Richmond Baking Co. v. Department of Treasury
| Decision Date | 01 February 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27094. |
| Citation | 18 N.E.2d 778,215 Ind. 110 |
| Parties | RICHMOND BAKING CO. v. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY et al. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court; James A. Emmert, Judge.
Claycombe & Stump and John F. Watkins, all of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Omer S. Jackson, Atty. Gen., A. J. Stevenson, Asst Atty. Gen., and Joseph W. Hutchinson, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellees.
This action was filed by the appellant against the appellees to enjoin the enforcement of Chapter 255 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1937, Sections 47-1119 to 47-1132 Burns' Ind.St.1933 (Pocket Supp.), Secs. 11246-1 to 11246-13, Baldwin's 1934 (May 1937 Supp), approved March 11, 1937, known as the 'Motor Vehicle Weight Tax Act', upon the ground that the act is unconstitutional being in violation of Section 23, Article 1, of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, for the reason that it grants to some citizens or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, do not equally belong to all citizens; that it violates Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A., for the reason that it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and deprives them of their property without due process of law; that it violates Clause 3, Section 8, Article 1, of the Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A., in that it undertakes to regulate commerce among the several states.
The second amended complaint is in one paragraph. No good purpose would be served by undertaking a detailed recital of all the allegations, many of which are argumentive and explanatory of the appellant's position with reference to the act in question. The entire act is filed as an exhibit to the complaint. The substance of two other acts of the same session, namely, Chapters 135 and 277, are also set out.
It is charged that the appellant is and for many years has been engaged in the business of baking and selling bread and other bakery products in the city of Richmond, Indiana, and surrounding territory; that in its business it uses 25 motor vehicles, a detailed description of which is alleged. This description includes the number and size of the tires used on all of the trucks and trailers, the capacity of each, the number of tires and wheels on both the front and rear axles, the load per axle of each truck, the number of miles traveled by each per day, and the territory covered, which includes the State of Ohio as well as the State of Indiana; that it is engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce; that the act provides for a license fee, which in itself amounts to a tax, for the purpose of collecting revenue only, upon the kind of vehicles owned by appellant; that the act exempts from said tax or license other motor vehicles and all passenger vehicles and trailers attached thereto; that such passenger vehicles are at times used for the same purpose as the trucks and trailers owned and used by appellant; that the act bears no relation to public safety, health, morals, or public welfare, but the only purpose thereof is to obtain revenue from a particular class of persons, 'not justifiable upon any reasonable basis'; that the classification made by the General Assembly under this act, as applied to the appellant, is 'arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, discriminatory, and without any justification whatever'.
The foregoing statement reveals the nature of the action pleaded in the 52 typewritten pages of the complaint and exhibits, and should be sufficient for a discussion of the questions involved.
The appellees filed a demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The memorandum to the demurrer recited that Chapter 255 does not violate said constitutional provisions, and 'upon the basis of the Second Amended Complaint and the allegations thereof, the facts as stated are insufficient to show that the Act violates either of the above constitutional provisions.'
The demurrer was sustained by the court. Appellant refused to plead further, final judgment was rendered against it, and, upon appeal, this ruling constitutes the only error assigned.
In the discussion of the law questions presented, the appellant admits that highways may be used for the transportation of persons and property for hire subject to special limitations and regulations, and that discrimination may be made between those using the highway for public purposes and those using them for hire in a classification for taxation, citing several United States decisions and Kelly v. Finney, 1935, 207 Ind. 557, 194 N.E. 157. Appellant further admits that classification is not invalid where it rests upon a reasonable basis of actual difference between those included and those excluded, but asserts that there is no basis for the classification made by the act in question except those stated in the statute itself, which classification is not based upon a compensation for the use of the highway; that a tax is imposed upon trucks and trailers of the kind owned and operated by appellant and exempts from such tax trailers pulled by passenger cars; that there is no reasonable ground for exempting passenger cars which are used for commercial purposes and at the same time levy a tax on trucks which are used for the same purpose, and for this reason the act is discriminatory and amounts to an unfair and illegal classification.
Many authorities, both federal and state, are cited by appellant which declare certain acts to be unconstitutional because they are discriminatory, and because no just and reasonable basis appears for the classification made. It therefore becomes important to examine the act in question and to determine whether or not the Legislature exceeded its constitutional authority in the passage of the act in question.
This court must approach the consideration of the questions herein involved with a presumption in favor of the validity of the legislative act. If the act can be sustained upon any reasonably conceivable basis, it must not be overthrown. Even if there is doubt upon the question of the unconstitutionality of the act, that doubt must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. State ex rel. v. Billheimer, 1911, 178 Ind. 83, 88, 96 N.E. 801; State ex rel. Duensing v. Roby et al., 1895, 142 Ind. 168, 180, 41 N.E. 145, 33 L.R.A. 213, 51 Am.St.Rep. 174; Bush v. City of Indianapolis, 1889, 120 Ind. 476, 483, 22 N.E. 422; Brown v. Buzan, 1865, 24 Ind. 194, 196, 197.
On the proposition of the lack of a basis for classification the court will presume the existence of a state of facts which will sustain the legislative act if such a state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the classification. Baldwin v. State, 1923, 194 Ind. 303, 307, 308, 141 N.E. 343. That authority, and many others, recognize that the determination of the question of classification is primarily for the Legislature, and is never a judicial question, unless the classification is so unreasonable that it cannot be sustained under any circumstances.
While it may be asserted that the highways of the state are open to the use of all persons upon equal terms, nevertheless, such use is restricted by legislative enactment which may place a tax or license upon the users of the highway, and such users may be separated into classes and taxed differently if any reasonable basis exists for the classification. Kersey v. City of Terre Haute, 1903, 161 Ind. 471, 473, 68 N.E. 1027; Kelly v. Finney, supra; Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 1932, 286 U.S. 352, 52 S.Ct. 595, 76 L.Ed. 1155, 81 A.L.R. 1402.
This court has been called upon to pass upon the question of classification made by the Legislature in so many cases that it would be useless to undertake a recital of authorities passing upon specific classifications made under circumstances there presented, but as a general proposition it may be said that the state has a right to classify for the purpose of taxation, and this right extends to sub-classifying where there is sufficient basis for the subdivision of the general class. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, supra, which is a case in principle much like Chapter 255, supra. The...
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