1983 had not been adequately briefed by the parties, and sua sponte, granted the defendants leave to file a motion for summary judgment solely on the plaintiff's section 1983 sex discrimination claim. As a consequence, the defendants filed their current motion for summary judgment on the section 1983 sexual discrimination claim. Richardson opposes their motion.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

Richardson is an African-American woman, who is a practicing Jehovah's Witness. On February 26, 1996, Metropolitan District Commission ("MDC") hired Richardson as a clerk typist in the Treasury Department. On or about October 26, 1996, MDC promoted Richardson to Account Clerk.

On September 20, 1997, Richardson was involved in a non-work-related automobile accident that resulted in a 22% disability of the lower back. Richardson Aff. [Dkt. No. 46], Ex. A, at 5. As a result of the accident, Richardson was out from work from September 20, 1997 through December 8, 1997. On several occasions between 1998 and 1999, Richardson took medical absences because of the injuries sustained in the accident.

In October 1998, Richardson received an evaluation that rated her performance as unsatisfactory, based in part on her absences from work, and her annual increment was withheld. MDC placed Richardson on a six-month probationary period. The comment section of the evaluation referenced Richardson's use of FMLA absences, but noted that her lack of attendance beyond the FMLA absences resulted in an inconsistent volume of work. All Richardson's prior evaluations were satisfactory.

On March 31, 1999, Richardson left work on a medical leave of absence because of pain from the September 1997 accident. On June 1, 1999, MDC processed an FMLA certification from Richardson's chiropractor that stated the need for medical leave. On June 4, 1999, MDC acknowledged receipt of the chiropractor's certification, but sent a letter to Richardson requesting additional medical documentation that projected the length of absence necessary and described Richardson's ability to return to work.

On July 1, 1999, Richardson attempted to return to work, but her supervisor, Jeffrey Johnson ("Johnson"), sent her home. On July 1, 1999, Richardson's chiropractor faxed a "Return to Work" form to MDC that explained that Richardson could return to regular duties with a few limitations: she could not lift or carry more than ten pounds; she should work half-days until further notice; and she requires chiropractic care twice a week. On July 9, 1999, when she returned from the March 31, 1999 medical leave, MDC reduced Richardson's responsibilities at work and elevated a less qualified white employee to her position. Richardson filed another "Return to Work" form on July 13, 1999 that stated she should only work part-time until July 23, 1999.

On July 23, 1999, Richardson attended a religious convention. Richardson had requested the day off in March, and Johnson approved the use of vacation time. On the day before the convention, Johnson informed Richardson that he revoked his approval. When Richardson returned to work on July 26, 1999, MDC suspended her for two days without pay for her absence on July 23 and part-time attendance from July 12 through July 21. On August 6, 1999, Richardson filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities.

Because of her medical absences, Richardson's six-month probationary period extended until August 1999. On August 30, 1999, MDC reviewed Richardson's performance and concluded that it continued to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, MDC denied Richardson a step increment.

Richardson took a medical absence for injuries from the accident and job-related stress on November 3, 1999, until her voluntary resignation on December 7, 1999. On December 2, 1999, Richardson had received a letter from Northeast Utilities System confirming her employment starting December 13, 1999.

While Richardson was employed at MDC, her supervisor, Jeffrey Johnson ("Johnson"), swore at her and called her names. She complained about his conduct to the Director of Human Resources and the president of her union.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave. Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 107 (2nd Cir. 2000). The burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists rests upon the moving party. Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994)). However, "a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)) (alteration in original and internal quotations omitted). If little or no evidence supports the non-moving party's case, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment may be appropriate. Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223-24.

In assessing the record to determine if genuine issues of material fact exist, all ambiguities must be resolved, and all inferences drawn, in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 721 (2d Cir. 1994). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. When reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standards, could differ in their responses to the questions raised on the basis of the evidence presented, the question is best left to the jury. Sologub v. City of New York, 202 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2000).

B. Section 1983 Hostile Work Environment and Sex Discrimination

Richardson claims that section 1983 was violated as a result of the hostile work environment created by Jeffrey Johnson, her supervisor, and by the adverse employment actions which were taken as a result of her complaints regarding Johnson's sex discrimination. The Supreme Court declared twenty-four years ago that individuals have a constitutional right under the equal protection clause to be free from sex discrimination in public employment. Annis v. County of Westchester. N.Y., 36 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1979)). Harassment that transcends coarse, hostile and boorish behavior can rise to the level of a constitutional tort. Id. (citing Gierlinger v. New York State Police, 15 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[I]n some circumstances a § 1983 claim may be properly grounded on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on sexual harassment in the workplace."). When sexual harassment includes conduct evidently calculated to drive someone out of the workplace, the harassment is tantamount to sex discrimination. Id.

1. Hostile Work Environment

A claim for harassment which creates a hostile work environment is cognizable under section 1983. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1993). Workplace harassment claims brought under section 1983 parallel those brought under Title VII, and therefore, courts have applied the same requirements of severity and pervasiveness. See, e.g., McPhaul v. Board of Com'rs of Madison County, 226 F.3d 558, 566 n. 6 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Because section 1983 claims generally follow the contours of Title VII claims, we will apply the same hostile environment standard that is applied in Title VII cases."); Rafiy v. Nassau County Medical Center, 218 F. Supp.2d 295, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (requiring harassment to be severe and pervasive to be cognizable under the equal protection clause); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F. Supp.2d 411, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Ericson v. City of Meriden, 113 F. Supp.2d 276, 290 (Conn. 2000) (same).

To establish a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show that she was subjected to harassment "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create a hostile working environment," Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), and that the harassing conduct occurred because of her sex, Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002). In order for the harassment of the plaintiff to...