Richland County Recreation Dist. v. City of Columbia, No. 22609
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Writing for the Court | FINNEY; NESS |
| Citation | 290 S.C. 93,348 S.E.2d 363 |
| Parties | RICHLAND COUNTY RECREATION DISTRICT, Appellant, v. The CITY OF COLUMBIA, G.C. Robinett, Jr., in his capacity as Finance Director of the City of Columbia, Kirkman Finlay, Jr., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Columbia; Patton T. Adams, Rudolph C. Barnes, Luther J. Battiste, Paul Z. Bennett, E.W. Cromartie, and W.C. Ouzts, in their capacities as Council members for the City of Columbia, Respondents. . Heard |
| Decision Date | 03 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 22609 |
Page 363
v.
The CITY OF COLUMBIA, G.C. Robinett, Jr., in his capacity as
Finance Director of the City of Columbia, Kirkman Finlay,
Jr., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Columbia;
Patton T. Adams, Rudolph C. Barnes, Luther J. Battiste, Paul
Z. Bennett, E.W. Cromartie, and W.C. Ouzts, in their
capacities as Council members for the City of Columbia, Respondents.
Decided Sept. 2, 1986.
Page 364
[290 S.C. 94] Randall M. Chastain, Columbia, for appellant.
Roy D. Bates, Columbia, for respondents.
FINNEY, Justice.
This is an action by the appellant, Richland County Recreation District, to secure an injunction and declaratory relief against the respondent, City of Columbia, to prevent the City from collecting taxes and otherwise administering recreational services within territory added to the City by annexation subsequent to the passage of Act 409 of 1971. The action was brought in the name of the District alone. The complaint alleges that Act 409 is unconstitutional and contrary to Article III, § 34, of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina, which prohibits a special law where a general law can be made applicable.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The circuit court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 1
The Recreation District was created by special legislation, Act No. 873 of 1960. Various other special legislative acts have been passed by the South Carolina General Assembly, such as the authorization of the Recreation District to issue general obligation bonds and to levy ad valorem taxes, in order to effectively operate the Recreation District.
The State, by creating a special purpose district, "does not confer on persons directly or indirectly affected thereby a property right to have the boundaries of such district remain perpetually the same." Sanders v. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 211 S.C. 141, 44 S.E.2d 185 (1947). No vested right exists in the Recreation District. The Recreation[290 S.C. 95] District and its public officials' "mere interest" in the validity of Act 409, without a showing that their rights of person or property are adversely affected by the operation of...
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Georgetown Cnty. v. Davis & Floyd, Inc., Appellate Case No. 2017-000234
...County may not bring an inverse condemnation claim against its "creator," the state. Richland Cty. Recreation Dist. v. City of Columbia , 290 S.C. 93, 95, 348 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1986) ; City of Reno v. Washoe County , 94 Nev. 327, 580 P.2d 460, 463 (1978) ("[T]he City, as a political subdivis......
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Bardoon Properties, NV v. Eidolon Corp., No. 24616
...as a real party in interest deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Richland County Recreation District v. City of Columbia 290 S.C. 93, 348 S.E.2d 363 (1986); Anders v. S.C. Parole and Comm. Corrections Board, 279 S.C. 206, 305 S.E.2d 229 (1983). 3 However, the wealth of authority......
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County of Lexington, S.C. v. City of Columbia, No. 23318
...must establish it is a real party in interest in order to maintain a suit. Richland County Recreation District v. City of Columbia, 290 S.C. 93, 348 S.E.2d 363 (1986); see also Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 229 S.E.2d 718 (1976) (wherein this Cou......
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City of Spartanburg v. County of Spartanburg, No. 23338
...of its own proprietary interests or statutory rights to establish standing. Richland County Recreation District v. City of Columbia, 290 S.C. 93, 348 S.E.2d 363 (1986). City has alleged no such infringement. There is no existing agreement between City and Draper and this case is clearly dis......
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Georgetown Cnty. v. Davis & Floyd, Inc., Appellate Case No. 2017-000234
...County may not bring an inverse condemnation claim against its "creator," the state. Richland Cty. Recreation Dist. v. City of Columbia , 290 S.C. 93, 95, 348 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1986) ; City of Reno v. Washoe County , 94 Nev. 327, 580 P.2d 460, 463 (1978) ("[T]he City, as a political subdivis......
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Bardoon Properties, NV v. Eidolon Corp., No. 24616
...as a real party in interest deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Richland County Recreation District v. City of Columbia 290 S.C. 93, 348 S.E.2d 363 (1986); Anders v. S.C. Parole and Comm. Corrections Board, 279 S.C. 206, 305 S.E.2d 229 (1983). 3 However, the wealth of authority......
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County of Lexington, S.C. v. City of Columbia, No. 23318
...must establish it is a real party in interest in order to maintain a suit. Richland County Recreation District v. City of Columbia, 290 S.C. 93, 348 S.E.2d 363 (1986); see also Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 229 S.E.2d 718 (1976) (wherein this Cou......
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City of Spartanburg v. County of Spartanburg, No. 23338
...of its own proprietary interests or statutory rights to establish standing. Richland County Recreation District v. City of Columbia, 290 S.C. 93, 348 S.E.2d 363 (1986). City has alleged no such infringement. There is no existing agreement between City and Draper and this case is clearly dis......