Richardson v. Planters' Bank Of Farmville

• Decision Date: 10 December 1896
• Citation: 94 Va. 130,26 S.E. 413
• Parties: RICHARDSON. v. PLANTERS' BANK OF FARMVILLE.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

26 S.E. 413

94 Va. 130

RICHARDSON.

v.PLANTERS' BANK OF FARMVILLE.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Dec. 10, 1896.

Jury—Competency of Jurors—Evidence.

1. It is not error to refuse to permit jurors to be asked on their examination whether or not they are indebted to a defendant bank.

2. Parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances surrounding the execution of a receipt sued on, which is ambiguous in its terms, and may be considered in determining what was the real transaction between the parties.

Appeal from circuit court, Prince Edward county.

Action by W. H. Richardson against the Planters' Bank of Farmville. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

W. H. Mann and R. M. Dickinson, for appellant.

J. P. Fitzgerald, A. D. Watkins, and P. W. McKinney, for appellee.

RIELY, J. During the examination into the fitness of the jurors summoned for the case, they were asked by the counsel for the plaintiff if any of them were indebted to the defendant, the Planters' Bank of Farmville. The counsel for the defendant objected to the question, and the court sustained the objection, and refused to permit the question to be answered. This was assigned as error. Confidence in the trial by jury depends upon the purity of the tribunal, and the fairness of its decisions. To secure this, the trial must be by impartial men. Purity of the tribunal is the watchful care of the law, and "it has guarded against the influence of those passions most likely to pervert the judgment of the jurors in deciding upon the conduct and controversies of their fellow men." If the juror does not stand indifferent to the cause, he is not competent. If he has any interest in the cause, or is related to either party, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice, he is excluded by the law.

The last disqualification has been applied in numerous business relations. The partner, or the clerk or other employé, of either of the parties has been held to be incompetent. But we have been cited to no case that has gone so far as to hold that a debtor of the defendant was incompetent. To hold, as a legal presumption, that such relationship would be likely to warp the judgment, would be, in our opinion, to estimate too cheaply integrity under the sanction of an oath.

The foundation of the suit is the following receipt: "Deposited with Planters' Bank of Farmville by W. H. Richardson, for collection: Farmville, Va., 4th March, 1892. Note of A. S. Herndon and B. C. Hazel for the sum of six thousand dollars, dated 15th December, 1890. A. S. Herndon, trustee, has left a note drawn by A. S. Herndon and others for $6,600, which note, if paid, is to be used in payment of note of W. H. Richardson. W. G. V., Cr." The note referred to as having been left by A. S. Herndon, trustee, bore date of January 7, 1892, and was payable six months after date, at the Planters' Bank of Farmville. On July 5, 1892, a few days before it would mature, A. S. Herndon, the payee of the note, withdrew it from the bank and canceled it. The plaintiff contended that the receipt given to him by the bank, which is described above, shows that the note for $6,600 was deposited as collateral security for the note of Herndon and Hazel to him for $6,000, which latter note was placed by him in the bank for collection; that it was the duty of the bank to hold the note for $6,600 until it matured, and, if it is not then paid, to take the necessary steps, by presentment, protest, and notice, to fix the liability of the parties to the note; and that, not having done this, but having, instead, delivered it up to Herndon before maturity, he was thus deprived of a solvent security for his debt of $6,000, and the bank thereby rendered liable to him for the loss he had sustained, which was the amount of his debt. On the trial the defendant propounded a number of questions to the witnesses, for the purpose of proving the circumstances under which the receipt was given, which were permitted by the court to be answered, against the objection of the plaintiff. The ground of the objection was that the receipt constituted a contract between the plaintiff and the bank, which this testimony tended to contradict and vary, and was therefore inadmissible. It is a well-settled and familiar rule that parol, contemporaneous evidence, in the absence of fraud or mistake, is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a valid instrument. Towner v. Lucas' Ex'r, 13 Grat. 705; Woodward v. Foster, 18 Grat. 200; and Allen v. Crank (Va.) 23 S. E. 772. The defendant did not question the rule, but claimed that the evidence it sought to introduce did not violate it. The receipt, upon a fair construction, does not sustain the contention of the...