Richardson v. Savage
| Decision Date | 17 December 1937 |
| Docket Number | 89-1937 |
| Citation | 129 Pa.Super. 235,195 A. 629 |
| Parties | Richardson et al. v. Savage et al., Appellants |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Argued September 29, 1937
Appeal from judgment of C. P. No. 2, Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1936, No 303, in case of Charles D. Richardson et al. v. Anna M Savage et al.
Ejectment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
Judgment entered for plaintiffs for want of a sufficient answer opinion by Lewis, J. Defendants appealed.
Error assigned was action of lower court in making absolute the rule for judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
James H. McHale, of McHale, Briddes & Matthews, for appellants.
James W. McLea, with him Maxwell H. Kratz, of Kratz & McLea, for appellees.
Before Keller, P. J., Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Parker, James and Rhodes, JJ.
This is an action in ejectment in which the defendants have appealed from a judgment entered on the pleadings for want of a sufficient answer.
James M. Richardson and Mary, his wife, became the owners by entirety of the land in question, by deed, dated June 20, 1921. James Richardson died March 17, 1933 and his wife died, intestate, on July 19, 1935, without having remarried, leaving to survive her two sons, plaintiffs herein, who filed a declaration and abstract of title showing their legal title as heirs-at-law of their deceased mother. Defendants' answer avers that James M. Richardson and his wife, together with defendants, lived on the premises in question for seven years before his death; that after his death, his wife and defendants continued to reside on the premises. The answer further avers that Mary Richardson, during the last several years of her life, was paralyzed in both legs and was without means of support with the exception of the premises in question; and that subsequent to the death of James M. Richardson, plaintiffs entered into an oral agreement with defendants whereby they promised that if defendants would put forth whatever sums were necessary for the maintenance and care of plaintiffs' mother, they would give defendants, upon her death, the house which she owned; and that they would reimburse defendants for any sums necessary for the upkeep of the property. It was also averred that on various occasions the parties discussed the payment of bills for repairs, taxes, insurance, sickroom equipment, doctor's services, and the mother's funeral expenses; that on each occasion the plaintiffs repeated their request that defendants pay the bills and they would be reimbursed by them; and that in pursuance of this arrangement, defendants kept, boarded and nursed Mary Richardson until her death and expended $ 1,458.77 -- of which sum, $ 189.53 was for expenses incident to the upkeep of the property -- and were reimbursed in the amount of $ 764.77, being moneys received from cash in the bank and the proceeds from three insurance policies. Defendants assert that they have been in possession of the premises since the death of plaintiffs' mother; that no rent has been paid by them; and that no demand for possession or rent was made until October, 1936, after they had demanded payment of the balance of moneys expended by them.
: Hart v. Carroll, 85 Pa. 508, 510; Wright v. Nulton, 219 Pa. 253, 256, 68 A. 707; Rader v. Keiper, 285 Pa. 579, 132 A. 824; Morrish v. Price, 293 Pa. 169, 142 A. 137; Jordan v. Jordan, 93 Pa.Super. 519; Estate of Lena Hartzell, 114 Pa.Super. 190, 173 A. 842; Byrne's Estate, 122 Pa.Super. 413, 186 A. 187. Defendants' answer does not aver that they took possession in pursuance of the contract at or immediately after it was made. It appears rather that they had lived in the home with its owners or owner for several years before the alleged contract was made. Nor was their possession exclusive after the contract was made, since the real owner continued to reside with them in the home until her death. These elements are essential to their case. Nor does the answer sufficiently aver that possession was accompanied by such improvements as cannot adequately be compensated in damages. The answer avers that whatever expenditures defendants made for improvements or repairs were to be repaid by plaintiffs; but it also appears that the moneys already received by defendants are in excess of such expenditures. This averment seems to bear no relation to the parol agreement for the premises, but indicates rather that the expenditures were based upon the promise of repayment by the plaintiffs. For the sums expended and the personal services rendered to the mother, separate action for the value thereof may be available.
In addition to the obstacles, we have above detailed, the defendants are faced with a factual situation unlike any of the cases that have been...
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