Richardson v. Prentiss

• Decision Date: 12 April 1882
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: RICHARDSON v. PRENTISS.

11 N.W. 819

48 Mich. 88

RICHARDSON v. PRENTISS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 12, 1882

Where lands are conveyed bounded by a navigable stream or a lake the water will be considered the boundary line, and all the riparian rights incident to the ownership of the shore will pass to the grantee unless clearly reserved.

Deed of land in the village of Alpena, and bordering upon Thunder bay, construed, and held to pass the riparian rights incident to the land conveyed.

Appeal from Alpena.

Turnbull & McDonald, for defendant.

MARSTON J.

The complainant asks equitable relief in the protection of certain riparian rights, which she claims the defendant is encroaching upon.

Semantha Hitchcock, as the owner of certain premises running to Thunder bay, platted a portion thereof in 1866. According to this plat a strip of land two rods wide lying between the lots nearest the waters of the bay and the water line, was reserved.

On the twenty-seventh of September, 1866, she conveyed to complainant lot 5 in block 2 on this plat and this lot extended to the above-mentioned reserve line. Afterwards and in August, 1872, Mrs. Hitchcock conveyed to complainant land in the rear, or towards the water, of lot 5, described as "so much of a reserved strip of land on Thunder bay shore as lies in the rear and adjoining lot No. 5, in block No. 2, in Hitchcock's first addition to the village (now city) of Alpena, to extend no further into the bay than six rods from the rear line of said lot No. 5, reserving to ourselves a strip of land two rods wide, across said six rods hereby conveyed, until second parties shall construct a passage-way beyond and adjoining said six rods hereby conveyed, two rods wide, and keep it open for the free passage of teams, for the use and benefit of first and second parties at all times."

In March, 1879, Semantha Hitchcock made a second plat of property which included this piece of land which was reserved on the first plat, and also laid out lots running into the waters of the bay, with a street beyond, out and in the waters of the bay, and beyond this street. Lot 1, which was wholly in the bay, was designated and extended across the water front of all the lots including the descriptions sold the complainant. After this platting, but the same month Mrs. Hitchcock conveyed this water lot 1, and other lots, to the defendant, who has made improvements thereon, permanent in their character and very valuable, a part of which extends out in front of complainant's property in the shallow waters of the bay.

The questions raised are as to the rights of the respective parties under their conveyances. Under the conveyance to complainant of lot 5, she acquired no riparian rights whatever. This lot was conveyed according to a plat which reserved a strip of land between the lot and the waters of the bay, and a strip two rods wide would as effectually cut off from lot 5 all riparian rights as would a much wider strip.

The second conveyance to complainant gives her this reserved strip with all the rights of a riparian proprietor pertaining thereto, unless such rights are restricted, owing to the peculiar language of the deed of conveyance. What does this deed purport to convey? First, it grants so much of a reserved strip of land on Thunder bay shore as lies in the rear and adjoining lot No. 5 in block No. 2 in Hitchcock's first addition to the village (now city) of Alpena. Secondly, this strip so conveyed, "to extend no further into the bay than six rods from the rear line of said lot No. 5." Thirdly, it reserves "to ourselves a strip of land two rods wide across said six rods here conveyed." Fourthly, and this reservation is to continue, "until second parties shall construct a passage-way beyond and adjoining said six rods here conveyed two rods wide, and keep it open for the passing of teams, for the use and benefit of first and second parties at all times."

The third and fourth clauses, referring to the reservation of a two-rod strip, and the time it is to continue, even if the reservation could be enforced, neither extend nor restrict the operation of the grant, or the extent of complainant's rights as riparian proprietor thereunder. The fourth clause does recognize the right of complainant to construct in the bay, beyond the six rod boundary line, a private way, for the use of both parties. Going back then to the first and second clauses, they grant and convey to the complainant a reserved strip of land in the rear of and adjoining lot 5, extending six rods, and no further, into the bay from the rear of this lot. The general rule is that where lands are conveyed, bounded by a water-course, the grantee holds to the thread of the river, even although such was not the grantor's intention; and a reservation of a right of way, in a grant of land so bounded, upon the bank of the stream, will nor...