Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson

Decision Date01 September 1993
Docket NumberNo. 120,120
Citation645 A.2d 1147,335 Md. 661
PartiesRICHWIND JOINT VENTURE 4 et al. v. Ernestine BRUNSON et al. ,
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Denise Ramsburg Stanley (Donald C. Allen, Allen, Johnson, Alexander & Karp, all on brief) Baltimore, for petitioner.

C. Christopher Brown (Joseph B. Espo, Brown, Goldstein, & Levy, all on brief) Baltimore, for respondent.

H. Thomas Howell, David A. Carter, Howell, Gately, Whitney & Carter, all on brief, Towson, amicus curiae, for the American Ins. Ass'n H. Thomas Howell, Daniel W. Whitney, Wendy A. Lassen, Howell, Gately, Whitney & Carter, all on brief, Towson, amicus curiae, for Continental Realty Corp.

M. Albert Figinski, Julie C. Janofsky, David W. Erb, Weinberg and Green, all on brief, Baltimore, amicus curiae, for The Apartment Builders and Owners Council of the Home Builders Ass'n.

Sally B. Gold, Gwen B. Tromley, Law Offices of Sally B. Gold, all on brief, Baltimore, amicus curiae, for Housing Authority of Baltimore City.

James E. Gray, Jeanne B. Gardner, Joseph E. Dever, Goodell, DeVries, Leech & Gray, Baltimore, amicus curiae, of the Property Owners Ass'n of Greater Baltimore, Inc.

Argued Before MURPHY, C.J., and RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL, RAKER and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr. * (retired), Specially Assigned, JJ.

CHASANOW, Judge.

Before this Court are a number of related cases involving the tragic circumstances of children suffering from various injuries due to their consumption of lead-based paint. The petition for certiorari was granted in the instant case in order to address the following issues:

1. To what extent, if any, do the lead-based paint provisions of Baltimore City ordinances and Public Local Laws supersede the common law requirement that a landlord's liability for negligence depends upon notice of a particular defect and a reasonable opportunity to correct it?

2. To what extent, if any, does the Maryland Consumer Protection Act impose strict liability for personal injury upon a landlord without requiring proof of knowledge, deception, reliance, or causation?

For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals as to the jury's verdict regarding negligence, but reverse the intermediate appellate court's holding with respect to Maryland's Consumer Protection Act. See Richwind v. Brunson, 96 Md.App. 330, 625 A.2d 326 (1993). See also Maryland Code (1975, 1990 Repl.Vol.), Commercial Law Article, §§ 13-101 through 13-501.

I. Facts

In December of 1983, Barbara Richardson moved into a residential rental property located at 2119 West Fairmount Avenue in Baltimore City and owned by Harry and Rita Baitch. While residing at the property, Ms. Richardson gave birth to her daughter Jamika Holman on March 18, 1984, and to her son Jamall Holman on March 13, 1985. In December 1985, Richwind Joint Venture (a general partnership) purchased the premises from Mr. and Mrs. Baitch. At the time Richwind assumed ownership, Barbara Richardson was already in possession of the premises under a preexisting lease.

Shortly thereafter, Richwind hired Scoken Management Corporation to manage the property and collect rent payments from the tenant. At that time, Scoken managed approximately 400 residential real estate properties, most of which were located in Baltimore City. Mark Chodak was the president of Scoken Management Corporation. Scoken's services were retained because of Richwind's prior business dealings with Mr. Chodak. Chodak had been a property manager for approximately sixteen years, prior to which he was a housing inspector for Baltimore City for two years. Chodak also attended and graduated from law school.

Scoken assumed the management of 2119 West Fairmount Avenue in January of 1986. At that time, Chodak knew that homes built prior to 1957 "often" contained lead-based paint, and that the property in question was built before 1957. Chodak also testified, however, that he possessed no specific knowledge that the premises contained lead-based paint at the time Scoken assumed the management of it. Richwind also alleged it did not know of any lead-based paint contained in the property at the time of its purchase. At the time of the purchase, there were no outstanding or "uncorrected violation notices" regarding the property. Richwind did not inspect the property when it was purchased, nor did it instruct Scoken to do so.

Once Scoken assumed management of the property, it immediately sent a letter apprising the tenant of that fact, and indicating that if she had any complaints regarding the property she should notify Scoken. Beginning on January 15, 1986, Ms. Richardson forwarded a series of complaints to Scoken about the disrepair of the premises. According to Scoken's records, the following complaint was made on January 17, 1986: "[P]aint & plaster peeling from walls." Chodak thereafter dispatched one of Scoken's workmen to correct the problem. Chodak testified that he did not inspect the property himself to determine either the condition of the paint or whether his employee corrected the problem in a satisfactory manner. On the other hand, Chodak also testified that he did visit the property sometime between January and September of 1986, though he could not recall the exact dates. The record further reflects that on at least three separate occasions (January 20, February 5, and April 30, 1986) after Scoken's employee responded to the initial complaint, Ms. Richardson requested paint from Scoken in order to repaint portions of the premises herself. Scoken provided the paint each time Ms. Richardson requested it.

On September 3, 1986, Jamika and Jamall Holman were both evaluated by the Kennedy Institute's Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, and they were determined to have elevated blood-lead levels. Due to Jamall's exceedingly high blood-lead level, he was immediately hospitalized to undergo chelation therapy. 1 Because of these high blood-lead levels, the Baltimore City Health Department inspected the property. On September 22, 1986, the Department served Richwind and Chodak with an "Emergency Violation Notice and Order to Remove Lead Nuisance." The Department's notice enumerated 42 specific lead paint violations of the Baltimore City Code. See, e.g., Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl.Vol.), Article 13.

Barbara Richardson filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City as the mother and next friend of Jamika and Jamall for injuries allegedly sustained by the children as a result of exposure to lead-based paint. Ms. Richardson died while the case was still pending and Ernestine Brunson, the children's grandmother and personal representative of Barbara Richardson's estate, was substituted as the plaintiff. Among others not here relevant, the complaint named the following as defendants: Harry and Rita Baitch (the original owners of the property), Richwind Joint Venture 4 (the current owner) and Scoken Management Corporation (Richwind's management company). As amended, the complaint alleged that the defendants were negligent, created a nuisance, and violated Maryland's Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"). See Md.Code (1975, 1990 Repl.Vol.), Comm.Law Art., §§ 13-101 through 13-501.

Rita Baitch settled with the plaintiffs prior to trial. 2 Also, the common law nuisance counts against the remaining defendants were dismissed prior to trial. The case proceeded to trial on the negligence and consumer protection counts, and after the parties presented their cases, the trial judge granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the CPA counts. Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded compensatory damages of $252,000.00 for Jamall Holman and $247,500.00 for Jamika Holman. In addition, the court awarded damages to Richardson's estate in the amount of $18,944.00.

The defendants appealed and the plaintiffs cross-appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the jury's negligence finding, reversed the circuit court's dismissal of the consumer protection counts, and remanded the case. See Richwind v. Brunson, 96 Md.App. 330, 625 A.2d 326 (1993). This Court granted the defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari.

II. Negligence

In order to establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiffs must prove the following elements: "(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty." Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994) (citing Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 448, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (1993) and Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 241, 492 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1985)).

In its brief before this Court, Richwind asserts that a landlord's liability for negligence depends upon actual knowledge of a defective condition on the premises, a contractual duty to repair it and a reasonable opportunity to do so. Even though Richwind concedes that "numerous statutory enactments impact upon the relationship between landlord and tenant," it further contends that "they do not supersede the common law requirement that a landlord's liability for negligence depends upon notice of a particular defect and a reasonable opportunity to correct it."

We agree with Richwind's concession that certain statutory enactments impact upon the common law requisites of liability in the instant case. For instance, even if Richwind is not liable for negligence under the common law, absent a covenant to repair, its duty to protect the plaintiffs from injury may nonetheless emanate from specific provisions of the Baltimore City Code. See Balt.City Code (1983 Repl.Vol.), Art. 13, §§ 702, 703 and 706. Section 702 of the city code provides that every building in Baltimore City which is occupied as a dwelling is to be "kept in good repair, in safe condition, and fit for...

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