Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc., No. 95-518-CIV-T-17A.

• Court: United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Florida
• Writing for the Court: KOVACHEVICH
• Citation: 902 F. Supp. 232
• Decision Date: 17 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 95-518-CIV-T-17A.
• Parties: Sheryl A. RICKMAN, Plaintiff, v. PRECISIONAIRE, INC., a Florida corporation, and Dian Gerhart, Defendants.

902 F. Supp. 232

Sheryl A. RICKMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
PRECISIONAIRE, INC., a Florida corporation, and Dian Gerhart, Defendants.

No. 95-518-CIV-T-17A.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

October 17, 1995.

902 F. Supp. 233

Michael S. Schwartzberg, Schwartzberg & Witt, P.A., St. Petersburg, FL, for plaintiff.

Mark E. Levitt, Hogg, Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A., Tampa, FL, for defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT GERHART'S MOTION TO DISMISS

KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Dian Gerhart's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. Nos. 6-7, filed May 25, 1995), and Plaintiff Sheryl Rickman's Response to Order to Show Cause coupled with Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 10, filed June 26, 1995).

I. Procedural History

This case was initially commenced by the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) filed April 3, 1995. The Complaint alleged that the actions of Defendants Precisionaire, Inc. (Precisionaire), and Gerhart constituted pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 701(k) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), et seq. Defendant Gerhart (individually) then filed her Motion to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 6-7) for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be obtained. Defendant Gerhart argued that individual liability is not available under Title VII, and therefore, her Motion to Dismiss should be granted. Plaintiff filed her response (Doc. No. 10) and attached a First Amended Complaint which establishes Defendant Gerhart's liability in her official capacity as an agent of Defendant Precisionaire (opposed to her liability individually). Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over Defendants Precisionaire and Gerhart pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(4).

II. Standard of Review

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts that support a claim for relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Bracewell v. Nicholson Air Services, Inc., 680 F.2d 103, 104 (11th Cir.1982). The scope of review concerns the allegations contained within the four corners of the Complaint. This Court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, must accept Plaintiff's well pleaded facts as true, and construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

III. Facts

The facts as alleged in the Complaint may be summarized as follows: Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Precisionaire on or about June 1, 1992, as a customer service representative. For the next year, Plaintiff's work was considered more than satisfactory. On or about July 1, 1993, the Plaintiff informed Defendant Gerhart, Plaintiff's supervisor, that she was pregnant. The Plaintiff at the time was not married. From the day that Plaintiff informed Defendant Gerhart about her pregnancy, Gerhart commenced a pattern of harassment...