Richardson v. Secretary of Labor, 81-3060

• Decision Date: 01 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-3060,81-3060
• Citation: 689 F.2d 632
• Parties: Kenny RICHARDSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR; Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 632

689 F.2d 632

Kenny RICHARDSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR; Mine Safety and Health Review

Commission, Respondent.

No. 81-3060.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 23, 1982.

Decided Oct. 1, 1982.

Rees Kinney, Jarvis, Payton & Kinney, Greenville, Ky., for petitioner.

Mine Safety & Health Review Comm., Washington, D. C., Thomas A. Mascolino, Dept. of Labor, Arlington, Va., Michael A. McCord, Debra L. Feuer, Linda Leasure, for respondent.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Circuit Judge, CONTIE, Circuit Judge, and ENSLEN ^*, District Judge.

CONTIE, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the findings of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. Petitioner Richardson is a master mechanic employed by Peabody Coal Company at their Sinclair Mine; his primary duty is to supervise repair of the mine's strip-mining equipment.

In August of 1977, the boom of the mine's dragline fell while it was being repaired; one worker was killed. An investigation of the accident led the Secretary of Labor to file a petition for assessment of civil penalty against Richardson pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 819(c). ¹ A hearing was held before an administrative law judge. The ALJ found that Richardson had knowingly violated a mandatory safety standard, and assessed him a fine of $500.00. Richardson filed a petition for discretionary review before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission affirmed the decision of the ALJ.

Title 30 U.S.C. § 819 provides for civil penalties, in subsections (a) and (b), against a mine operator who violates a mandatory health or safety standard under the Act and, in subsection (c), against any director, officer, or agent of a corporate operator, who knowingly authorizes, orders or carries out such violation.

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of § 819(c), arguing that the distinction between agents of corporate operators and agents of non-corporate operators violates the equal protection guarantee contained in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. ² He contends that insofar as his liability hinges solely upon the business organization of his employer, the statute is arbitrary and capricious. The Court does not agree.

A federal statute dealing with economic regulation comes to the court with a presumption of constitutionality. Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). In areas of economic regulation, the courts have consistently deferred to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, its constitutionality is presumed and the challenged classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Id.

The purpose of the Federal Coal Mines Health & Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., is to increase the health and safety of the mining industry's "most precious resource-the miner," by requiring inter alia that every operator and miner comply with federally promulgated health and safety standards. 30 U.S.C. § 801. To this end, the Act imposes personal liability on mine operators for violations of the federal standards.

The legislative intent behind subsection 819(c) was to assure that the decision-makers responsible for illegal acts of corporate operators would also be held personally liable for violations. S.Rep. No. 411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1969). In a practical sense, any non-corporate mining operation is going to be relatively small, and the probability is that the decision-maker is going to fit the statutory definition of "operator." In a larger, corporate structure, the decision-maker may have authority over only a part of the mining operation. Subsection 819(c) assures that this makes him no less liable for his actions.

In a noncorporate structure, the sole proprietor or partners are personally liable as "operators" for violations; they cannot pass off these penalties as a cost of doing business as a corporation can. Therefore, the noncorporate operator has a greater incentive to make certain that his employees do not violate mandatory health or safety standards than does the corporate operator. Subsection 819(c) attempts to correct this imbalance by giving the corporate employee a direct incentive to comply with the Act. See Cowin & Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission, 612 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1979).

The congressional intent behind § 819(c), to hold an additional group of decision-makers personally liable, is rationally related to the purpose of the Act-the enhanced safety of the mine worker.

The failure to include agents of non-corporate operators does not make the classification arbitrary and capricious. The underinclusiveness of a legislative classification will not alone render it unconstitutional. The legislature may act to remedy part of a problem only. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949). The legislature may even "select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 220, 98 S.Ct. 1024, 1028, 55 L.Ed.2d 225 (1978), quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). As noted above, Congress may have thought that the imposition of personal liability on corporate agents would do much to further mine safety while the imposition of liability on noncorporate agents would do less, and consequently have decided to attack one problem and ignore the other. Because the classification is rationally related to the ends of the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 819(c) does not violate the federal guarantee of equal protection.

The findings of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission are affirmed.

ENSLEN, District Judge, dissenting:

As the following passage makes clear, Congress intended to protect the health and safety of a precious national resource, the miner, when it enacted the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. ¹ It is equally obvious that Congress intended the protections to apply to all miners whether they were employed by corporations, partnerships, or sole proprietorships. 30 USC § 801 states:

Congressional findings and declaration of purpose

Congress declares that-

(a) the first priority and concern of all in the coal or other mining industry must be the...