Richland County v. State
| Decision Date | 04 September 1970 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 8628--8634,s. 8628--8634 |
| Citation | 180 N.W.2d 649 |
| Parties | RICHLAND COUNTY, North Dakota, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The STATE of North Dakota, Walter Christensen, State Treasurer of the State of North Dakota,ota, and Bowman County, Defendants, and Adams County, et al., Defendants and Appellants. PEMBINA COUNTY, North Dakota, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The STATE of North Dakota, Walter Christensen, State Treasurer of the State of North Dakota,ota, and Bowman County, Defendants, and Adams County, et al., Defendants and Appellants. SARGENT COUNTY, North Dakota, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The STATE of North Dakota, Walter Christensen, State Treasurer of the State of North Dakota,ota, and Bowman County, Defendants, and Adams County, et al., Defendants and Appellants. MERCER COUNTY, North Dakota, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The STATE of North Dakota, Walter Christensen, State Treasurer of the State of North Dakota,ota, and Bowman County, Defendants, and Adams County, et al., Defendants and Appellants. RANSOM COUNTY, North Dakota, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The STATE of North Dakota, Walter Christensen, State Treasurer of the State of North Dakota,ota, and Bowman County, Defendants, and Adams County, et al., Defendants and Appellants. WALSH COUNTY, North Dakota, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The STATE of North Dakota, Walter Christensen, State Treasurer of the State of North Dakota,ota, and Bowman County, Defendants, and Adams County, et al., Defendants and Appellants. DUNN COUNTY, North Dakota, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The STATE of North Dakota, Walter Christensen, State Treasurer of the State of North Dakota,ota, and Bowman County, Defendants, and Adams County, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where one party has received money that in equity and good conscience belongs to another, an action for money had and received will lie. To recover such money, it is not necessary that there be a showing of wrongdoing or fraud on the part of the one in possession thereof.
2. Where money which, under the law, should be paid to one county is paid to another by mistake, and there is no showing that the county receiving the money acted fraudulently or collusively, a cause of action to recover it arises immediately and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of such payment.
3. The defense of laches is based principally upon the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced due to change of conditions of the parties because of delay. It is based upon the conduct of the party against whom the defense is urged which places the other party in a situation where his rights will be imperiled because of such delay. It is based upon inexcusable delay in asserting a right.
4. The defense of estoppel arises where, by the conduct or acts of another a party has been induced to alter his position or to do something, to his prejudice, which he otherwise would not have done.
5. A waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, benefit, claim, or privilege which, except for such waiver, the party would have enjoyed.
6. The statutory requirement that any person having an account, claim, or demand against a county for property or services for which the county shall be liable shall reduce such claim to writing and verify and present it to the county against whom the claim is asserted, does not apply to a claim for money belonging to one county which has been mistakenly paid to another, and an action may be brought by the county to whom such money belongs to recover it.
7. Generally, a county, as a unit of government and as an arm of the State, cannot be held liable for interest on an obligation unless there is a contractual or statutory provision for payment of interest.
8. Where the defendant counties received more than their proper share of motor-vehicle registration fees because of erroneous distribution by the State treasurer, the general rule that a county is not liable for payment of interest on an obligation unless it contracts to pay interest or there is a statutory provision for its payment, would apply.
9. Where the statute provides that fifty per cent of the motor-vehicle registration fees, after payment of expenses, shall be distributed to the counties of the State 'in proportion to the number of certificates of title credited to each county,' it is held that distribution must be made on the basis of numerical registration of motor vehicles from the residents of each county.
George T. Dynes, of Freed, Dynes & Malloy, Dickinson, Special Counsel for plaintiff and respondent in each case.
Dennis A. Schneider, Asst. State's Atty., Bismarck, Special Counsel for defendants and appellants in all cases.
In December of 1965, Stark County commenced an action against the State of North Dakota for the recovery of moneys claimed to be due it because of allegedly improper distribution of motor-vehicle registration fees by the State Treasurer. The district court permitted recovery by the County against the State, and the Supreme Court, on appeal, held that where the State, by legislative enactment, provided for the distribution of a portion of the motor-vehicle registration fees to the counties, and an error was made in the distribution of such funds with the result that some counties received too small a share and some counties received too large a share thereof, and where the State retained no part of such funds due the counties, no action would lie against the State by a county which had received less than its proper share of such fees. Stark County v. State, 160 N.W.2d 101 (N.D.1968).
Upon the dismissal of the action brought by Stark County against the State, the above-named seven counties, each contending that it had received less that its proper share of such motor-vehicle registration fees, commenced separate actions against fourteen defendant counties which they allege had received too large a share of such fees because of the error in distribution thereof. The seven cases were consolidated for trial. Seven judgments were entered against the fourteen counties, and thirteen of such defendant counties appeal from each of the seven judgments so entered.
On these appeals, the defendants raise a number of issues, including:
1. Did the trial court err in finding that the motor-vehicle registration fees had been improperly distributed by the State Treasurer?
2. If, because of misinterpretation of the law, distribution of such fees was improperly made, did the trial court err in failing to find that the plaintiffs' claims were not barred, either in whole or in part, by (a) the statute of limitations, (b) laches, (c) estoppel, (d) waiver, or (e) failure of the plaintiffs to give notice of claim?
3. Did the trial court err in allowing the plaintiffs interest on any sums due from the defendants?
4. Did the trial court err in denying the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaints because the plaintiffs had failed to show where the moneys had come from and where and how they had been disbursed?
These issues will be considered in the order in which they appear above.
The first issue to be considered is whether there was an incorrect distribution of the motor-vehicle registration funds with the result that the plaintiff counties received too small a share and the defendant counties received too large a share thereof. Obviously, if the distribution was proper and correct, the plaintiffs have no claim against the defendants.
The history of the legislation out of which these actions arose is discussed in Stark County v. State, Supra. Briefly stated, it discloses that the Legislative Assembly, by enacting Chapter 177(1) of the Session Laws of 1935, provided that fifty per cent of the moneys in the motor-vehicle registration fund in excess of any amount required for payment of salaries and necessary expenses of the Motor Vehicle Department should be transferred by the State Treasurer 'to the counties of the State of North Dakota; * * *' No direction was given to the State Treasurer as to the basis for transfer of such funds to the counties. Under that Act, distribution was made to the counties on the basis of the amount of motor-vehicle registration fees received from each county.
In 1955, the law was amended, but the provision for distribution to the counties was not changed and required that such distribution be made--
'1. * * *
'2. * * *
Again, this amendment was enacted without any direction as to distribution to the counties. Chapter 244(5), S.L. 1955.
In 1957, the law again was amended. This time, the Act provided that distribution was to be made under Subsection 3 as follows:
In 1959, the law was further amended, without any significant change in the method of distribution. Chapter 289, Sec. 39--0439(3), S.L.1959.
Under the 1957 and 1959 amendments, the State Treasurer paid the fifty per cent of such fees to the various counties on the basis of the total amount of registration fees received from the residents of each county, regardless of the county in which payment was made. For example, if a resident of another county came to the State Capitol at Bismarck to apply for his motor-vehicle license, his home county was credited even though the license was issued in Burleigh County. Thus the only change in distribution made under the 1957 and 1959 amendments was that if fees were...
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