Richardson v. Quitman Cnty.

Decision Date17 December 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 4:11–CV–124 (CDL).
Citation912 F.Supp.2d 1354
PartiesDenise RICHARDSON and Calvin Richardson, Plaintiffs, v. QUITMAN COUNTY, GEORGIA, Sheriff Steve Newton, Deputy Corey Mason, Deputy Jamie Ming, and Tammye Atkinson, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joseph Wiley, Jr., Columbus, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Jason C. Waymire, Terry E. Williams, Buford, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

CLAY D. LAND, District Judge.

Upon receiving a tip from a confidential informant that a vehicle being driven by Plaintiff Calvin Richardson (Mr. Richardson) contained illegal drugs, Defendant Corey Mason (Mason), a sergeant with the Georgetown–Quitman County Sheriff's Office, stopped Mr. Richardson's vehicle to conduct an investigatory stop. Plaintiff Denise Richardson (Mrs. Richardson) was a passenger in the vehicle. During the stop, Mr. and Mrs. Richardson were subjected to strip searches that included examination, exposure, and touching of their body parts and cavities. The invasive body searches yielded no contraband, but they have produced this lawsuit.1

Claiming that the searches, investigatory stop, and their ultimate arrests violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, Plaintiffs have sued the persons who participated in the stop, searches, and arrests in their official and individual capacities, the Georgetown–Quitman County Sheriff in his official and individual capacity, and Quitman County.2 They seek damages for the constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“ § 1983”) and also assert various state law claims. Defendants have filed a Joint Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26) as to all of Plaintiffs' claims except for claims against Mason based on the manner of Mr. Richardson's strip search and Mr. Richardson's false arrest. Defendants assert immunity defenses as to Plaintiffs' official capacity claims, and they also contend that Georgetown–Quitman County cannot be liable for the additional reason that it had no policy or custom that contributed to the alleged constitutional violations. Defendants in their individual capacities assert the defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23) on their Fourth Amendment claims. As discussed below, the Court finds that Mason is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Mrs. Richardson's Fourth Amendment strip search claim against him in his individual capacity, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied as to that claim only. Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment is otherwise granted.3 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. As a result, the claims remaining for trial are Mrs. Richardson's Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Mason, Mr. Richardson's Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Mason, and Mr. Richardson's Fourth Amendment and state law false arrest claims against Mason.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs for purposes of deciding Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the record reveals the following.

On August 24, 2009, Mason, a sergeant with the Georgetown–Quitman County Sheriff's Office, received a call from a confidential informant reporting that a person named Calvin had just obtained cocaine in the “bluff” area of Eufaula, Alabama, an area known for drug activity, and would be driving in a cream-colored Lincoln with a female over the bridge into Georgetown, Georgia. Mason Dep. 35:5–36:25, ECF No. 51–2; D. Richardson Dep. 106:3–24, ECF No. 30 4 (agreeing that as a resident living up the street from the “bluff,” she had heard “there was drug activity in that area”). Mason knew the informant, having previously recovered drugs and made an arrest based on information he supplied. Mason Dep. 35:9–13. The informant informed Mason that if the cocaine was not in the car, it would be in the possession of one of the vehicle's occupants. He also mentioned that Calvin was known to conceal cocaine in his buttocks. Id. at 52:13–25. Mason did not inquire further about the informant's basis for giving this last detail, id. at 53:1–18, nor did Mason receive any information about the unidentified female passenger and her involvement in the alleged illegal activity.

I. The Investigatory Stop

When Mason saw a vehicle fitting the informant's description, id. 40:1–41:2, he informed fellow deputy sheriff Defendant Jamie Ming (Ming) over the radio that he intended to stop the vehicle. Ming Dep. 10:24–11:12, ECF No. 51–7. Mason explained to Ming that a confidential informant reported that the vehicle's occupants had obtained cocaine from the “bluff” area in Eufaula. Id. at 12:24–13:5. Mason alerted the vehicle to pull over using his blue lights, and the vehicle stopped at the Liberty Gas Station in Georgetown. Mason Dep. 41:10–13. Ming pulled in behind them in his vehicle to assist Mason with the stop.5 Ming Dep. 12:7–11. Mason was Ming's supervisor, and Ming had been a law enforcement officer for only a short time. Id. at 92:3–5, 92:21–93:2.

Mason first asked the driver, Mr. Richardson, for his driver's license, but Mr. Richardson informed Mason that he did not have a license because it was expired. C. Richardson Dep. 51:23–52:5, ECF No. 32.6 Mr. Richardson voluntarily relinquished a knife in his possession to Ming. Ming Dep. 18:9–12. According to Mr. Richardson, Mason patted him down. C. Richardson Dep. 60:22–61:17. Mason also asked Mr. Richardson to empty the contents of his pockets, and Mr. Richardson did so. Mason Dep. 51:11–16; C. Richardson Dep. at 60:25–61:9. Mason then conducted a search of Plaintiffs' vehicle. Mason Dep. 47:17–22. Mason describes his initial search of the vehicle as a cursory search. Mason Dep. 101:6–12. Plaintiffs contend that Mason searched the vehicle twice when he first made the stop and that Ming participated in searching the car. Ming Dep. 24:4–13; D. Richardson Dep. 139:4–141:4. Also, Ming stood with Mr. Richardson as Mason asked Mrs. Richardson questions. D. Richardson Dep. 130:3–9.

II. The Alleged Strip and Cavity Searches

Mason decided to search Plaintiffs for drugs. He suspected that they had concealed drugs on their bodies in areas where they could not be seen from a visual inspection of their outer clothing. Mason, who had been a law enforcement officer since 1995, had worked as a narcotics officer in Enterprise, Alabama before joining the Georgetown–Quitman County Sheriff's Office. Mason Dep. at 8:23–9:1, 10:6–17, 54:19. Based on his experience, Mason knew that the buttocks and scrotum areas were common places for a male to conceal drugs and that the chest and vaginal areas were common places for a female to conceal drugs. Id. at 53:10–18. Therefore, he decided to search these areas for the drugs.

Because no female deputy was available to search Mrs. Richardson, Mason called Defendant Tammye Atkinson (Atkinson), a female licensed paramedic, for assistance. Id. at 79:25–80:14, 85:7–13. Atkinson was also the director of the Georgetown–Quitman County Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Defs.' Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, Atkinson Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 26–1; Atkinson Dep. 8:9–14, ECF No. 51–9. Atkinson had experience searching people's pockets and looking beneath people's clothing in the course of providing medical treatment. Atkinson Decl. ¶ 3; Atkinson Dep. 16:1–15. Mason explained to Atkinson that he was conducting a drug investigation and needed her help searching a female who could possibly have drugs on her person. Atkinson Dep. 12:6–11, 27:20–23; Mason Dep. 86:10–13, 87:15–88:2. This was the only time Mason had ever asked Atkinson to assist in searching a suspect. Mason Dep. 80:15–17, 86:14–18; Atkinson Dep. 13:19–24.

Atkinson arrived in an EMS vehicle. Mason directed Atkinson to check whether Mrs. Richardson had drugs underneath her clothing. Mason Dep. 88:25–89:10; Atkinson Dep. 16:24–17:1. According to Mrs. Richardson, Mason referred to Atkinson as “his officer.” D. Richardson Dep. 161:8–11. Atkinson told Mason there was a restroom inside the convenience store, so Mason and Atkinson walked Mrs. Richardson to the restroom. Id. at 161:12–14, 162:5–7. Mason told Atkinson to make sure nothing was flushed down the toilet. Atkinson Dep. 19:16–17. Mrs. Richardson went into the restroom first, and then Atkinson walked in and shut the door. Id. at 20:1–4, 14–16. No one else was in the small, fully-enclosed, single restroom. According to Mrs. Richardson, Atkinson wore medical gloves and searched her vagina and rectum for drugs by probing them with a single finger for two seconds or less.7 D. Richardson Dep. 185:20–186:5, 186:17–187:21. Mrs. Richardson also claims that Atkinson felt for drugs under her shirt beneath her breasts for about ten to fifteen seconds without removing her bra.8 D. Richardson Dep. 184:1–21. Including about a minute to arrange clothing, Mrs. Richardson and Atkinson were in the restroom for about five minutes total. Mrs. Richardson was crying during this time. Atkinson Dep. 23:23–24:4. Mrs. Richardson acknowledges that Atkinson came across as kind and caring. D. Richardson Dep. 189:5–11.

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