Richmond Television Corporation v. United States
Decision Date | 20 December 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 9531.,9531. |
Citation | 354 F.2d 410 |
Parties | RICHMOND TELEVISION CORPORATION, Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Fred R. Becker, Atty. Dept. of Justice, (Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and David O. Walter, Attys., Dept. of Justice, C. Vernon Spratley, Jr., U. S. Atty., and Samuel W. Phillips, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellant.
Robert T. Barton, Jr., and Horace D. McCowan, Jr., Richmond, Va. (Christian, Barton, Parker, Epps & Brent, Richmond, Va., on the brief), for appellee.
Before SOBELOFF, BRYAN and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges.
This court has heretofore held that the taxpayer, Richmond Television Corporation, was not entitled to the claimed refund for the years 1956 and 1957. 345 F.2d 901. Its claim was based on an expenditure of $53,129.19, representing the cumulative cost of the training program conducted by it from 1953 to 1956, before it obtained its FCC license and commenced the operation of its broadcasting station. The facts of the case are set forth more fully in our opinion. For the reasons therein stated we reaffirm our holding that this sum is not a deductible business expense for the two years in question within the meaning of section 162 (a). The expenditures in the advance training of a body of personnel created a capital asset, requiring different tax treatment.1
The taxpayer's amended complaint presented an alternative claim for relief. Richmond there contended that, if it was not entitled to deduct the sum as an ordinary and necessary business expense, it was entitled to amortize it over the life of the capital asset thereby created.
This court reserved the question of whether the taxpayer was entitled to amortize these costs, taking the view that the question was premature and not properly before us. However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and ruled that the amortization claims for the years 1956 and 1957 were adequately raised and properly before us and remanded the case for consideration of those claims. 86 S.Ct. 233 (Nov. 8, 1965). We of course accept the correction of the Supreme Court and proceed to determine the taxpayer's right to amortization. The parties have submitted the issue, waiving further briefs or argument.
The parties are agreed that the controlling provision is section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S. C.A. § 167 (1954),2 as implemented by Regulation 1.167(a)-3. The Regulation provides:
* * *"(Italics added.)3
While it is not disputed that the expenditures for the training program in anticipation of the grant of a broadcasting license created a valuable asset, the parties are in disagreement as to whether this asset has a life of limited duration as the taxpayer contends, or of unlimited duration as the Government maintains. The taxpayer insists that this capital asset must be regarded as having a useful life limited to the period of the first broadcasting license, which is three years beginning in 1956, when the license was issued and broadcasting began, and that amortization is therefore allowable and due for 1956 and 1957, the tax years in question. Presumably, according to the taxpayer's theory, it is entitled to amortize a pro rata portion of one-third of the sum in each of the years 1956 and 1957, and the remaining one-third in 1958.4
The position of the United States is that to qualify this intangible asset for amortization the taxpayer was required by the above-quoted Regulation to prove from "experience or other factors" that the useful life of the asset was for "a limited period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy." The Government points to the fact that the only testimony in the record on this issue showed that only "a very, very tiny, tiny percentage" of applications for renewals of both radio and television broadcasting licenses has been denied by the Commission in a period of 25 years. The percentage has been estimated at less than one-tenth of one percent.
The taxpayer, in cross-examining the government witness, posed the possibility that under the statute the taxpayer's license might fail to be renewed, but we think that this suggestion is not entitled to sufficient weight to overcome the contrary experience, practically without exception, in the regulation of the industry. The taxpayer should not be permitted to rely on a remote speculative possibility that the Commission might refuse renewal on the ground of the licensee's misconduct. Indeed, we do not understand that possible future misconduct is relied upon by the taxpayer in support of its contention. But in the absence of misconduct, what reason could arise to cause the Commission to deviate from its consistent practice and refuse renewal? There was no intimation whatever at the trial of a waning public interest in the continued existence of this station. The taxpayer has furnished its own appraisal of the insubstantiality of any such conjecture. It has in fact proceeded in 1956 and 1957 and in the succeeding years with confidence on the only reasonable assumption — that its license, while technically granted for only three years at a time, is in economic operation one of indefinite duration.5
In KWTX Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 952 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1959), the Commissioner introduced considerable evidence on renewal of television licenses. The Tax Court found as a fact that:
"In the past a large number of these applications for renewal of television broadcasting licenses has been granted and none ever denied,"
and the Tax Court concluded that:
"While it is doubtless true that it will be within the power of the F. C.C. to refuse to grant a renewal of petitioner\'s television license * * nevertheless we think * * * that it is altogether unlikely that the F. C.C. will deny petitioner\'s application for a renewal of its license."
Courts have adopted similar reasoning where local broadcasting companies have attempted to amortize the cost of renewable network affiliation contracts. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 350 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 86 S.Ct. 645 (Feb. 1, 1966), the court reversed the Tax Court, 31 T.C. 793, and denied amortization of the cost of an affiliation contract renewable every two years, even though the taxpayer introduced evidence showing that similar contracts had in the past been terminated. In deciding that the asset was of indefinite duration, the court said that "the record as a whole persuasively indicates, that taxpayer's contracts may be expected to remain in force for a wholly unpredictable period of time." 350 F.2d at 586. See also Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 912, aff'd, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935, 83 S.Ct. 881, 9 L.Ed.2d 766 (1963) ( ). To the same effect, see Gant v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1959) ( ); and Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
NCNB Corp. v. U.S.
...907 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68, 86 S.Ct. 233, 15 L.Ed.2d 143, original holding on this issue reaffirmed, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965) ) requiring the matching of revenues and costs in the appropriate accounting period...." 651 F.2d at 948. The panel concluded that ben......
-
NCNB Corp. v. U.S.
...Cir. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68, 86 S.Ct. 233, 15 L.Ed.2d 143 (1965), original holding on this issue reaffirmed, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965): Our system of income taxation attempts to match income and expenses of the taxable year so as to tax only net income. A taxpayer m......
-
Boeing Company v. Shipman
...2d 292, 295; Beaty Shopping Center, Inc. v. Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio, 4 Cir., 1963, 315 F.2d 467, 469; Richmond Television Corporation v. United States, 4 Cir., 1965, 354 F.2d 410, 414; Round Rock Independent Sch. Dist. v. First National Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 1963, 324 F.2d 280, 281; Herron v. ......
-
Neely v. Martin Eby Construction Co, 12
...Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 241 F.2d 465 (C.A.3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 815, 78 S.Ct. 17, 2 L.Ed.2d 32; Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410 (C.A.4th Cir.); Mills v. Mitsubishi Shipping Co., 358 F.2d 609 (C.A.5th Cir.); Lappin v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 337 F.2d 399......