Richardson v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 06 December 1895
• Citation: Richardson v. Simpson, 82 Md. 155, 33 A. 457 (Md. 1895)
• Parties: RICHARDSON v. SIMPSON.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

33 A. 457

82 Md. 155

RICHARDSON v. SIMPSON.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 6, 1895

Appeal from circuit court, Prince George's county.

Bill by Robert L. Simpson against George W. Richardson, Jr., to set aside a tax sale.There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.Affirmed.

Argued before ROBINSON, C.J., and BRISCOE, BRYAN, BOYD, FOWLER, and McSHERRY, JJ.

C. C Magruder and Jos. S. Wilson, for appellant.

J. J Johnson, Marion Duckett, and Elbert Dent, for appellee.

McSHERRY J.

A tract of land called "Three Brothers," and containing 103 acres, lying in Prince George's county, was conveyed by Samuel T. Suit and others to Milton L. Howser, in March 1879, and four days afterwards was reconveyed by Howser to Suit, by way of mortgage, to secure the payment of $2,250.Howser caused the tract to be surveyed, and subdivided into six lots, and had the survey and plat recorded in 1880, among the land records of the county.Lots 1, 2, and 3 appear to have been conveyed to Ellen E. Bruce, and were transferred to her on the assessment books of the county.The title to the residue of Three Brothers, by some means not clearly disclosed in the record, was again acquired by Suit, who afterwards died.In March, 1890, 25 acres of this residue were conveyed by Suit's executrix to one Werck, for the sum of $875; and, in December following, the remainder comprising about 38 1/2 acres, was conveyed by Suit's executrix to the appellee, Simpson, for the consideration of $1,330.The whole tract of 103 acres was assessed in the name of Howser, and stood thus, long after he had ceased to own any part of it.In May, 1891, to enforce the payment of the taxes for 1890, which amounted to $8.73, and which were then due and in arrear, subdivisions 4, 5, and 6, belonging, under the conveyances mentioned above, to Werck and Simpson, and aggregating about 63 acres, were sold by the tax collector, after he had first advertised the sale for the period of time prescribed by law.In the advertisement the collector described the land as follows: "M. L. Howser, a tract of land called the 'Three Brothers,' containing sixty-four and eighteen one-hundredth acres, more or less.For further description, see deed recorded in Liber A.T. B., No. 1, folio 154.State and county taxes for year 1890, $8.73."At the tax sale, the 63 or 64 acres were purchased by the appellant, Richardson, for the sum of $35, or a fraction over 55 cents an acre.Simpson unquestionably never knew of this sale until after the expiration of the time allowed for a redemption of the property, nor until after Richardson had received a deed for the land from the collector.Simpson then offered to redeem the land, and to repay the purchaser all his outlay, with the penalty fixed by the statute added, and whatever after-imposed taxes Richardson had paid; but the latter refused to surrender his claim to the property under the collector's deed, unless upon the payment of a considerable sum of money.Thereupon a bill was filed by Simpson in the circuit court for Prince George's county, against Richardson, alleging that the tax sale was irregular and void, and praying that the tax collector's deed might be canceled and set aside.Richardson answered.Testimony was taken, and the court below passed a decree granting the relief prayed.From that decree, this appeal has been taken.There are several alleged irregularities relied on to defeat the sale attacked in this proceeding; but, as one of these presents a fatal objection, it will not be necessary to consider or to discuss the others.

Under the provisions of section 52, art. 81, of the Code, the final ratification of a tax collector's sale by the circuit court is prima facie evidence of the regularity of the antecedent proceedings, but it has no greater or other efficacy.It seems merely to relieve the purchaser of the onus of proof, and to cast the burden of showing the illegality of the proceedings upon the party resisting the sale.Until such proof is offered by the assailing party, the sale, if ratified and confirmed, stands good and effective, by operation of the statute.Guisebert v. Etchison,51 Md. 478;Steuart v. Meyer,54 Md. 454;Cooper v. Holmes,71 Md. 26, 17 A. 711.While the burden of proof is thus shifted, still the validity of the sale depends on there having been a substantial compliance on the part of the collector with all the essential requirements of the statute.This is in no manner dispensed with.With the burden thus cast upon him, the appellee, who is owner of the property which was sold as the property of some one else, insists, and in the court below successfully maintained, that there was no sufficient description of the property given by the collector in the advertisement of sale to gratify the requirements of the law.He claims that the advertisement was vague, misleading, and indefinite; and that it failed to designate the property intended to be sold with an accuracy or certainty that identified it.If this contention be well founded, then the decree appealed from was right, and must be affirmed.

It cannot be seriously doubted that under a summary proceeding where a special power has been executed, and the land of one person has been levied upon and sold to pay taxes assessed against another, the failure of the officer to give a proper notice of the sale, or his omission to advertise a sufficient description of the property intended to be sold, will deprive him of authority and jurisdiction to proceed at all, and will invalidate the deed which he subsequently makes, even though the sale may have been ratified by the court; and especially is this true if the insufficient or indefinite description has arisen from, or can be traced to, the neglect of public officials, whose duty it is to properly keep the records of persons chargeable with taxes, and to levy the tax accordingly.The chief, if not the only, objects in giving notice of tax sales by public advertisement, are: First, to apprise the owner of property intended to be sold that a proceeding is pending which, unless arrested by the payment of the tax, will divest him of his property; and, secondly, to apprise persons desirous of purchasing, so they may know the particular property to be sold.If both or if either of these objects be defeated by the form of the advertisement, or by the description which it gives of the property, then, obviously, the designs of the law in requiring public notice to be given have not been subserved; the proceeding is irregular; and the sale, if made, will be void.Ronkendorff v. Taylor's Lessee, 4 Pet....