Richmond v. Duke

Decision Date19 December 1995
Docket NumberCiv. No. PB-C-95-473.
PartiesWilliam RICHMOND, Plaintiff, v. James DUKE, Disciplinary Hearing Officer; Warden Reed; Assistant Warden Lay; Robert Clark, hearing (Disciplinary) Administrator; and Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

William Richmond, Grady, AR, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

EISELE, District Judge.

Before the Court is plaintiff William Richmond's pro se complaint (Docket No. 3), which seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's complaint has been referred to a United States Magistrate,1 see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); E.D.Ark. Rule F-1(VIII)(A)(8), who has since presented the Court with his proposed Findings and Recommendation (Docket No. 4), recommending that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice under the authority of Heck v. Humphrey, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Defendants have filed no objections to the Magistrate's recommended disposition, and the time for them to do so has passed. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); E.D. Ark. Rule F-1(VIII)(C). However, plaintiff has timely filed a list of objections to the Magistrate's recommended disposition (Docket No. 5), see ibid., and the Court must therefore undertake "a de novo determination of those portions of the . . . proposed findings and recommendation to which objections have been made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2411-12, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980); Taylor v. Farrier, 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir.1990). After conducting this review, the Court concludes that the Magistrate's recommendation should, ultimately, be adopted in its entirety. The Court, however, pauses to explain in detail the reasons for its decision.

I.

The facts of this case are, according to the allegations of plaintiff's complaint and the documentation attached thereto,2 relatively straightforward, and for purposes of this opinion the Court will accept plaintiff's factual representations as true.3 Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Correction (the ADC). Complaint ¶ II. It appears, according to the ADC records presently before the Court, that on December 18, 1994, an ADC corrections officer accused plaintiff of a "major disciplinary" violation of the ADC's disciplinary rules. Complaint exh. 1; see also ADC Admin. Reg. § 831, ¶ VI.D.1-2 (May 18, 1990). Following a hearing conducted by an ADC Hearing Officer, defendant James Duke, see ADC Admin. Reg. § 831, ¶¶ III.B, VI.E (May 18, 1990), plaintiff was found guilty of violating the ADC's disciplinary rules, and he was disciplined accordingly (it appears, among other things, that plaintiff was placed in punitive isolation and stripped of some "good-time" credits). Complaint exh. 1; see ADC Admin. Reg. § 831, ¶¶ III.F, VI.F, VI.G.1 (May 18, 1990). However, plaintiff claims (and for purposes of this opinion the Court accepts as true) that his disciplinary hearing was not held until December 27, 1994, Complaint exh. 1 & 2, i.e., nine days following the corrections officer's filing of the disciplinary charges against plaintiff. On December 29, 1994, plaintiff appealed to defendants Warden Reed and Assistant Warden Lay, see ADC Admin. Reg. § 831, ¶¶ III.G, VI.H (May 18, 1990), arguing that the disciplinary charges filed against him had expired, since his disciplinary hearing was not held within five days of the corrections officer's filing of those charges,4 and that his disciplinary conviction therefore violated his constitutional due process rights. Complaint exh. 3. Plaintiff also argued that he was, in fact, innocent of the charges against him. Id. Warden Reed and Assistant Warden Lay affirmed plaintiff's disciplinary conviction that same day. Id. Plaintiff then appealed to the ADC's Hearing Administrator, defendant Robert Clark, see ADC Admin. Reg. § 831, ¶¶ III.G, VI.H (May 18, 1990), but that appeal was denied on January 9, 1995. Complaint exh. 4. On January 21, 1995, plaintiff finally appealed to the Director of the ADC, defendant Larry Norris, see ADC Admin. Reg. § 831, ¶¶ III.G, VI.H (May 18, 1990) but it appears that his final appeal was likewise to no avail.5 Complaint exh. 6.

After exhausting his administrative appeals within the ADC, plaintiff declined to appeal the ADC's final determination to the appropriate Arkansas Circuit Court, as is permitted under Ark.Code Ann. § 25-15-212(a) (Michie 1987). See Clinton v. Bonds, 306 Ark. 554, 816 S.W.2d 169 (1991) (holding that, despite its language to the contrary, § 25-15-212(a) provides for judicial review of any ADC determination (including one involving an inmate's "good time") that raises a federal or state constitutional question).6 Instead, plaintiff filed his § 1983 complaint with this Court on September 5, 1995. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he "was tried on a disciplinary that was expired," and that he "was innocent" of the disciplinary charges made against him, Complaint ¶ V, and, therefore, plaintiff (presumably) argues that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by his disciplinary conviction and consequent punishment. To redress these alleged due process violations, plaintiff asks that this Court vacate his disciplinary conviction and order same to be removed from his institutional record, that he be ordered removed from the ADC's "hoe squad," and that he be awarded $1,500.00 against each defendant.

II.

The issue that must presently be dealt with is not whether the allegations of plaintiff's complaint have stated a meritorious due process claim,7 but, rather, whether plaintiff has selected the appropriate vehicle for bringing any such claim before this Court. This question, in turn, boils down to whether plaintiff may now present either of his due process challenges to his disciplinary conviction under § 1983 (as he has attempted to do), or whether, under the current facts, his sole avenue for raising those claims in federal court is provided by the appropriate federal habeas corpus statute, namely 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As the Magistrate correctly recognized, the answer to this question must begin with an analysis of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Heck v. Humphrey, supra.

In Heck, the Supreme Court was faced with a question similar (though not identical) to that currently presented — whether a state prisoner could challenge his conviction in federal court, on due process grounds, in a suit for damages (and other unspecified relief) under § 1983. The Supreme Court resolved that question as follows:

In order to recover for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidation of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

___ U.S. at ___ - ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2372-73 (footnotes omitted). In other words, if a § 1983 claim is necessarily dependant upon proving that the plaintiff's conviction was constitutionally infirm, he may not make that showing for the first time in his § 1983 action. Rather, the plaintiff must first, as a prerequisite to his § 1983 action, have successfully attacked his conviction in prior proceeding (e.g., by having secured a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254). Id. at ___ - ___ & n. 6, 114 S.Ct. at 2372-73 & n. 6; Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1835, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). However, if a plaintiff's § 1983 claim challenges only the constitutionality of the procedures employed in securing his conviction (as opposed to the legality of the conviction itself), and if any such error would not be sufficient to undermine his conviction, then the plaintiff will be allowed to proceed with his § 1983 claim. Id. at ___, ___ - ___ & n. 7, 114 S.Ct. at 2370, 2372-73 & n. 7; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). This basic dichotomy of Heck has been recognized (in principle, at least), by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in its recent decisions in Schafer v. Moore, supra, and Armento-Bey v. Harper, 68 F.3d 215, 216 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam).8

What remains to be seen, however, is whether the rationale expressed in Heck should be applied to cases in which a prisoner, such as plaintiff, seeks to challenge a forfeiture of "good-time" credits mandated by a penal institution's disciplinary tribunal. It appears that the Eighth Circuit has, in at least two decisions, apparently assumed that Heck applies in the context of such prison disciplinary disputes, see Armento-Bey v. Harper, supra; Schafer v. Moore, supra, and the Court is aware that at least one court has expressly so held. Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C.Cir.1994).

Were it writing on a clean slate, the Court might be inclined to take a...

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