Rickards v. State

• Decision Date: 23 June 1916
• Docket Number: 41.
• Parties: RICKARDS v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

98 A. 525

129 Md. 184

RICKARDS v. STATE.

No. 41.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 23, 1916

Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City; Henry Duffy, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Harry N. Rickards was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, URNER STOCKBRIDGE and CONSTABLE, JJ.

Albert S. J. Owens, of Baltimore (Harry B. Wolf, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Albert C. Ritchie, Atty. Gen. (William F. Broening, State's Atty. for Baltimore City, and Roland R. Marchant, Dep State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief), for the State.

URNER J.

The questions to be decided in this case are raised by 28 exceptions reserved in the course of the appellant's trial, resulting in conviction, upon an indictment for manslaughter alleged to have been committed through an operation performed for the purpose of producing an abortion.

The first exception was taken to the action of the trial court in overruling an objection to a question addressed by the state to its principal witness, James R. Meredith, who had been indicted jointly with the appellant, but had obtained a severance, and was testifying voluntarily for the prosecution. Meredith had stated in his testimony that he was responsible for the pregnancy of the young woman, Miss Smith upon whom the operation is said to have been performed; that he employed the appellant to produce the abortion, and went with Miss Smith to the appellant's apartments for that purpose; that she reclined upon a bed and the appellant inserted a speculum, which made her very nervous, and that to compose her the witness sat down by her, on the side of the bed opposite to the appellant, and stroked her hand. After further testifying that he did not see any instrument except the speculum used, he was asked, "Why didn't you see it?" The answer, in effect, was that he withdrew his attention from the appellant and was looking in the girl's face as he sat by her side. Objection was made to the question because it assumed that the speculum was not the only instrument employed. An abortion according to the proof, could not be produced by a speculum, which is useful only for examination purposes. The appellant's defense was that he in fact used no instrument or other means to cause an abortion, and was not employed for such an operation, but was simply engaged to clean out the womb upon the representation by Meredith that a miscarriage had already occurred, leaving certain irregular conditions which required attention. Upon examination, however, as the appellant asserts, he discovered that a miscarriage had not taken place, but was then impending, and he therefore proceeded no further, advising Meredith and the young woman that the only thing to do was to let nature take its course. There is no reason whatever to believe that the defense thus indicated was prejudiced by the assumption contained in the interrogatory above quoted. The witness distinctly and repeatedly testified that he did not see any instrument used except the speculum. It was the object of the inquiry to show that, as the witness was not watching the appellant's movements, but had his attention otherwise occupied, an instrument capable of causing an abortion could have been used without coming under his observation. The question was objectionable in assuming that there was such an instrument employed, but the answer elicited, in the light of the other testimony just referred to, involved no injury to the defense, and hence we see no reversible error in this ruling.

The second exception relates to the refusal of the court to permit Meredith to be asked, for the sixth time on cross-examination, when it was he had communicated to the state's attorney, through his counsel or others, his willingness to testify for the state in this case. As the witness had five times stated that he had always expressed such a willingness, beginning with the time of his hearing before the police justice, and later on in a conference with representatives of the state's attorney, the further repetition of the question was properly held to be unnecessary.

In the effort to develop the theory that Meredith had procured, and Miss Smith had used, some means of abortion before she was brought to the appellant, questions were asked Meredith on cross-examination as to whether he had not previously consulted a certain other physician about the trouble. Having admitted that he had talked with the other doctor several times on the subject, he was questioned as to how long before he brought Miss Smith to the appellant's apartments he had been having conferences with the other physician, and in reply he twice fixed the time at one or two weeks. Counsel for appellant again inquired whether it was not at least a week, and, the witness not responding further, and the question being pressed, the court said: "Oh, do not repeat your questions so often. Your questions are getting captious." This comment was made the occasion for the third exception. In thus forbidding and characterizing the unnecessary repetition of a question which had been fully answered, the trial court was exercising a discretion with which we find no sufficient reason to interfere.

The fourth and fifth exceptions show further unsuccessful efforts to renew the question just considered. There is no ground for reversal in those rulings.

The sixth bill of exception reveals no error. Having repeated on cross-examination that he did not see the appellant use any instrument except the speculum, Meredith was asked by counse...