Richardson v. Salaam
| Decision Date | 19 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 54A05-9903-CV-120.,54A05-9903-CV-120. |
| Citation | 726 N.E.2d 888 |
| Parties | Charles RICHARDSON and Judith Hightower Richardson, and Greta A. Harris, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Nasir Raghib SALAAM and Howard Transport, Inc., Commissioners of Montgomery County and Indiana Department of Highways, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
James E. Ayers, Wernle, Ristine & Ayers, Crawfordsville, Indiana, Attorney for Appellants.
James S. Stephenson, Stephenson, Daly, Morrow & Kurnik, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellee Montgomery County.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Timothy W. Beam, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee/Cross Appellant Indiana Department of Transportation.
Greta Harris and Charles and Judith Richardson appeal the trial court's summary judgment denying their negligence claims against the Indiana Department of Transportation and Montgomery County. The Department of Transportation cross-appeals the portion of the trial court's judgment rejecting its immunity defense.
The parties present the following issues,1 which we restate:
I. Whether the superceding cause doctrine relieves the defendants of liability as a matter of law.
II. Whether the State is immune from suit according to section 10 of the Indiana Tort Claims Act, IC XX-XX-X-X(10).
We reverse.
This case stems from a highway collision between a semi tractor-trailer and a car driven by Jason Richardson, a high school student. The case first came before this court in 1995, on plaintiffs' appeal from the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Montgomery County. We reversed the summary judgment because of factual issues about whether the County breached its duty of care in the design, construction, and maintenance of the county road intersecting the highway. Richardson v. Salaam, 653 N.E.2d 136 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. Judge Hoffman dissented, maintaining that summary judgment should be granted for the County due to the intervening negligence of the semi driver.
The underlying facts are: In April 1991, Nasir Salaam was driving a semi loaded with steel on a county road toward a stop sign at a highway intersection. Richardson was approaching the same intersection on the highway. Salaam did not stop at the sign, and Richardson collided with the semi's rear axle. The semi crushed Richardson's car, dragged it across the intersection, and pulled it fifty feet up Shiloh Hill, killing Richardson and injuring his passenger, Greta Harris. An eyewitness stated that when the semi ran through the stop sign, it was traveling about fifty miles per hour. The plaintiffs contend that the State and County are liable for the accident because of the unworkable design of the intersection. According to the plaintiffs, the intersection design forced the semi driver to run the stop sign in order to have sufficient speed to climb Shiloh Hill. The plaintiffs further contend that the State was negligent in issuing a construction permit to the County without obtaining information regarding Shiloh Hill's steep grade.
The State and the County filed summary judgment motions regarding the plaintiffs' claims, contending that: (1) they are immune from the plaintiffs' suit, and (2) the intervening negligence of the semi driver broke any chain of causation linking the plaintiffs' injuries to the design of the intersection. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants on the ground that the semi driver's failure to stop was a superseding cause of the accident. The summary judgment order also stated, however, that neither the State nor the County were immune from suit.
In a summary judgment appeal, this court applies the same standard as the trial court. Wickey v. Sparks, 642 N.E.2d 262, 265 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. Accordingly, this court examines the designated evidence, determines whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and decides whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).
The plaintiffs contend the trial court erred when it found that the semi driver's conduct was a superceding cause of the accident. First, the plaintiffs argue that the superceding cause doctrine which has been subsumed by the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, IC XX-XX-X-X to -19, as to non-governmental defendants should be subsumed regarding governmental defendants, as well. Next, the plaintiffs argue that even if the superceding cause doctrine is viable with regard to governmental entities, application of the doctrine is a jury question that cannot be decided on summary judgment. According to the plaintiffs, there is a factual dispute in this case about whether the intersection design caused the semi driver to run the stop sign. That dispute, the plaintiffs argue, must be decided by a jury.
In response, the defendants point out that the Comparative Fault Act does not apply to governmental entities, citing IC XX-XX-X-X. As such, the defendants continue, the plaintiffs' claims are governed by common law principles, including the superceding cause doctrine. The defendants acknowledge that superceding cause is ordinarily a jury question, but argue that in this case the uncontested facts indicate that the semi driver's failure to stop was a superceding cause.
The plaintiffs recognize that the Comparative Fault Act does not apply to the governmental defendants. See Sauders v. Steuben County, 693 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind.1998). The plaintiffs argue, however, that this court should apply comparative fault principles in this case so as to render the superceding cause doctrine inoperable. The plaintiffs rely upon dicta in Sauders in which our supreme court stated that appellate courts are free to adopt comparative fault doctrines as a matter of the common law of this state even in areas where the legislature did not apply the Comparative Fault Act. Id. at 20.
In Sauders, the court did not state the comparative fault doctrines to which it referred, and we are unable to discern any such doctrines short of the wholesale inclusion of governmental entities into our comparative fault system of loss allocation. While we acknowledge that there may be strong policy reasons in favor of such inclusion,2 we also acknowledge that there may be equally strong policy considerations against such inclusion.3 Here, however, the plaintiffs fail to make a sufficient case for the inclusion of governmental entities in our comparative fault system. The Record is void of any constitutional challenge, or legal or evidentiary basis upon which to predicate the extension of comparative fault to governmental entities. While we may have the freedom to adopt comparative fault, we do not have the license to do so in the absence of a sufficient basis other than our own conceptions of what would be good policy. We therefore decline to apply comparative fault principles in this case.
To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the injuries. Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). When the causation evidence demonstrates that something has intervened between the defendant's alleged negligence and the plaintiff's injuries, the case presents a superceding cause issue. We have described the superceding cause doctrine as follows:
"Under common law, independent intervening conduct precludes the original wrongdoer's liability when the later conduct constitutes a cause interrupting the natural sequence of events, turning aside their course, preventing the natural and probable result of the original act or omission, and producing a result that could not have been reasonably anticipated."
L.K.I Holdings, Inc. v. Tyner, 658 N.E.2d 111, 119 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (). Thus, to constitute an intervening cause sufficient to preclude the original wrongdoer's liability the intervening conduct must be an independent act which interrupts the natural consequence of the events.
Here, the conduct of the semi driver is neither independent of the governmental defendants' allegedly negligent design, nor does it interrupt the consequences of the alleged design defect. Rather, the conduct of the semi driver in proceeding through the stop sign is the very act which plaintiffs allege is the natural consequence of defendants' negligence. Thus, this case does not present an issue of intervening cause at all. Rather, the issue presented is whether the plaintiffs' losses were proximately caused by the defendants' negligence.
The plaintiffs' expert testified that semi drivers run the stop sign at the intersection in order to maintain the speed required to traverse Shiloh Hill:
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