Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees

• Decision Date: 11 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86-3544,86-3544
• Citation: 795 F.2d 1161
• Parties: 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3172, 104 Lab.Cas. P 11,920 RICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG AND POTOMAC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYEES, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1161

795 F.2d 1161

122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3172, 104 Lab.Cas. P 11,920

RICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG AND POTOMAC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYEES, Appellee.

No. 86-3544.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 5, 1986.

Decided July 11, 1986.

Fred Calvin Alexander (Thomas F. Farrell, II, Alexandria, Va., Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., Washington, D.C., Boothe, Prichard & Dudley, Alexandria, Va., Urchie B. Ellis, Vice-President of Law, Richmond, Va., Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R. Co., on brief), for appellant.

John O'Brien Clarke, Jr. (Highsaw & Mahoney, P.C., Louis P. Malone, III, General Counsel, Broth. of Maintenance of Way Employees, Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellee.

Before WIDENER, HALL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges.

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company ("RF & P") appeals from orders of the district court denying its motions for preliminary injunctions in this action brought against the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (the "BMWE"). In April, 1986, RF & P filed suit against the BMWE pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (the "RLA"), seeking to enjoin the union's picketing of its facilities at Alexandria and Richmond, Virginia. The picketing occurred during the pendency of a labor dispute between the BMWE and two New England railroads regarding pay and working conditions. Following RF & P's motions for preliminary injunctions to prohibit further picketing of its Alexandria and Richmond facilities, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to award the requested relief. We affirm.

I.

RF & P is a major railway carrier connecting the northeastern and southeastern parts of the United States. It operates two railroad yards, the Potomac Yard in Alexandria and the Acca Yard in Richmond, both of which have recently been picketed by the BMWE.

The BMWE has been involved in a labor dispute with the Maine Central Railroad Company ("MEC") and its subsidiary, the Portland Terminal Company ("PT"). The MEC and PT, together with the Delaware & Hudson Railway ("D & H") and the Boston & Maine Corporation ("B & M"), are part of the Guilford Rail System, of which Guilford Transportation Industries, Inc., is the parent corporation. After exhausting the statutory procedures of the RLA without success in resolving the dispute, the union went on strike against MEC on March 3, 1986. Later that month the BMWE extended its picketing activities to the B & M and the D & H.

On April 2, 1986, MEC and PT broke off negotiations with the BMWE. The National Mediation Board, operating under the authority of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 151, then recessed its public interest mediation efforts without setting a future date for negotiations. The union asserts that it decided to extend its picketing further to include RF & P's Alexandria facilities in order to put economic pressure on the Guilford Rail System to bring MEC and PT back to the bargaining table. ¹

On April 4, 1986, the BMWE posted pickets at Potomac Yard. Employees of RF & P and four tenant railroads refused to cross the union's picket lines. RF & P immediately sought to enjoin the picketing, alleging that such activity had a serious impact on its ability to perform services for the railroads, including those which were not involved in the MEC/PT dispute. On the same day that RF & P's action was filed, the district court denied appellant's request for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a preliminary injunction. The district court concluded that although RF & P appeared to be a neutral, "it's not completely disinterested in the underlying labor dispute in that it has an association and does some business with the [MEC] and [PT], which do have the underlying labor dispute and which are of the same industry." Under these circumstances, the district court found that the Norris LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 104, deprived the court of jurisdiction to award injunctive relief.

On April 9, 1986, the union commenced picketing activity at RF & P's facilities in Richmond. The following day, RF & P returned to district court, seeking a TRO and preliminary injunction to enjoin the new picketing. Again, the district court denied relief on jurisdictional grounds. ²

This appeal followed. ³

II.

On appeal, RF & P contends that, contrary to the district court's conclusion, a federal court has jurisdiction to enjoin the picketing of a neutral railroad employer in order to accommodate the mandates of both the Railway Labor Act and the Interstate Commerce Act. Appellant further argues that injunctive relief is permissible where the neutral railroad is not substantially aligned with the railroad involved in the primary dispute with the union. We disagree with each of RF & P's contentions.

At the outset, we note that the union exhausted the procedures of the RLA and thereafter engaged in a lawful strike against the MEC/PT. Moreover, the union's secondary picketing against the RF & P has been peaceful. Absent clear congressional intent to the contrary, peaceful boycotts and nonviolent picketing are a form of speech or conduct ordinarily entitled to protection under the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855 (1941); Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). Significantly, the Supreme Court has held that in railroad disputes subject to the RLA until Congress acts, peaceful picketing in both primary and secondary situations is conduct which may not be proscribed by a state. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969). The question which we must resolve in this appeal is whether a federal court may enjoin such activity.

Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 104, provides in pertinent part that:

No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:

(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; ...

(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence;

(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute;

(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts heretofore specified;

(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified; and

(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified.

The plain language of this statute severely limits the power of a federal court to enter the labor dispute area. A case is deemed to involve or grow out of a labor dispute:

when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a "labor dispute" (as defined in this section) of "persons participating or interested" therein (as defined in this section).

29 U.S.C. Sec. 113(a). The Act defines "labor dispute" broadly:

The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

29 U.S.C. Sec. 113(c). And finally,

A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation.

29 U.S.C. Sec. 113(b).

Despite the sweeping language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, RF & P maintains that the statute cannot be viewed in isolation. According to appellant, the district court had jurisdiction to issue an injunction prohibiting the picketing at issue here in order to accommodate the Railway Labor Act and the Interstate Commerce Act and to protect the public interest in avoiding interruption of commerce. The railroad's argument, however, would have us ignore the Supreme Court's decision in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Assoc., 457 U.S. 702, 102 S.Ct. 2672, 73 L.Ed.2d 327 (1982).

In Jacksonville Bulk, the longshoremen's union, reacting to the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, refused to load certain goods on ships bound for the Soviet Union. The employer then brought suit pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a), alleging that...