Richardson v. State

Decision Date12 August 1976
Docket NumberNo. 3--1274A209,3--1274A209
PartiesCharles RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Sheldon H. Cohan, Gary, for defendant-appellant.

Theo. L. Sendak, Atty, Gen., John R. O'Bryan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Appellant Charles Richardson entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to a charge of second degree burglary. 1 Trial was to a jury which returned a verdict of guilty as charged, and judgment was entered thereon. Richardson contends on appeal that:

1. There was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time of the offense;

2. There was insufficient evidence to prove that he was capable of forming the required criminal intent; and

3. The trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte on the issue of his competence to stand trial.

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Richardson was sane at the time of the offense; that he was capable of forming the requisite intent; and that the trial court did not err in failing to hold a competency hearing.

INSANITY.

When a criminal defendant properly raises the defense of insanity, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane at the time of the offense.

Johnson v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 324, 264 N.E.2d 57; Fitch v. State (1974), Ind.App., 313 N.E.2d 548.

The law in Indiana is that a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. Hill v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429.

The question of sanity is a question of fact. We may not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses, but must look to the evidence and the inferences most favorable to the State to determine if there is evidence to support the jury's finding of sanity.

Wilson v. State (1975), Ind., 333 N.E.2d 755; Blake v. State (1975), Ind., 323 N.E.2d

227; Stamper v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 211, 294 N.E.2d 609; Fitch v. State, supra.

The facts most favorable to the State contained in the record establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Richardson was sane at the time of the offense. The offense was committed on March 27, 1973. The two psychiatrists who testified at trial examined Richardson during the fall of 1973, 2 and again during the trial, and neither of them could form an opinion as to whether Richardson was sane at the time of the offense. Such inconclusiveness on the part of expert witnesses, however, is not dispositive of the sanity issue, in view of the principle that lay testimony is proper on such an issue and may be credited over that of expert witnesses.

Wilson v. State, supra; Blake v. State, supra; Hill v. State, supra; Fitch v. State, supra.

The trier of fact may consider all the facts of defendant's life relevant to the issue of insanity, including the acts of the crime charged. Lynn v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 631, 266 N.E.2d 8; Fitch v. State, supra.

Dr. August Dian testified that he was of the opinion that Richardson had attempted to feign mental illness on occasion. Dr. Frank Hogle testified that, if he had addressed the question of Richardson's sanity at the time of the offense during his first interview with him, he would have concluded that Richardson was probably sane at the time of the offense.

Bernard Austin, the manager of the burglarized office, stated that prior to the burglary Richardson had come to the office seeking temporary employment. One or two temporary labor assignments per week had been completed by Richardson in the year prior to the burglary. Bernard Austin further testified that Richardson could comprehend working instructions. Dr. Hogle testified that these facts could indicate sanity.

The arresting police officer testified that Richardson tried to hide from the police in an effort to avoid capture. His evasive actions tended to show that he was awre of the wrongfulness of his conduct. Jester v. State (1975), Ind.App., 321 N.E.2d 762; Fitch v. State, supra. Later, about ten hours after the burglary, Richardson was interrogated. He gave a lucid confession relating his participation in the burglary and admitted his attempt to hide from the police. Dr. Hogle stated that such evasive actions and confession could lend some weight to a finding of sanity.

The evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient to enable the jury to find Richardson sane at the time of the offense.

CRIMINAL INTENT.

The crime of second degree burglary as delineated by IC 1971, 35--13--4--4(b) (Burns Supp.1976) 3, requires a specific intent:

'Whoever breaks and enters into * * * any building or structure other than a dwelling house or place of human habitation, with the intent to commit a felony therein, shall be guilty of burglary in the second degree, * * *.'

The questions of the existence of such intent and of whether appellant had sufficient mental capacity to form such intent are questions of fact to be resolved by the jury from all the evidence. Storie v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 301, 258 N.E.2d 849; Hill v. State, supra.

Although Dr. Dian testified that Richardson has a low intelligence, almost retarded Bernard Austin testified that Richardson could comprehend instructions and could complete temporary labor assignments. Furthermore, the interrogating police officer testified that Richardson gave a lucid account of his participation in the burglary. Mental weakness has long been rejected as a defense to a criminal prosecution.

Hill v. State, supra; Hashfield v. State (1965), 247 Ind. 95, 210 N.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921, 86 S.Ct. 1373, 16 L.Ed.2d 442; Robinson v. State (1888), 113 Ind. 510, 16 N.E. 184.

From the evidence presented, the jury could have concluded that Richardson's level of intelligence did not render him incapable of forming a criminal intent.

Richardson stated that he had consumed a portion of a bottle of wine immediately prior to the burglary. The law on voluntary intoxication was recently restated in Watson v. State (1975), Ind.App., 330 N.E.2d 781, at 784:

'While voluntary intoxication is not a defense in a criminal proceeding, it is, nevertheless, well recognized that the absence of a specific intent, regardless of the cause of such mental state, is a defense to any crime requiring such an intent. To this extent, mental incapacity, although occasioned by the voluntary ingestion of alcohol or drugs, is a defense. The existence of this mental condition or incapacity, rendering the accused incapable of forming a specific intent, is a question of fact to be determined by the trier thereof--in this case, the jury. Stout v. State (1974), Ind., 319 N.E.2d 123; Preston v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 353, 287 N.E.2d 347; Daniels v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 376, 274 N.E.2d 702.'

Dr. Dian testified that Richardson had been drinking for about twenty-five years and, recently, his drinking became excessive. The arresting officer testified that he smelled alcohol in the burglarized office, but he could not tell if the odor emanated from Richardson or from the other participant in the offense. The officer testified that Richardson's speech was not slurred and that he did not appear to be stumbling. The jury could have concluded from the evidence presented that Richardson's consumption of a portion of a bottle of wine did not render him incapable of forming the requisite intent, in light of his twenty-five-year history of drinking.

COMPETENCY HEARING.

The defense rested after the presentation of the State's case-in-chief. Because appellant had entered a special plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court then called as witnesses Dr. Dian and Dr. Hogle, the two psychiatrists who had been appointed to examine Richardson pursuant to IC 1971, 35--5--2--2 (Burns Code Ed.). Both doctors had also examined Richardson during the morning of the final day of trial. Neither could form an opinion as to Richardson's sanity on the date of the offense, but both formed opinions as to Richardson's competence to stand trial.

Dr. Dian testified that Richardson was then legally sane. Dr. Hogle reached a contrary conclusion. Later, when Dr. Hogle was examined by the defense, he reiterated such opinion.

Richardson contends on appeal that the testimony of Dr. Hogle was sufficient to require the trial judge to hold a competency hearing pursuant to IC 1971, 35--5--3.1--1 (Burns Code Ed.), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

'Hearing to determine defendant's sanity during trial.--When at any time before the final submission of any criminal cause to the court or jury trying the same, the court, either from its own knowledge or upon the suggestion of any person, has reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane, the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the question of the defendant's sanity and shall appoint two (2) competent disinterested physicians who shall examine the defendant upon the question of his sanity and concerning the same at the hearing. At the hearing, other evidence may be introduced to prove the defendant's sanity or insanity. If the court shall find that the defendant has comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the criminal action against him and the proceedings thereon and to make his defense, the trial shall not be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the defendant. If the court shall find that the defendant has no comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense, the trial shall...

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