Richardson v. State

Decision Date10 December 1886
PartiesRICHARDSON v. STATE.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from circuit court, Baltimore county.

Indictment for libel. Defendant appeals.

James A. C. Bond, for appellant.

N Charles Burke and Charles B. Roberts, Atty Gen., for appellee.

IRVING J.

The appellant was indicted for libel in the circuit court for Baltimore county, and was found guilty. At the trial an exception was taken to the exclusion of certain evidence offered in defense, which was made the basis of this appeal; and, properly speaking, the correctness of the court's ruling on the evidence is the only question legitimately before us. But, by agreement of the counsel of the state and defense, the ruling of the court below on the demurrer to the indictment, whereby the same was overruled, this court was to be asked to pass upon. That question is not regularly before us, and could not be except on writ of error after final judgment in the cause, which has not yet been rendered; the same having been suspended, under the statute, until the determination of the appeal. In this instance we will pass on the question raised by the demurrer, in deference to the wishes of the respective counsel, and to save the necessity of a writ of error after final sentence. The practice pursued in this case by the state, in consenting to request the hearing of the question raised by the demurrer irregularly, cannot be commended, and ought to be discountenanced. Therefore our decision of the question must not be taken as a precedent to be quoted, or indication that we will hereafter pass on a like question, similarly presented, after this expression of our disapproval of the practice.

The indictment charges Hon. David Fowler to be a judge of the circuit court for Baltimore county before and at the time of the composing and publication of the "scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel," and at the finding; and that the defendant, "well knowing the premises aforesaid, unlawfully and maliciously desiring and intending to bring the administration of justice by the said Fowler, as judge as aforesaid in the circuit court for Baltimore county, into hatred and contempt among the citizens of Baltimore county and state of Maryland, and to traduce, defame, and vilify the said David Fowler, judge as aforesaid, on the nineteenth day of August, in the year of our Lord 1886, at Baltimore county aforesaid, unlawfully, falsely, and maliciously did compose, print, and publish, and cause and procure to be composed, printed, and published, a certain false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel of and concerning the said David Fowler, judge as aforesaid, and of and concerning the administration of justice by the said David Fowler, judge as aforesaid, in the circuit court for Baltimore county, containing therein, among other things, certain false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words and matter of and concerning the administration of justice by the said David Fowler, judge as aforesaid, in the circuit court for Baltimore county, which said libel is as follows; that is to say: 'He [meaning thereby the Honorable David Fowler, judge as aforesaid] has violated the state constitution, and is disqualified; he is liable to impeachment and to indictment,'--to the great scandal and disgrace of the administration of justice in Baltimore county, and in contempt of the state of Maryland and its laws, and to the evil example of all others in like case offending, and against the peace, government, and dignity of the state."

In support of the demurrer it is contended, by the traverser's counsel, that the gravamen of this indictment is that, by the alleged libelous publication, the administration of justice is brought into contempt. Treating it as nothing but a libel upon judicial proceedings, the argument is that the indictment does not set forth with sufficient particularity in what regard the administration of justice was held up to contempt; that it does not set out the place where justice was being administered, nor the case in which Judge Fowler was acting, nor the subject-matter of the suit, including the parties litigant. All these things, it is contended, should have been particularly stated, in order to put the traverser upon notice of what he was called on to defend, and in order to show that the language used may not be susceptible of another meaning than that ascribed to it. In especial support of the view that the prosecution is wholly for libeling judicial proceedings, reliance is placed on the conclusion of the indictment, which, in addition to the common-law conclusion, also adds, "to the scandal and disgrace of the administration of justice in Baltimore county," and omits to charge that it was to the scandal of Judge Fowler, as is usual in the forms of such indictments. Without the conclusion that it is to the great damage and scandal of Judge Fowler, it is contended it is not a good common-law indictment for libeling him.

If this indictment was nothing more than what the traverser's counsel contends that it is, there would be much force in the exceptions to its sufficiency; but as we do not think the indictment is, or was intended to be, what the counsel contends, the objections are not so impressive. It distinctly charges Judge Fowler to be a judge of the circuit court for Baltimore county, and alleges that the publication charged to be libelous was intended to traduce, defame, and vilify him as such judge. It holds him up, as such judge, to contempt and scorn, by charging him to be guilty of something which would justify his impeachment and indictment. By this vilification of a judge who administers justice in Baltimore county, it further alleges that scandal is thrown upon the administration of justice through him. The theory of this indictment is that the libel is against Judge Fowler in his official character and capacity, for the purpose of injuring him in that official station, in the esteem of the public, and that thereby the general administration of justice by him has been scandalized. The official position of Judge Fowler is only alleged, and the scandal upon the administration of justice in consequence thereof is only inserted by way of aggravation of the offense.

In 2 Bish. Crim. Law, 923, libels against official persons are said to be especially reprehensible. In 6 Bac. Abr. tit. "Libel," 339, we find this statement of the law: "Words, though not scandalous in themselves, yet if put in writing and published, and tending in any degree to the discredit of a man, are libelous when they defame a private person only, or persons in public capacity; in which latter case they are said to receive an aggravation, as they tend to scandalize the government by reflections on those who are intrusted with the administration of public affairs." Lord Hale, in his Pleas of the Crown, (page 168,) says: "An indictment is nothing more than a plain, brief narrative of an offense committed by any person, and the necessary circumstances that concur to ascertain its fact and nature."

The offense here charged is libel, and the question is, are the "necessary circumstances" mentioned in this statement by Lord Hale found in this indictment, so that it is sufficient to warrant a judgment thereon? All authorities agree that any written words are libelous...

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