Richter v. Rose
| Citation | 962 P.2d 583,1998 MT 165 |
| Decision Date | 30 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-288,97-288 |
| Parties | William R. RICHTER and Carol Anne Richter, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Joseph C. ROSE and Lois F. Rose, husband and wife, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Marshall Murray, Kalispell, for Defendants and Appellants.
Thomas R. Bostock; Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg,Kalispell, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
¶1 William R. and Carol Anne Richter (the Richters) brought the underlying action against Joseph C. and Lois F. Rose (the Roses) seeking a declaration that a public right-of-way had been established across the Roses property in the early 1900s or, alternatively, a condemnation order granting them an easement across the Roses property. The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, rejected the Richters public right-of-way claim but entered a preliminary condemnation order and judgment in their favor.
¶2 The Roses appeal from that order and judgment and from the subsequent denial of their motion to amend the conclusions and judgment, contending that the District Court erred in concluding that the Richters property is a farm for eminent domain purposes and, because it did not have jurisdiction over the issue of necessity, further erred in issuing the preliminary condemnation order. We reverse the District Courts conclusion that the Richters property is a farm for eminent domain purposes and, therefore, we need not reach the issue relating to the issuance of the preliminary condemnation order.
¶3 The Richters cross appeal from the District Courts conclusion that they did not establish the existence of a public right-of-way by a preponderance of the evidence. We affirm on the cross appeal.
¶4 Francis and Lois OConnell (the OConnells), Carol Richters parents, obtained Government Lot 10 of Section 1, Township 31 North, Range 20 West, Flathead County (Lot 10) at a sheriffs sale in 1958 and gifted it to the Richters in 1971. Lot 10 consists of 133.47 acres of alternating meadow and timberland that has been used primarily for recreational purposes by both the OConnells and the Richters. Neither couple had deeded land access to Lot 10.
¶5 Lot 10 is bounded to the north and west by property owned by the Roses and to the south by property owned by the Roses and by several smaller properties, the owners of which were not named as defendants in this suit. The North Fork of the Flathead River forms the eastern boundary of Lot 10 and has provided the only access to Lot 10. The portion of the Roses property across which the Richters seek access is described as Government Lot 2 and the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 31 North, Range 20 West (Lot 2).
¶6 The Richters first sought to obtain deeded land access to Lot 10 in 1990, when they contacted Joseph Rose about purchasing an easement across the Roses property. Discussions continued for several months, during which time the Richters obtained a survey of Lot 10 at Joseph Roses request. Joseph Rose then proposed a location for the easement and a price of approximately $2,000 was discussed. The Richters attorney submitted a written easement agreement to the Roses in 1991.
¶7 In the interim, and acting on their belief that they had viable access to Lot 10, the Richters hired professional forester Phillip Healey (Healey) in 1991. Healey analyzed and evaluated the timber resources on Lot 10 and concluded that there was merchantable timber on Lot 10 requiring management. He further concluded that land access to Lot 10 was necessary for the economical management and extraction of the timber.
¶8 The Roses refused to sign the written easement agreement and the Richters filed the present action seeking a declaration that a public right-of-way exists across the Roses property or, alternatively, to condemn an easement for an authorized public use. The Richters complaint also included breach of contract and trespass claims.
¶9 The Richters presented considerable historical evidence at trial relating to their theory that a public right-of-way was established across the Roses property in the early 1900s. Carol Richter also testified that the Flathead County Attorney had found no evidence of either the existence or the abandonment of such a public right-of-way. Because the statutes applicable to eminent domain require the party attempting to condemn ¶10 The District Court concluded that the Richters did not establish the existence of a public right-of-way across the Roses property. It found, however, that the only reasonable or practical means of access to Lot 10 is across the Roses property and ultimately concluded that the Richters were entitled to condemn an easement across the Roses property. Its conclusion was based, in part, on its determination that the Richters property is a farm.
property via eminent domain to take certain steps prior to filing a condemnation action, the Richters both testified to the steps they had taken. William Richter stated that he had negotiated with Joseph Rose regarding an easement and the Richters attorney had submitted an offer for a written easement agreement. He also stated that Lot 10 consists half of grazing land and half of timber land. According to Carol Richter, the crops raised on Lot 10 are timber and grass.
¶11 The District Court issued a preliminary condemnation order and ordered the Roses to file a statement of claim of just compensation. The Roses subsequently moved to amend the District Courts conclusions and judgment and the motion was deemed denied when the District Court failed to rule on it within 60 days. The Roses appeal and the Richters cross appeal.
¶12 The parties challenges are directed primarily to conclusions of law made by the District Court. We review a district courts conclusions of law to determine whether the interpretation of the law is correct. St. John v. Missoula Elec. Co-op., Inc. (1997), 282 Mont. 315, 320, 938 P.2d 586, 588 (citations omitted).
¶13 The Roses also appeal from the denial of their motion to amend the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. Our standard in reviewing the denial of a motion to amend is whether the district court abused its discretion. Hickingbotham v. Duncan (1995), 271 Mont. 525, 529, 898 P.2d 1215, 1217 (citation omitted).
¶14 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that Lot 10 is a farm?
¶15 Eminent domain is the right to take private property for a public use. Section 70-30-101, MCA. In Montana, the procedures for taking property pursuant to eminent domain are entirely statutory. See §§ 70-30-101, MCA, et seq. Among the public uses on behalf of which the right of eminent domain may be exercised are private roads leading to farms or residences. Section 70-30-102(6), MCA.
¶16 In this case, the Richters sought to exercise the right of eminent domain to obtain an easement interest across Lot 2 for a private road to Lot 10. They contended that Lot 10 is a farm under § 70-30-102(6), MCA. The District Court applied the definition of "farm" set forth in § 72-16-331(7), MCA, as "truck farms, ranches, nurseries, ranges, greenhouses, orchards, woodlands, or structures used primarily for raising agricultural or horticultural commodities" and concluded that Lot 10 is a farm because it consists of woodlands with marketable timber. The Roses contend that the District Court erred in relying on the definition of farm contained in § 72-16-331(7), MCA.
¶17 Title 70, Chapter 30, MCA, does not define "farm." "Farm" is defined in several other locations in the MCA, however, and when a word is defined in any part of the MCA, the same definition applies wherever the word appears unless "a contrary intention plainly appears." See § 1-2-107, MCA.
¶18 Here, the District Court applied the definition of farm contained in § 72-16-331(7), MCA. However, § 72-16-331, MCA, limits application of the definitions contained therein to §§ 72-16-331 through 72-16-349, MCA, which involve valuation for probate purposes. The legislature having clearly expressed its intention that the definition of "farm" contained in § 72-16-331(7), MCA, applies only to certain sections within the Montana Probate Code, that definition cannot properly be applied in the context of § 70-30-102, MCA. Therefore, we hold that the District Court erred in doing so ¶19 For similar reasons, none of the other statutory definitions of farm advanced by the parties in the District Court and this Court are applicable in defining "farm" for purposes of § 70-30-102(6), MCA. The definitions of farm contained in § 39-3-402, MCA, apply only to Part 4 of Title 39, Chapter 3, which pertains to minimum wage and overtime compensation. Similarly, the definition of farm contained in § 39-51-205(3), MCA, is limited to use "in this section[.]" Thus, as was the case with the definition of farm contained in § 72-16-331(7), MCA, the legislature clearly expressed its intention that the definitions contained in §§ 39-3-402 and 39-51-205(3), MCA, are limited in their application and cannot properly be used in defining "farm" for purposes of § 70-30-102(6), MCA.
¶20 Nor does the definition of "farm operation" contained in § 70-31-102(6), MCA, apply. On the face of it, "farm operation" and "farm" are not necessarily equivalent terms and, in any event, we cannot simply impose the definition of a different term on the word "farm" contained in § 70-30-102(6), MCA. Moreover, § 70-31-102, MCA, provides that the definitions contained therein apply only to Chapter 31, which relates to relocation assistance for condemnees. Thus, the legislature again clearly expressed its intention that the definitions contained in § 70-31-102, MCA, are limited in their application.
¶21 Since farm is not defined for purposes of § 70-30-102(6), MCA, and other definitions advanced...
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