Richmond v. Post

• Decision Date: 26 October 1897
• Docket Number: Nos. 10,701 - (82).,s. 10,701 - (82).
• Citation: 69 Minn. 457
• Parties: CATHERINE H. RICHMOND v. JOHN POST.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

69 Minn. 457

CATHERINE H. RICHMOND v. JOHN POST.¹

Nos. 10,701 - (82).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 26, 1897.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Otter Tail county, Baxter, J., denying his motion for a new trial after a verdict of $300 for plaintiff. Reversed.

C. J. Gunderson, for appellant.

E. E. Corliss, for respondent.

COLLINS, J.

Action for slander, in which plaintiff secured a verdict. Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

The primary question arises out of an objection made by defendant's counsel to the reception of any evidence under the complaint upon the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the objection being overruled by the trial court. The plaintiff attempted to set forth four distinct causes of action in the complaint, but at the trial no testimony was offered except as to one. Certainly, if this cause of action was insufficiently pleaded, the allegations of the complaint respecting the others were wholly inadequate.

As to the cause of action concerning which evidence was offered and received, the complaint, after setting out that plaintiff was a married woman, having one son; that for two years prior thereto she had been engaged in the business of keeping an hotel in a certain village; that she had maintained a good reputation for the hotel and for her business; that she had always conducted herself properly and respectably; and that defendant was, and for said two years had been, a business man in said village of great wealth and influence, — alleged:

"That [defendant] during the month of December, 1895, at the store of the defendant, in Parker's Prairie, in the presence and hearing of one Harry Tombes, spoke of and concerning the plaintiff the following words: `I am going to build an addition to my store. I am going to get out stone, and put a good foundation under it, and when I get it done I am going to paint it red, and run opposition to Mrs. Richmond and Dr. Henderson. If they can make money dishonestly, I have the same right,' — thereby meaning and being understood by the said Harry Tombes to mean that the plaintiff was keeping a house of prostitution at her said hotel."

It was also averred that said words were false and untrue.

In passing upon the sufficiency of the above-quoted allegation, it must be remembered that a distinction has long been recognized between actions for libel and for slander. Words, when committed to writing and published, are considered as libelous, which, if only spoken, would not subject the person speaking to any action (13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 296, and cases cited in note 8); so that authorities as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of complaints in actions for libel are not always in point when we are considering actions for slander.

What is essential, in order to render spoken words actionable perse, is well stated in Stroebel v. Whitney, 31 Minn. 384, 18 N. W. 98. They need not, in express terms, contain a criminal charge. The question is, how would ordinary men naturally understand the language? If the charge is not direct and unambiguous, do the words consist of a statement of facts which would naturally and presumably be understood by the hearers...