Richitelli v. United States
| Decision Date | 22 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-CV-62202-STRAUSS |
| Parties | ANGEL RICHITELLI, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (“Motion”) [DE 39]. I have reviewed the Motion the Response [DE 42] and Reply [DE 49] thereto, all other summary judgment materials, and all other pertinent portions of the record. For the reasons discussed herein, the Motion [DE 39] will be GRANTED.
On August 2, 2019, Plaintiff visited a United States Postal Service (“USPS”) post office location at 2350 N University Drive in Pembroke Pines, Florida (“Premises”) around 3:00 p.m. Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”) [DE 40] ¶ 1 (undisputed); Deposition of Angel Richitelli (“PL Depo.”) [DE 40-3] at 25. In the exterior parking lot of the Premises, there is a typical, blue, metal mail collection box (“Collection Box”) located on a concrete and grass raised median. SMF ¶ 2 (undisputed). The Collection Box has no electrical components and no purposeful connection to any source of electricity. Id. ¶ 19 (undisputed). It is the drive-up type that postal customers can pull up to in their vehicles and place mail into without exiting their vehicles. Id. ¶ 4 (undisputed). It does not have a handle; rather, it has a slot into which mail can be placed. Id. ¶ 5 (undisputed). Although the Collection Box does not have any electrical components, there is a light pole (“Pole 8”) on the same raised median. Id. ¶ 22 (undisputed).
When Plaintiff visited the Premises on August 2, 2019, she drove up to the Collection Box, rolled down her window, and - with her car in park but still running - reached through the open window to place mail into the slot of the Collection Box. Id. ¶¶ 6-7 (undisputed). In doing so, a portion of three fingers on her left hand touched the Collection Box. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8 (undisputed). When Plaintiff touched the Collection Box, she felt an electric shock (“Incident”), which she estimates lasted 15-30 seconds. Id. ¶¶ 8-9 (undisputed). However, she did not lose consciousness as a result of the Incident, and she was able to roll up her window “perfectly fine” following the Incident. Id. ¶¶ 10-11 (undisputed). Also Plaintiff's vehicle did not turn off from the Incident, and her vehicle - including all of its electronic components - was working fine after the Incident. Id. ¶ 11 (undisputed). Aside from Plaintiff, nobody witnessed the Incident. Id. ¶ 12 (undisputed).
Following the Incident, Plaintiff called her mother, and immediately after the call, she drove her car into a parking space at the Premises, went inside the building, and reported the Incident to USPS employees. Id. ¶ 13 (undisputed). Plaintiff was able to walk from her car into the Premises without issue. Id. ¶ 14 (undisputed). After reporting the Incident, Plaintiff drove herself across the street to Memorial Pembroke Hospital. Id. ¶ 15 (undisputed). She spent approximately 2 hours at the hospital but was not admitted, and she did not have any complaints of back or neck pain while at the hospital. Id. ¶ 16 (undisputed). After leaving the hospital, Plaintiff drove herself home. Id. ¶ 17 (undisputed).
When Plaintiff reported the Incident to USPS, USPS employees conducted an inspection of the Collection Box and determined that it was not electrified. See id. ¶¶ 28-29;[1] see also Declaration of Jim A. Walker (“Walker Decl.”) [DE 40-6] ¶¶ 12, 14. The employees who inspected the Collection Box did not discover any issues with it, including any issues suggesting that it posed a danger to anyone. SMF ¶¶ 28-29; Walker Decl. ¶ 14. Moreover, on the day of the Incident (like other weekdays), USPS employees retrieved mail from the Collection Box around 11:00 a.m. (before the Incident) and 5:00 p.m. (after the Incident). SMF ¶ 31 (undisputed). They were not shocked in doing so. Id. Additionally, aside from the Incident, nobody else has reported an electronic shock from the Collection Box - either before or after the date of the Incident. Id. ¶ 33 (undisputed). And this particular Collection Box is generally used by 50-100 customers throughout the day. Id. ¶ 32;[2] Walker Decl. ¶ 17. Moreover, the customer service manager at the Premises on the date of the Incident has never heard of someone being shocked by a USPS collection box (aside from Plaintiff's report of the Incident). Compare SMF ¶¶ 34-35, with Resp. SMF ¶¶ 34-35; see also Walker Decl. ¶ 13.
As a result of the Incident, Plaintiff asserts that she has suffered multiple injuries. See SMF ¶ 18 (undisputed). It is undisputed that her “injuries related to the [I]ncident are not readily observable.” Joint Pretrial Stipulation [DE 45] at 3. At any rate, due to the Incident and the injuries Plaintiff asserts she has suffered as a result, Plaintiff brings a negligence/premises liability claim in this case pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).
A “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.1996)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Initially, it is the moving party's “burden to demonstrate the basis for its motion, and [it] must identify the portions of the record ‘which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the case.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23). See also Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) . Provided that the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311-12.
To establish a dispute of fact sufficient to avoid the entry of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.3d 1270, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “However, a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. 242). Nevertheless, courts “must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Moreover, all reasonable doubts regarding the facts must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
“It is well settled that the United States, as a sovereign entity, is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued.” Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2011)). “The FTCA waives the United States' sovereign immunity from suit in federal courts for its employees' negligence.” Foster Logging, Inc. v. United States, 973 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). That waiver applies “to tort claims arising out of activities of [USPS].” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 484 (2006) (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 409(c)). Congress, however, has carved out certain exceptions to the waiver under the FTCA. Foster Logging, 973 F.3d at 1157. Two exceptions include the discretionary-function exception and independent- contractor exception. See id. (discussing discretionary-function exception); Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071, 1077 (11th Cir. 1992) (discussing independent-contractor exception); see also United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976). These exceptions implicate the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.[3]
In the Motion, Defendant indicates that its request for dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction is only brought in the alternative to its request for summary judgment on the merits. However, a court is obligated to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists before considering the merits. See United States v. Meyer, 50 F.4th 23, 31 (11th Cir. 2022) (). Here Defendant's subject matter jurisdiction arguments are conditional...
To continue reading
Request your trial