Richardson v. Oldham

• Decision Date: 16 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 2:91-CV-158.,2:91-CV-158.
• Citation: 811 F. Supp. 1186
• Parties: Willie RICHARDSON v. Bill OLDHAM, Sheriff of Harrison County; Harrison County, Texas; Thomas Harold, Deputy Sheriff, Harrison County Sheriff's Department; Rick Berry, District Attorney of Harrison County; and Other Unidentified Law Enforcement Officers.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

811 F. Supp. 1186

Willie RICHARDSON v. Bill OLDHAM, Sheriff of Harrison County; Harrison County, Texas; Thomas Harold, Deputy Sheriff, Harrison County Sheriff's Department; Rick Berry, District Attorney of Harrison County; and Other Unidentified Law Enforcement Officers.

No. 2:91-CV-158.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division.

December 16, 1992.

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Nelson W. Cameron, Shreveport, LA, for plaintiff.

James Scott Howard and Robert Scott Davis, Cowles & Thompson, Tyler, TX, for defendants.

ORDER

HALL, District Judge.

CAME ON TO BE HEARD THIS DAY the following motions in the above entitled and numbered cause of action: Motion for Summary Judgment of Tommy E. Harrell, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Harrison County, and Rick Berry, in his Official Capacity; Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence; and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Objection to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence. After consideration of the motions and the responses thereto, the Court finds the following: Motion for Summary Judgment of Tommy E. Harrell, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Harrison County, and Rick Berry, in his Official Capacity is well taken; Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence is well taken in part; and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Objection to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence is not well taken.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Willie Richardson and Rose Jean Richardson bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also bring pendent state claims.

Plaintiffs are husband and wife and reside at Route 3, Box 628 in Harrison County, Texas. Defendant Tommy Harrell is a law enforcement officer employed by the District Attorney of Harrison County and at all relevant times was acting under color of state law. Officer Harrell is sued in both his individual and official capacities. Defendant Rick Berry, the District Attorney of Harrison County, is sued in his official capacity only.

In order to obtain the warrant to search the Plaintiffs' home, on May 14, 1991, Officer Harrell presented to Judge Sandlin an affidavit containing information from a reliable confidential informant that a black female residing at Route 3, Box 628, Harrison County, Texas had been observed by the informant delivering an amount of marijuana to a third party. In the affidavit, Officer Harrell further stated that he had accompanied another informant to the residence and observed the female telling the informant that she would have no marijuana until the next morning. See Affidavit for Search and Arrest Warrant in Harrison County, Texas, attached to Defs.' Motion for Summ. J. as Ex. B.

Based on the information presented him, Judge Sandlin determined that probable cause existed and issued a search warrant authorizing Officer Harrell to search the premises described in the warrant, in part, as Route 3, Box 628, Harrison County, Texas, and more specifically described in the warrant as "a single family residence of wood frame construction ... being a light colored (off white) colored structure having double entry doors."

Plaintiffs contend that the description of the premises was so deficient that no reasonable person could have located the premises. Plaintiffs also contend that the search warrant was negligently and wrongfully executed for the following reasons: the entry was "forcible" and without announcement or presentation of the warrant; plaintiffs were "startled" and "embarrassed" when they were awakened in their bedroom; and Plaintiffs were "frightened by defendant agent" for approximately one hour after which time Plaintiffs were "told that the wrong premises had been entered" and the officers left "without any further explanation or apology." First Am. Compl. at 4. In addition, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Harrison County engaged in the custom and practice of allowing illegal search and seizure tactics. Plaintiffs also contend that District Attorney Berry improperly supervised and trained Officer Harrell. Finally, Plaintiffs assert the following pendent state claims: false arrest, wrongful search and seizure, illegal detention and intentional infliction of mental distress.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

All Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and answers to interrogatories, together with affidavits, must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the motion is made and properly supported, an adverse party may not rest on allegations or denials but must set forth specific and supported material facts. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). Therefore, the nonmovant must bring forth significant probative evidence to prevent summary judgment. Union Planters Nat'l Leasing Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.1982). To that end, the Court must "review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.1986).

When determining whether to grant summary judgment, the Court is merely determining whether a factual dispute exists, and is not required to resolve those disputes. Jones v. Western Geophysical Co., 669 F.2d 280, 283 (5th Cir.1982). The fact that it appears to the Court that the nonmovant is unlikely to prevail at trial or that the movant's statement of facts appears more plausible is not a valid reason to grant summary judgment. Id. at 283.

In a nonjury case, such as this particular case, there is no jury to whom factual disputes are submitted; the judge is the ultimate finder of fact. In re Placid Oil Co., 932 F.2d 394, 397-398 (5th Cir. 1991). Therefore, at the summary judgment stage the judge has limited discretion to weigh the summary judgment evidence and to draw inferences unless those inferences involve issues of witness credibility or disputed material fact. Id.

Defendants seek summary judgment on each of Plaintiffs' claims set forth in part III, sections A through C below.

III. DISCUSSION

The purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to provide a federal remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights by authorizing suit against local public officials and governmental entities. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174, 81 S.Ct. 473, 477, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). In order to state a claim under § 1983, the Plaintiffs must prove two elements: (1) deprivation of a federally protected right "secured by the "Constitution and the laws of the United States", and (2) state action taken under color of law. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2750, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1732-33, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978)).

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity, shielding them from damages under § 1983, as long as their conduct could reasonably be thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The standard for determining when an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful action is whether the action was objectively reasonable. Id. (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343-44, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)).

A heightened pleading requirement is imposed on a civil rights plaintiff suing a state actor in his individual capacity. Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir.1985). In order to satisfy the heightened pleading requirement and maintain a § 1983 action against an official who raises a qualified immunity defense, a complaint must allege with particularity all material facts establishing a plaintiff's right of recovery, including "detailed facts supporting the contention that a plea of immunity cannot be sustained." Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1055 (5th Cir.1992), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2989, 120 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (citing Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1482). Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to meet this heightened pleading requirement. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479.

The Fifth Circuit has extended the scope of this heightened pleading requirement beyond suits against state actors in their individual capacities to include all § 1983 actions, including suits against state actors in their official capacity and suits against municipalities. Leatherman, 954 F.2d at 1057-58.

A. Officer Tommy Harrell in his Individual Capacity

Officer Harrell asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims asserted against him in his individual capacity based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.

In Plaintiffs' "First Amending Complaint"¹ Plaintiffs allege illegal search and seizure and false arrest. First Am. Compl. at 3. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that "the description of the premises was so deficient that no reasonable person could have located the premises." They further contend that the search warrant was "negligently and wrongfully executed at plaintiff's residence ... by Agent Tommy Harrell...." In Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs, for the first time, assert that the allegations in Officer Harrell's affidavit were false. Pls.' Mem. Opp'n to Summ. J. at 4.

As to Plaintiffs'...