Richardson v. State

Citation437 So.2d 1091
Decision Date01 September 1983
Docket NumberNo. 61924,61924
PartiesRobert C. RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Steven L. Bolotin, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Richard A. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

SHAW, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from a judgment adjudging defendant guilty of first-degree murder and a sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm the conviction but vacate the death sentence and remand for resentencing.

Appellant Robert C. Richardson was charged by indictment with first-degree murder and burglary. A trial was held on August 18-21, 1981, before Circuit Judge Charles E. Miner. The jury was unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. On October 13, 1981, a second trial was commenced before Judge George L. Harper, and the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts. Subsequent to the guilty verdicts, it was discovered and disclosed to the judge that one juror was a distant relative of appellant's ex-wife and that two of the jurors had gone to the scene where the crimes occurred following the conclusion of the guilt trial. A new jury was impaneled, without objection, to hear the penalty phase of the trial. After hearing testimony and argument, the jury returned a recommendation that appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. The trial judge adjudicated the appellant guilty of first-degree murder and burglary, overrode the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, and sentenced the appellant to death for murder with a consecutive life sentence for the burglary.

The following facts bear on the issues before us. Willie Gary, Jr., testified that he had known appellant for a number of years. Gary testified that he was helping Shack Gardner at the latter's garage on the morning of the murder when he saw appellant talking with the murder victim in the victim's yard. Gardner's garage is across the street, approximately forty yards, from the murder scene. Four other witnesses testified they were at a home adjacent to the murder homesite and saw and talked with appellant there on the morning of the murder. They also corroborated Gary's testimony that appellant and the victim were talking together the morning of the murder and that appellant was wearing a work uniform comprised of dark blue pants and a light blue shirt.

Later in the morning Gary heard loud noises coming from the victim's home, which he mentioned to Gardner. Gardner attributed the noise to someone moving furniture and left the garage on an errand. Gary testified he heard more loud "bamming" noises coming from the house and saw appellant leave the house, carrying a yellow blanket covered with blood. Gary testified that appellant returned to the house after five to ten minutes and reentered, carrying what appeared to be two wooden objects, that there were more loud "bamming" noises, and that appellant left the scene covered with blood.

There was testimony from crime scene investigators that there was evidence of a forced entry into the house and a great deal of blood splattered on the walls and floor. The medical examiner testified that the victim died from massive head injuries with multiple fractures caused by a large instrument wielded with great force. Also present were wounds probably caused by a cutting instrument of some kind. The victim's grandson, who lived in the house, testified that various items of value were missing from the house and that the house had been in order when he left that morning. A fence-post type of object was found in the house; the medical examiner testified that an object of that type could have been used to cause some of the injuries and the grandson testified that object was not in the home when he left that morning.

Appellant first urges that his conviction should be reversed because of the admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony by one of the four witnesses who testified to appellant's presence adjacent to and on the murder scene during the morning of the murder. The testimony from Mamie Franklin, an elderly woman, was as follows:

Q All right. Now, what happened when he came up to Ruby's house? What was that about?

A Yes. He sat on the steps and Ruby and I were planting some flowers, putting them in the pot. And I had a flower in the pot and I was standing up and he was sitting on the steps. And he asked me could he carry my flower home. And I told him no, I didn't want him to carry my flower home, I could take it.

So, he said again, "Aw, Ms. Mamie, let me carry your flower home."

I say, "Stop being hard-headed. I can carry my flower home." I said, "When anybody tell you no, they mean no." That's the way I spoke it to him.

So, after then, he jumped up on the steps and he turned towards me and he shook his private at me. So, I told Ruby then, I said, "Ruby, I'm going home." I don't know what happened here, because this is the first time he ever did anything like that, got out of his place with me. All he did was spoke to me and went on.

Q Now, my question to you then was that behavior--was Robert Clarence Richardson acting different that morning than he has acted when you have seen him in the past?

MS. COCHEU: Objection, Your Honor. May we approach the bench?

(Whereupon, the following bench conference was had with the court reporter present.)

MS. COCHEU: Your Honor, I think Mr. Meggs is going to try and get Ms. Franklin to say something that is very irrelevant and inflammatory concerning something Mr. Richardson might have said and done. And I don't think it's appropriate. And I think it's only intended to inflame the jury. And I would object to this being said in front of the jury.

MR. MEGGS: Judge, I'm just asking was he acting any different before.

THE COURT: Well, that question can be allowed. I don't know what you're talking about.

MR. RICHMOND: Acting any different is too general.

MR. MEGGS: I can't hear you, Hal, I'm sorry.

MR. RICHMOND: Just asking a question, was he acting any different, his common bad character or otherwise, it's an improper comment at this time. His character has not been proven an issue before this jury. Now, we can go ahead and let it--

MR. MEGGS: I'm not asking how he--I was just asking was he different that morning.

MR. RICHMOND: He has already asked and gotten in through the witness the fact that he shook his private at her, which I move to strike that as being highly prejudicial and having nothing to do--it's not within the res gestae of this crime and it's just done to show prejudice against this Defendant.

THE COURT: I will let you ask this one question you asked, but don't get into anything of a nature that would be prejudicial and bring out matters of his character, because they're not in issue at the time.

MR. MEGGS: Yes, sir. I need to instruct the witness that the question that I asked, was he acting any different than she knew him in the past. And I think her answer to that question would be yes and that would be all I would ask her.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RICHMOND: I object to that question as to form.

THE COURT: Objection overruled.

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in the presence of the jury.)

BY MR. MEGGS:

Q Ms. Franklin, I will repeat my question to you. Was Robert Clarence Richardson acting any different on that...

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  • Spaziano v. Florida
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • July 2, 1984
    ...takes that standard seriously and has not hesitated to reverse a trial court if it derogates the jury's role. See Richardson v. State, 437 So.2d 1091, 1095 (Fla.1983); Miller v. State, 332 So.2d 65 (Fla.1976). Our responsibility, however, is not to second-guess the deference accorded the ju......
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    ...8 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 314, 93 L.Ed.2d 288 (1986); Cannady v. State, 427 So.2d 723 (Fla.1983); Richardson v. State, 437 So.2d 1091 (Fla.1983). We note that while capital defendants often present testimony of family members and psychiatrists in mitigation, it is unus......
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    • July 25, 1991
    ...is presented with evidence not considered by the jury, the jury's recommendation still retains great weight.See also Richardson v. State, 437 So.2d 1091, 1095 (Fla.1983) (judge should have applied Tedder standard even though the sentencing jury had not heard all of the facts and circumstanc......
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