Rickett v. City of Fairborn
Decision Date | 29 June 2012 |
Docket Number | Case No. 3:11-cv-370 |
Parties | LINDA RICKETT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FAIRBORN, OHIO, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This case is before the Court on Defendant James Sawyer's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 11). Plaintiff has filed a Response in opposition (Doc. No. 12) and Defendant Sawyer has filed a Reply to that Response (Doc. No. 13).
In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must accept all well-pleaded material allegations of the complaint as true. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007); Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001); Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n., 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991), citing Beal v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 51 (1941). The Court must then decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993). This is the same standard applied in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008); EEOC v. J. H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir. 2001).
The test for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) has recently been re-stated by the Supreme Court:
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004)("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"), on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)(" Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ( ).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 555 (2007).
[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, " 'this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.' " 5 Wright & Miller § 1216, at 233-234 (quoting Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645 (D. Hawaii 1953) ); see also Dura [Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005), at 346, 125 S.Ct. 1627; Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc ., 289 F.Supp.2d 986, 995 (N.D.Ill.2003) ( )("[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset before a patent antitrust case should be permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase").
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558; see also Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations in a complaint "must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief." Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008), quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007)(emphasis in original).
Twombly overruled Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), specifically disapproving of the proposition that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), the Supreme Court made it clear that Twombly applies in all areas of federal law and not just in the antitrust context in which it was announced. Following Iqbal, district courts faced with motions to dismiss must first accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a complaint. This requirement 550 U.S. at 555. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig.), 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2009). Under Iqbal, a civil complaint will only survive a motion to dismiss if it Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629-630 (6th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff's Complaint contains four counts. Count I is for gender discrimination and purports to arise under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; it is made against the City of Fairborn alone. Count II for gender discrimination purports to arise under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 and is made against both Defendants. There are two Count III's in the Complaint. The first is under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 against the City alone for retaliation; the second is under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 for retaliation against both Defendants. The Court assumes it was a typographical error to label the last count as a second Count III and will refer to it hereafter as Count IV.
Only Counts II and IV are at issue in the instant Motion. Since both of them arise under Ohio law, the Court is bound to apply Ohio substantive law in determining whether the complaint states a claim for relief against Defendant Sawyer. 28 U.S.C. §1652; Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 528 U.S. 415, 427, n. 7 (1996); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
In applying state law, the Sixth Circuit follows the law of the State as announced by that State's supreme court. Savedoff v. Access Group, Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 762 (6th Cir. 2008); Ray Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 758 (6th Cir. 1992); Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Assocs., 917 F.2d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 1990). "Where the state supreme court has not spoken, our task is to discern, from all available sources, how that court would respond if confronted with the issue." Id.; In re Akron-Cleveland Auto Rental, Inc., 921 F.2d 659, 662 (6th Cir. 1990); Bailey v. V & O Press Co, 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985); Angelotta v. American Broadcasting Corp., 820 F.2d 806 (1987). This rule applies regardless of whether the appellate court decision is published or unpublished. See Talley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 223 F.3d 323, 328 (6th Cir.2000); Puckett, 889 F.2d at 1485. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, 249 F.3d 509,517 (6th Cir. 2001).
Defendant Sawyer claims absolute immunity from liability under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03(A)(6) as a political subdivision employee. He asserts that "there is absolutely no set of facts that Plaintiff could prove, in the face of R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6), that would entitle her to judgment against Sawyer in this case." (Motion, Doc. No. 11, PageID 50). Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03(A)(6) provides:
Plaintiff responds by asserting she has pled sufficient facts to come within the latter two exceptions to immunity, Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b)(the "Malice Exception") and(c)(the "Express Imposition Exception" (Memo in Opp., Doc. No. 12, PageID 67). Plaintiff makes no claim that Mr. Sawyer's actions toward her were outside the scope of his employment, disclaiming any reliance on the exception in Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(a).
The Magistrate Judge concludes the Complaint pleads sufficient facts to come within the malice exception or can be appropriately amended to satisfy the Ohio case law. The analysis supporting this conclusion...
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