Ricks v. Cadorath Aerospace Lafayette, LLC
| Decision Date | 14 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION CASE NO. 15-6686 SECTION: "G" (5),c/w 16-2593 SECTION: "G" (5) |
| Parties | RICKS v. CADORATH AEROSPACE LAFAYETTE, LLC, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Defendant Rolls-Royce's ("Rolls-Royce") "Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint."1 Having considered the motion, the memoranda in support and in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the motion in part and transfer the case to the Southern District of Indiana.
In this consolidated action, Plaintiff Colleen Ricks ("Plaintiff"), individually and on behalf of her minor children, alleges that the decedent, Brandon Ricks, died while piloting a helicopter in Mississippi because the helicopter experienced engine failure and loss of power, resulting in a crash.2 Plaintiff alleges that the helicopter was equipped with a Rolls-Royce model 250-C30P turbine engine.3 Plaintiff alleges that Rolls-Royce knew or should have known that the engine was defectively designed and/or manufactured and failed to provide reasonable instructions andwarnings to maintenance providers that worked on the engines.4 Plaintiff also alleges that the helicopter was inadequately serviced by Defendants Cadorath Aerospace Lafayette, LLC ("Cadorath") and Rotorcraft Leasing Company, LLC ("Rotorcraft") prior to the crash in Broussard, Louisiana, which is in the Western District of Louisiana.5 Rolls-Royce has an authorized repair facility agreement with Cadorath6 and a fleet operator agreement with Rotorcraft.7
On December 10, 2015, the first complaint in this consolidated matter was filed against Defendants Cadorath, H&H Turbine Services, LLC, and Rotorcraft, alleging negligent maintenance of the helicopter and the engine before the accident.8 On March 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed a separate action against Defendant Rolls-Royce,9 which the Court consolidated with the first action for all purposes on January 13, 2017.10 On May 20, 2016, Rolls-Royce filed a motion to dismiss the action against it for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3).11 On June 29, 2016, the Court denied the motion without prejudice and granted Plaintiff's motion to conduct limited discovery pertinent to Rolls-Royce'smotion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.12 In its Order, the Court allowed the parties 60 days to exchange limited discovery pertaining to the jurisdictional and venue issues outlined by Rolls-Royce in its motion.13 On November 8, 2016, Rolls-Royce filed the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.14 On November 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion.15 On December 6, 2016, with leave of Court, Rolls-Royce filed a reply.16
Rolls-Royce moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and/or 12(b)(3), arguing that the Court lacks both general and specific personal jurisdiction over it and that venue is improper.17 In the alternative, Rolls-Royce requests that the Court transfer the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.18
Rolls-Royce asserts that it is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business inIndianapolis, Indiana.19 Therefore, Rolls-Royce argues that the Court lacks general jurisdiction over it because it has no contacts with Louisiana sufficiently systematic or continuous such that Louisiana could be considered Rolls-Royce's "home."20
Rolls-Royce further argues that Plaintiff cannot establish specific jurisdiction over it, because Plaintiff's cause of action does not arise out of or relate to any of Rolls-Royce's contacts with Louisiana, as required for the exercise of specific jurisdiction under Fifth Circuit precedent.21 Rolls-Royce contends that the fact that its products wind up in Louisiana is not sufficient to establish that Plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or is related to Rolls-Royce's Louisiana-related activities.22 Rolls-Royce further contends that its contacts with Louisiana do not establish specific jurisdiction over it, because according to Rolls-Royce, it did not design, manufacture, sell or deliver the engine at issue.23 According to Rolls-Royce, it has a non-exclusive authorized repair facility agreement with Defendant Cadorath Aerospace Lafayette, LLC, which is located in Broussard, Louisiana.24 Rolls-Royce contends that this does not confer specific jurisdiction on the Court, however, because: (1) Plaintiff's first amended complaint does not tie the repair of the helicopter that occurred at Cadorath in 2009 to the 2015 Mississippi helicopter crash; and (2) thehelicopter part that Cadorath repaired in 2009 was not a Rolls-Royce part.25 Thus, Rolls-Royce contends that whatever repair was made at Cadorath was unrelated to Rolls-Royce's contacts with Louisiana.26
Rolls-Royce next argues that the fact that Rolls-Royce entered into a fleet operator agreement with Defendant Rotorcraft is unrelated to Plaintiff's cause of action and does not confer specific jurisdiction.27 Rolls-Royce asserts that in Plaintiff's other consolidated action, she alleges that Defendant Rotorcraft negligently performed maintenance work on the helicopter's engine in Broussard, Louisiana, but that Rotorcraft is not part of Rolls-Royce's network of independently owned and operated repair facilities.28 Rolls-Royce contends that specific jurisdiction cannot be established over it through the actions of another party, including the actions of those who repaired the helicopter's engine or its parts.29
Next, Rolls-Royce contends that the fact that it employs regional managers who live in Louisiana does not confer specific jurisdiction.30 Rolls-Royce asserts that it has a distribution agreement with a company that maintains a customer service center in Lafayette, Louisiana.31 However, Rolls-Royce argues that even if these contacts are sufficient "minimum contacts" with Louisiana under Fifth Circuit precedent, they do not establish specific jurisdiction becausePlaintiff's cause of action does not arise out of or result from these contacts.32
Next, Rolls-Royce asserts that Plaintiff may argue that the Court has personal jurisdiction because of Rolls-Royce's requirement that any authorized repair facility must make repairs in accordance with its manuals or instructions.33 However, Rolls-Royce contends that this jurisdictional argument would fail, because the federal government requires any person performing maintenance on aircraft to do so in accordance with the manufacturer's manual and there is no authority to support such a theory of jurisdiction.34 Rolls-Royce also argues that Plaintiff cannot establish personal jurisdiction through Rolls-Royce's alleged failure to warn repairers of the engine about alleged defects in the engine at issue.35 Rolls-Royce contends that under this theory, any state could constitutionally exercise specific jurisdiction over Rolls-Royce if a third party once repaired a helicopter's engine, regardless of where the accident later occurred.36 In sum, Rolls-Royce argues that the Court "lacks specific jurisdiction over Rolls-Royce in this case involving a Mississippi helicopter crash that killed two persons and injured a third person, none of whom worked or resided in Louisiana."37
Rolls-Royce next contends that venue is improper in this district.38 Rolls-Royce assertsthat it is Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that venue is proper and the venue statute is to be strictly construed.39 According to Rolls-Royce, Plaintiff has identified no Rolls-Royce contacts with this district, let alone sufficient contacts to subject Rolls-Royce to jurisdiction if this district were a separate state.40 Rolls-Royce contends that even assuming Rolls-Royce's contacts were sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in Louisiana for this case, those contacts took place in the Western District of Louisiana, not the Eastern District of Louisiana.41 Rolls-Royce requests that Plaintiff's first amended complaint be dismissed without prejudice because venue is improper in this district.42
In her opposition, Plaintiff argues that she must only present prima facie evidence to establish the first two prongs of the Fifth Circuit's specific jurisdiction inquiry.43 After that, Plaintiff asserts that the burden shifts to Rolls-Royce to demonstrate that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable.44 According to Plaintiff, specific jurisdiction exists here, because her claims for inadequate warnings and negligent undertaking arise out of Rolls-Royce's contacts with Louisiana.45 Plaintiff asserts that western Louisiana is a center of helicopter operations and Rolls-Royce engines.46 Plaintiff also asserts that Rolls-Royce established a Louisiana connection in 1999 when it executed a distributor services agreement with Aviall Services, Inc. ("Aviall") to distribute its publications to customers worldwide, including in Louisiana, and to maintain a facility near Lafayette, Louisiana.47
According to Plaintiff, Rolls-Royce held itself out as a manufacturer of the M250 engine and may therefore be subject to liability under the Louisiana Product Liability Act (LPLA) even though it did not physically design or manufacture the engine.48 Plaintiff contends that for several years, Rolls-Royce failed to adequately warn Cadorath, its authorized Louisiana repair facility, and Rotorcraft, its authorized Louisiana fleet operator of M250 engines, of the risks...
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