Richmond & D.R. Co. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 16 April 1891
• Citation: 92 Ala. 218,9 So. 276
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: RICHMOND & D. R. CO. v. JONES.

9 So. 276

92 Ala. 218

RICHMOND & D. R. CO. v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 16, 1891

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; JAMES B. HEAD, Judge.

Action by D. W. Jones against the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. There were three counts in the complaint. The first count sought to recover on the ground that the injuries were caused by reason of defects in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with or used in the employ of defendant. In the second count of the complaint the plaintiff based his right of recovery on the alleged negligence of the employes of the defendant who had charge and control of the train by which plaintiff was injured, and at the time of the accident. The third count was for failure of the fireman on defendant's engine to transmit plaintiff's signal to the engineer. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and by special plea pleaded a written contract of employment entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant on February 17, 1890,-not quite two months before the accident,-one of the terms of which was in words as follows: "Rule 23. The conditions of employment by the company are that the regular compensation paid for the services of employes shall cover all risks incurred and liability to accident from any cause whatever while in the service of this company. If an employe is disabled by accident or other cause, the right to claim compensation for injuries will not be recognized. Allowances when made in such cases, will be as a gratuity, justified by the circumstances of the case, and previous good conduct of the party. The fact of remaining in the service of the company will be considered acceptance of these conditions. All officers employing men to work for this company will have these conditions distinctly understood and agreed by each employe before he enters the service of the company." A demurrer to the plea was sustained. There was judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

James Weatherly, for appellant.

Bowman & Harsh, for appellee.

COLEMAN J.

The suit was brought by appellee to recover damages for personal injury. For defense to the action by way of special plea the defendant set up rule No. 23, which will be found in the statement of the facts of the case. To this plea a demurrer was sustained. In the case of Railroad Co. v. Orr, (Ala.) 8 South. Rep. 360, it is declared that "railroads cannot stipulate for immunity from liability for their own wrongful negligence. A rule which imposes upon an employe to look after and be responsible for his own safety contravenes the law itself which fixes the liability of railroads for negligence causing injury or death to their employes." The demurrer was properly sustained.

It is the duty of railroads to keep themselves reasonably abreast with improved methods so as to lessen the danger attendant on the service, and, while they are not required to adopt every new invention, it is their duty to adopt such as are in ordinary use by prudently-conducted roads engaged in like business and surrounded by like circumstances. Railway Co v. Propst, 83 Ala. 518, 3 South. Rep. 764. There have been such advancements in science for the control of steam, and improvements in the machinery and appliances used by railroads for the better security of life, limb, and property, it would be inexcusable to continue the use of old methods, machinery, and appliances known to be attended with more or less danger, when the danger could be reasonably avoided by the adoption of the newer, and which are in general used by well-regulated railroads. Not that it is required of them to adopt every new invention useful in the business, although it may serve to lessen danger; but it is their duty to discontinue old methods which are insecure and to adopt such improvements and advancements as are in ordinary use by prudently-conducted roads engaged in like business and surrounded by like circumstances. Railroad Co. v. Allen, 78 Ala. 494. Applying this principle in the case of Railway Co. v. Propst, 83 Ala. 526, 3 South. Rep. 764, the court held that, "if the draw-heads and bumpers used by defendant were such as were employed by many well-conducted roads, this would repel all imputation of negligence founded on their mere structure, although other roads, even a majority of them, adopted a different pattern. Witnesses who have sufficient knowledge of the subject may testify to the general rules of railroads on the subject." The same general principle is declared in the case of Railroad Co. v. Hall, 87 Ala. 722, 6 South. Rep. 277. Under these rules, we think it was proper to inquire whether the draw-heads used by defendant when the injury occurred were such as were usually used on well-regulated railroads. The witnesses were shown to be experts, and were competent to give such testimony. It may be laid down generally that objections to evidence, which do not particularize or define the grounds of objection, may be overruled. The court is not bound to cast about for the grounds upon which, in...