Ricklefs v. Clemens

• Decision Date: 25 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 47507,47507
• Citation: 531 P.2d 94,216 Kan. 128
• Parties: , 94 A.L.R.3d 572, 16 UCC Rep.Serv. 322 Warren RICKLEFTS, Appellant, v. Ronald D. CLEMENS, Appellee, Motor City Motors, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 94

531 P.2d 94

216 Kan. 128, 94 A.L.R.3d 572, 16 UCC

Rep.Serv. 322

Warren RICKLEFTS, Appellant, v. Ronald D. CLEMENS, Appellee, Motor City Motors, Inc., Defendant.

No. 47507.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. 25, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The measure of damages for breach of warranty of title to an automobile is the loss directly and naturally resulting from the breach of warranty. Generally, in the absence of special circumstances, this is the difference between the value of the automobile at the time of delivery and the value it would have had if title had conformed to the warranty.

2. The purchaser of an automobile, warranted as to title, has the right to rely on the fact that he will not be required, at some later time, to engage in litigation concerning the validity of his ownership.

3. The casting of a substantial shadow over a purchaser's title to an automobile is sufficient to violate warranty of good title.

4. The price paid for an article is some evidence of its value for the purpose of assessing damages.

5. In an action for damages for breach of warranty of title, brought by the buyer of a stolen automobile against the seller wherein the buyer had undisturbed possession of the automobile for a period of approximately nine months, the record is examined and it is held: The value of the automobile at the time the buyer's possession was disturbed so that he lost the use of the automobile is the proper measure of damages.

Robert F. Duncan, of Duncan, Senecal & Bednar, Chartered, Atchison, argued the cause, and Robert J. Bednar, Atchison, was with him on the brief for appellant.

William J. Brady, of Stillings, Caplinger & Brady, Chartered, Atchison, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.

KAUL, Justice:

This appeal requires the determination of the proper measure of damages to be applied in an action for breach of warranty of title brought by the purchaser of a stolen automobile against the seller.

On March 26, 1971, defendant-appellee (Ronald D. Clemens) sold the automobile in question-a Chevrolet Corvette Stingray 2- door coupe titled as a 1969 model, to plaintiff-appellant (Warren Ricklefs) for $1,500.00 cash and a trade-in allowance of $2,400.00 for plaintiff's 1969 Pontiac. Clemens executed a certificate of title warranting the title to be free from all liens and encumbrances except as stated in the assignment. Ricklefs operated the automobile until December 1, 1971, when he was notified by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the automobile was stolen. The agent also informed plaintiff that the automobile was a 1968, rather than a 1969 model. Plaintiff did not use the automobile after December 1, 1971, for the reason, plaintiff testified, that the agent had told him he might be arrested. Plaintiff claims that he made demand on Clemens for restitution but was refused.

On February 14, 1972, plaintiff filed this action against Clemens. In his petition plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to 'complete restitution and has suffered damages in the sum of Three Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($3,900.00).' Plaintiff also prayed for such other and further relief as to the court might seem equitable.

On March 13, 1972, defendant Clemens filed his answer alleging that he had purchased the automobile from Motor City Motors, Inc., of Kansas City, Missouri for $2,325.00; that he was given a certificate of title and had no notice whatsoever, either express or implied, of any defect in the title or any encumbrance affecting the title to the automobile. Defendant prayed that plaintiff take naught by his suit.

After defendant's answer was filed, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment.

In the meantime, an action was filed against plaintiff (Ricklefs) by Carol A. Romero, Kenneth J. Rhines and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty, a corporation (hereafter referred to as USF&G). This petition alleged that the automobile was purchased by Romero and Rhines from Bill Allen Chevrolet in North Kansas City, Missouri on January 7, 1971, for $3,295.00; that while the automobile was on the Bill Allen lot awaiting repairs, it was stolen; that USF& G, insurance carrier for Bill Allen, paid Romero and Rhines $3,295.00 and took an assignment of all interest in the automobile; plaintiffs (Romero, Rhines and USF&G) prayed for delivery of the automobile from Ricklefs to USF&G, or in the alternative for judgment against Ricklefs in the amount of $3,295.00.

Ricklefs's motion for summary judgment in his action against Clemens was argued on April 3, 1972. The court took the matter under advisement and filed its memorandum decision on May 3, 1972. Noting the entangled facts which had developed, the trial court observed that the F.B.I. agent might have been in error and that USF&G might have made the payment to Romero and Rhines as a volunteer. The court ruled that Ricklefs's motion for summary judgment was premature and further found that the case could not be finally disposed of without USF&G being made an additional party and directed plaintiff (Ricklefs) to file an amended petition against Clemens and make USF&G an additional party defendant.

At a pretrial conference on October 16, 1972, the two actions (the instant action, district court No. 24008, and the replevin action, district court No. 24145) were consolidated. The trial court directed Clemens to make Motor City Motors, Inc. a third party defendant to the instant action, and further found that it was necessary to appoint a special master to determine whether the automobile in question was the same as that stolen from Bill Allen Chevrolet.

On December 18, 1972, the special master filed his report disclosing that the 1968 model automobile sold by Bill Allen Chevrolet to Romero and Rhines, and then stolen, was the same automobile that was later sold to plaintiff (Ricklefs) and identified as a 1969 model.

On January 23, 1973, Ricklefs filed a second motion for summary judgment against Clemens. On June 25, 1973, plaintiff's motion was sustained. The court entered judgment for Ricklefs against Clemens for breach of warranty of title, and further ruled that the amount of damages should be determined as a question of fact. On the same date the court entered judgment in case No. 24145 for USF&G granting recovery of the automobile from Ricklefs.

On November 15, 1973, Ricklefs amended his petition against Clemens and asked for full and complete restitution and consequential damages in the total amount of $5,000.00.

In pretrial proceedings on December 11, 1973, the trial court ruled that Ricklefs's only measure of relief was damages limited to the value of the automobile on the date (June 25, 1973) of the entry of judgment of replevin in favor of USFPG.

The case came on for trial on December 13, 1973. At trial the court rejected plaintiff's (Ricklefs) requested instructions on damages and restated its ruling as to plaintiff's measure of recovery previously announced by the court on December 11. The court also rejected plaintiff's proffer of evidence as to the purchase price and the value of the automobile on December 1, 1971; and also evidence as to value as of the date of purchase. The court also ruled evidence inadmissible as to the correct model year of the automobile, the cost of repairs and improvements, and evidence of plaintiff offered to show rescission.

On December 14, 1973, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $2,800.00 and judgment was entered accordingly.

On appeal, the main points asserted by plaintiff are: (1) The trial court erred in ruling that the measure of damages was the value of the automobile at the time of dispossession on June 25, 1973, when the judgment in replevin was entered; and (2) that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff's petition did not set forth rescission and in rejecting evidence which plaintiff claimed would have established his attempt to rescind.

Extensive arguments, which are reproduced in the record, were made to the court concerning the theories of the parties as to the proper measure of damages on the hearing for summary judgment, at pretrial on December 11, 1971, and in connection with requested instructions at trial. Understandably, the court encountered much difficulty in resolving the issue of damages in view of the complicated set of facts which had developed and the alternative, if not inconsistent, positions taken by plaintiff at the various hearings at which the question of damages was argued.

The trial court adhered to its original ruling and instructed the jury that Ricklefs was entitled to recover from Clemens the actual market value of the 1969 automobile as it existed on June 25, 1973, and that in turn Clemens was entitled to recover a like sum from the third party defendant, Motor City Motors, Inc. The court defined actual value and further instructed that in this case it meant retail market value.

Plaintiff submitted five requested instructions on damages, each of which was rejected by the court. Requested instruction No. 1 defined the measure of damages as the difference in value at the time of acceptance. The requested instruction further stated that plaintiff was entitled to incidental and consequential damages for the losses he suffered as a result of his purchase of the automobile from Clemens. In support of his position plaintiff cited K.S.A. 84-2-714 and 84-2-715 of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter referred to as U.C.C.). In his other requested instructions plaintiff takes a position either in the alternative to or inconsistent with his position set out in requested instruction No. 1. In requested instruction No. 2 he asks for the purchase price together with direct and consequential damages. In No. 3 he asks that damages be assessed on the difference in value if the automobile had been as warranted not to exceed $5,000.00 without fixing a time. In instruction No. 4 plaintiff requested that the jury be...