Richman v. Sheahan

Decision Date16 October 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-2173,00-2173
Parties(7th Cir. 2001) Marcella Richman, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Jack B. Richman, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Sheahan, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, et al., Defendants-Appellants
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 98 C 7350--Joan B. Gottschall, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Bauer, Posner, and Williams, Circuit Judges.

Williams, Circuit Judge.

Jack Richman died shortly after fourteen sheriff's deputies restrained him during his mother's appearance before an Illinois judge on a traffic violation. Marcella Richman, on her own behalf and on behalf of her son's estate, brought federal and state claims against the sheriff's deputies in their individual capacities and against Cook County Sheriff Michael Sheahan in his official capacity. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based in part on absolute, Eleventh Amendment, and state sovereign immunity. We agree with the district court that the deputies are not entitled to absolute immunity, and therefore affirm the court's denial of their motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims. Because we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the sheriff's alleged unconstitutional policy regarding training and supervision of deputies represents state policy for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, we affirm the district court's denial of the sheriff's motion to dismiss. However, we conclude that the deputies' conduct would be attributed to the state for purposes of Illinois sovereign immunity, and therefore reverse the district court's denial of the deputies' motion to dismiss the state law claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Marcella Richman appeared in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to challenge a traffic citation.1 She was accompanied by her son, Jack Richman, who planned to testify as a witness. The Richmans waited in the courtroom for several hours before their case was called, and then the judge continued the hearing to a future date. The Richmans attempted to ask a question but the judge quieted them, and when Jack continued to speak, the judge ordered him restrained. Two Cook County sheriff's deputies began to take him into custody and twelve more deputies then entered the courtroom. According to the complaint, the fourteen deputies attacked Jack, forced him to the floor, sat on and handcuffed him. Jack, who was physically disabled and required the use of a cane, did not resist the deputies' attempt to restrain him, nor did his mother, who was restrained by four other deputies. While Jack was handcuffed and on the floor, he emptied his bladder and bowels, and he appeared to have stopped breathing. Paramedics rendered emergency assistance at the scene and then transported him to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

Marcella Richman's amended complaint seeks damages against the deputies in their individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the deputies' conduct violated her and her son's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint also includes § 1983 claims against Cook County Sheriff Michael Sheahan in his official capacity, alleging that he failed adequately to train and supervise the deputies in their duties "to refrain from using excessive force in effecting seizures of citizens." The complaint also includes claims against the deputies under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 180/1, and the Survival Act, 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/27-6.2

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, we must decide whether the district court erred in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss based on (1) the deputies' claim to absolute immunity; (2) the sheriff's claimed right, under the Eleventh Amendment, to be free from suit in federal court; and (3) the deputies' claim to sovereign immunity under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1, and Court of Claims Act, 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/8. We review each of these questions of law de novo. DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 209 F.3d 973, 975 (7th Cir. 2000); Hammond v. Kunard, 148 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 1998); cf. Benning v. Bd. of Regents, 928 F.2d 775, 778-80 (7th Cir. 1991).

A. Absolute Immunity--§ 1983 Claims Against the Deputies

The parties are correct that we have jurisdiction, under the collateral order doctrine, to review the district court's decision to deny the defendants' motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1995); Hammond, 148 F.3d at 695.

The ordinary rule is that qualified--and not absolute--immunity is sufficient to protect law enforcement officers in the conduct of their official duties. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-41 (1986); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). The deputies argue that the ordinary rule does not apply in this case because they were required to execute the judge's order, and that quasi-judicial immunity, a form of absolute immunity derived from judicial immunity, is appropriate for officers providing courtroom security. We disagree.

We begin our analysis with the fundamental principle that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from damages for their judicial conduct. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-29 (1988). Judicial immunity was recognized at common law "as a device for discouraging collateral attacks and thereby helping to establish appellate procedures as the standard system for correcting judicial error" and to "protect[ ] judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants." Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225; see also Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872).

The absolute immunity afforded to judges has been extended to apply to "quasi- judicial conduct" of "[n]on-judicial officials whose official duties have an integral relationship with the judicial process." Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir. 1986). For example, we have applied absolute immunity to officials engaged in quasi-judicial decision making, such as members of a parole board. See Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1443-44 (7th Cir. 1996); Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1994). For these officers, whose conduct is "functionally comparable" to those of judges, Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993); Wilson, 86 F.3d at 1443, the rationale for applying absolute immunity is much the same as for judges: that officials making quasi-judicial decisions should be free of "'the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation.'" See Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494 (1991)). The deputies do not claim that they exercise a comparable form of discretionary decision making.3

The deputies instead rely on a different sort of quasi-judicial immunity, which we have recognized for some officials whose functions are further removed from the core dispute resolution function of judges. "[W]hen functions that are more administrative in character have been undertaken pursuant to the explicit direction of a judicial officer, we have held that that officer's immunity is also available to the subordinate." Kincaid, 969 F.2d at 601. The policy justifying an extension of absolute immunity in these circumstances is to prevent court personnel and other officials from becoming a "'lightning rod for harassing litigation' aimed at the court." See Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976)); see also Kincaid, 969 F.2d at 601; Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 113 (5th Cir. 1996); Coverdell v. Dept. of Social & Heath Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 1987).

We have not yet had occasion to consider whether law enforcement officers charged with using unreasonable force when seizing a person pursuant to a judge's order are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Two other circuit courts of appeal have addressed this question, with different results. In Martin v. Board of County Commissioners, 909 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth Circuit held that officers charged with employing excessive force to execute a bench warrant were not entitled to absolute immunity. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that, because an order to take someone into custody carries with it an implicit order not to use unreasonable force, the judge's order would not shield the officers from a claim challenging the manner in which they enforced the order. Id. The court distinguished its earlier holding in Valdez v. City of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir. 1989), that law enforcement officers enforcing a contempt order were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for claims of false arrest and imprisonment. In Valdez, the claim was not directed at the manner in which the judge's order was executed, but instead at conduct expressly prescribed by the order. Because of this difference, the court held that the policies underlying the extension of absolute immunity--not holding officials accountable for conduct they are powerless to avoid--did not apply. Martin, 909 F.2d at 404-05.

The Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997), a case, like this one, in which the plaintiff was restrained in the courtroom by order of the judge. The Eighth Circuit rejected the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, and held that the alleged impropriety of the officers' acts (using excessive force to effectuate the seizure) did not strip the acts of their quasi-judicial character. Id. at 721-22. The Eighth Circuit...

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