Richey v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 October 1909
• Citation: 122 N.W. 1030,140 Wis. 486
• Parties: RICHEY v. UNION CENT. LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

140 Wis. 486

122 N.W. 1030

RICHEY

v.UNION CENT. LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oct. 26, 1909.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Chippewa County; A. J. Vinje, Judge.

Action by T. H. Richey against the Union Central Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

About December 1, 1905, the defendant contracted to employ the plaintiff for 10 years as a district agent in several of the counties in the northern part of the state, for the sale of life insurance on commission. Plaintiff entered upon the performance of the contract, devoted himself to the work of building up a business, and expended his earnings in furtherance thereof. About January 1, 1908, the defendant, claiming that it was compelled, in the interest of its policy holders, because of the oppressive laws of Wisconsin, to withdraw from the state and cease to do business here, canceled its contract with the plaintiff, and discharged him from its employ. Plaintiff brought action against the defendant, setting up two causes of action: (1) For the breach of the contract; and (2) for the labor performed and for the money expended by him for the defendant. The plaintiff introduced evidence before the referee to whom the action had been referred, tending to show that he had written insurance, during the first year of his employment by the defendant, from which he derived $868 in premiums, and over $1,300 during the second year; that his commissions on the business so written would, if renewed annually, amount to over $200 per year for the unexpired term of his contract; that he had expended money in traveling about his district, in advertising the company, and in developing the territory with a view to future profits; that the greater part of the work incurred in establishing such a business was during the first two years; and that he had expended time and effort in selecting and appointing subagents who would be efficient in the prosecution of the business. Plaintiff, at the conclusion of the testimony, elected to stand on the first cause of action, and the referee reported in favor of allowing plaintiff $2,750 as the damages caused by the breach of the contract. The circuit court approved the report of the referee, and awarded plaintiff judgment upon the report. This is an appeal from the judgment.W. H. Stafford, for appellant.

W. M. Bowe, for respondent.

SIEBECKER, J. (after stating the facts as above.)

The point made that the appellant was prejudiced by the refusal of the trial court to compel respondent to elect which of the two causes of action alleged in the complaint he would proceed on has no merit. The facts of the so-called second cause of action were inserted for the sole purpose of claiming damages for labor and services in the event that no binding contract should be found to have been made by the parties, as alleged. The respondent, at the conclusion of his affirmative case, discontinued as to these allegations, and apprised appellant that he stood on the contract and its alleged breach by the appellant. There was nothing to mislead appellant, or to interfere with its defense to respondent's demands.

It is insisted that no breach of the alleged contract is shown. The argument is that the appellant had the right to terminate its agreement with respondent under the stipulation that, if respondent failed “to comply with any of the conditions, duties, and obligations * * * or to conduct his business in a satisfactory manner, then” appellant might at its option terminate the contract. Under the allegations and proof on this subject it is not claimed or shown that the agreement was terminated because respondent failed to comply with the imposed conditions, duties, and obligations, or because he failed to conduct his business in a satisfactory manner. Under ...