Richardson v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-CA-00876-SCT.,2004-CA-00876-SCT. |
| Citation | 923 So.2d 1002 |
| Parties | Frances Mary (Robbins) RICHARDSON, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Ray Robbins, II, Deceased v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
John W. Chandler, Jr., Pamela R. O'Dwyer, Phil R. Hinton, Corinth, attorneys for appellant.
Stephanie Camille Reifers, Everett B. Gibson, attorneys for appellee.
Before WALLER, P.J., EASLEY and CARLSON, JJ.
¶ 1. This wrongful death case arises from an accident in which a train collided with a car crossing the railroad tracks at a grade crossing. The driver of the car, Michael Ray Robbins, died as a result of his injuries from the accident. His mother, Frances Mary (Robbins) Richardson, sued both Alcorn County, the county in which the incident occurred, and Norfolk Southern Railway Company for negligence. Alcorn County prevailed on its motion for summary judgment, leaving Norfolk Southern the remaining defendant.1 At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Norfolk Southern, and the trial court entered judgment consistent with the jury verdict. Richardson now appeals to us, asserting error in the trial court's entry of its final judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
¶ 2. On May 10, 1999, sixteen year old Michael Ray (Mikie) Robbins was driving over a railroad grade crossing on County Road 715 in Alcorn County when a Norfolk Southern Railway Company train struck his car. Mikie died as a result of the injuries sustained in the collision. The grade crossing was equipped with passive warning devices, such as advance warning signs and pavement markings, but not active warning devices, such as flashing signal lights and automatic gates. Additionally, there was limited visibility to drivers at the grade crossing because of an embankment, grass, trees, and debris which obstructed the view on the right of way. Richardson, Mikie's mother and administratrix of his estate, brought suit against Norfolk Southern, and later amended the complaint to add Alcorn County as a defendant. In her amended complaint, Richardson alleged that Alcorn County negligently maintained the crossing by failing to provide adequate active warning devices; failing to properly maintain the passive warning devices; and failing to remedy the overgrown conditions which limited visibility at the grade crossing. The basis of the complaint against Norfolk Southern was also negligent maintenance for the inadequate signal and the overgrown conditions; Richardson also asserted that Norfolk Southern was negligent in failing to sound the horn and to properly operate the train due to the train's excessive speed at a grade crossing known to be dangerous.
¶ 3. Because the passive devices had been installed with federal funds, Alcorn County prevailed on its motion for summary judgment on the ground that federal regulations preempted state tort law. The trial court found Richardson's claim that the signalization was inadequate was preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, and that Alcorn County had no duty to maintain the obstructed right-of-way as it was privately owned.
¶ 4. After the trial court granted Alcorn County's motion for summary judgment, Richardson filed a second amended complaint against Norfolk Southern. Norfolk Southern filed a motion for partial summary judgment, alleging, inter alia, the same grounds as Alcorn County — that federal law preempted state tort law. The trial court granted partial summary judgment on the issue of adequate signalization, finding the issue of the adequacy of crossing warning devices was deemed to be preempted by federal law; however, the trial court found its ruling on this issue would not preclude Richardson "from contending at trial that [Norfolk Southern] negligently failed to properly maintain the passive warning devices at that location in good condition and failed to properly maintain the right-of-way belonging to the railroad at the scene." The trial court additionally found the excessive speed claim was preempted by federal law. By denying, in part, Norfolk Southern's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court permitted Richardson to proceed to trial on her claims that Norfolk Southern (1) failed to properly maintain the passive warning devices at the scene in good condition; and, (2) failed to properly maintain the railroad right-of-way at the scene.
¶ 5. In response to Richardson's efforts to introduce certain evidence at trial, Norfolk Southern filed a pre-trial motion in limine to exclude evidence of two other accidents involving Matthew Bradley and Wendy McClure. The trial court granted this motion, thus excluding evidence of these other accidents.
¶ 6. At trial, Richardson submitted proposed jury instructions P-12 and P-22, regarding the duties of a motorist at a grade crossing; however, the trial court refused them and instead gave jury instructions C-20 and C-21. Because Norfolk Southern employees never properly recovered the event recorder data, Richardson also submitted jury instruction P-16, regarding spoliation of evidence, but the trial court refused to give that instruction. On appeal, Richardson claims that the trial court erred in (1) granting partial summary judgment on the federal preemption issue; (2) excluding evidence of prior accidents at the same railroad crossing; and, (3) refusing three jury instructions which she submitted.
¶ 7. Richardson pursued this action against Norfolk Southern on tort theories of liability. Norfolk Southern's defense included an assertion that federal law preempted Richardson's claim.
¶ 8. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment under Miss. R. Civ. P. 56. Leffler v. Sharp, 891 So.2d 152, 156 (Miss.2004). A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, giving the non-movant the benefit of the doubt as to the existence of any genuine issues of material facts. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So.2d 627, 630 (Miss.1996). However, in Richmond v. Benchmark Constr. Corp., 692 So.2d 60, 62 (Miss.1997), this Court also said: "[t]he party opposing the motion must be diligent." Mere reliance on the allegations or denials in the pleadings is not sufficient; but instead, the party opposing the motion is required to set forth specific facts showing that genuine issues for trial do exist. Id.
¶ 9. This Court must also view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. Leffler, 891 So.2d at 156. A motion for summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial of disputed fact issues. Owens Corning v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 868 So.2d 331, 335 (Miss. 2004). On a Rule 56 motion, this Court must only determine if there are issues to be tried; we need not actually try those issues. Id. The mere presence of fact issues in the record does not entitle a party to avoid summary judgment per se. Id. "`The court must be convinced that the factual issue is a material one, one that matters in an outcome determinative sense. . . the existence of a hundred contested issues of fact will not thwart summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute regarding the material issues of fact.'" Leffler, 891 So.2d at 156 (quoting Simmons v. Thompson Mach. of Miss., Inc., 631 So.2d 798, 801 (Miss.1994) (citing Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 252 (Miss.1985))); see also, Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358 (Miss.1983). Finally, issues of law are subject to de novo review by this Court. Andrus v. Ellis, 887 So.2d 175, 179 (Miss.2004).
¶ 10. The Code of Federal Regulations requires "adequate warning devices" be installed on any railroad-highway grade crossing that is part of a federal-aid highway project before the crossing is opened. 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(2) (2005). Where federal-aid funds were used for installation of the warning devices, "adequate warning devices" include active signal devices, or "automatic gates with flashing light signals," but only when one of six conditions exists. 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3). When those six conditions do not exist, the Federal Highway Administration must approve the warning device. 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(4).
¶ 11. Recognizing that federal law preempts a state law when the two are in conflict, the United States Supreme Court found in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 670, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1740-41, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993), that when 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) and (4) are applicable, these federal regulations preempt state tort law. In that wrongful death case, which also arose out of a train-automobile collision, the Court found the regulations did not apply because the party raising the defense failed to establish their applicability. The Easterwood Court held the federal regulation must "cover" the same subject matter and not merely touch upon it or relate to it. Id. at 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732.
¶ 12. The United States Supreme Court later, in a case with facts similar to Easterwood and this case, held the Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA), in conjunction with § 646.214(b)(3) and (4), preempts state tort law actions against a railway company for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at crossings where federal funds were used for installation of the warning devices. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 347, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 1471, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000). The Court also held that, "Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) `cover the subject matter' of the adequacy of warning devices installed with the participation of federal funds." Id. at 358, ...
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