Ricks v. City of Winona, Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–00039–GHD–JMV.

• Decision Date: 12 March 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–00039–GHD–JMV.
• Citation: 858 F.Supp.2d 682
• Parties: James Vernon RICKS, Jr., Plaintiff v. CITY OF WINONA; County of Montgomery; Winona–Montgomery Airport; Winona–Montgomery Board; and Jan Bailey, Clifford Dance, Cecil Austin, Eugene Hathcock, and Jimmy Hayward, individually and as representatives of the Winona–Montgomery Board, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

858 F.Supp.2d 682

James Vernon RICKS, Jr., Plaintiff

v.CITY OF WINONA; County of Montgomery; Winona–Montgomery Airport; Winona–Montgomery Board; and Jan Bailey, Clifford Dance, Cecil Austin, Eugene Hathcock, and Jimmy Hayward, individually and as representatives of the Winona–Montgomery Board, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–00039–GHD–JMV.

United States District Court,

N.D. Mississippi,

Western Division.

March 12, 2012.

Charles C. Edwards, Boutwell Law Offices, PLLC, Lexington, MS, for Plaintiff.

B. Stevens Hazard, Steven James Griffin, Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, Jackson, MS, Alan D. Lancaster, Liston/Lancaster, Winona, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GLEN H. DAVIDSON, Senior District Judge.

Presently before the Court are two motions for summary judgment, [78] and [82], filed by Defendants City of Winona and Winona–Montgomery Airport, Winona–MontgomeryAirport Board, Jan Bailey, Jewell Harrison, Jim Corban, Brent Richardson, Clifford Dance, Cecil Austin, Eugene Hathcock, and Jimmy Hayward. Sadly, the Plaintiff, James Vernon Ricks, Jr., passed away on February 19, 2012. See Suggestion of Death [95]. To date, no motion for substitution pursuant to Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been filed in this case. After due consideration, the Court finds that the motions for summary judgment should be granted and the case dismissed.¹

A. Factual and Procedural Overview

Plaintiff James Vernon Ricks, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) brought this lawsuit against the City of Winona, Mississippi; the County of Montgomery; the Winona–Montgomery Airport; and the following individually and as representatives of the Winona–Montgomery Board: Jan Bailey, Clifford Dance, Cecil Austin, Eugene Hathcock, and Jimmy Hayward. Plaintiff, a lessee of space at the Winona–Montgomery Airport, alleged that Defendants violated his rights under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, as well as his rights Under state law. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

This Court grants summary judgment only “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir.2008). The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to “go beyond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548;Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir.2001). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence to support the elements of its prima facie case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 321–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “In adjudicating a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co., 465 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). However, a district court is not required “to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.” Id. at 164 (citing Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–16 & n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992))). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient” to preclude summary judgment; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

C. Analysis

On May 6, 1993, Plaintiff paid J.A. Olson Company, an Illinois corporation, for a hangar building “excluding the real property upon which it is situated” at the west end of the airstrip at the Winona–Montgomery Airport in which to store his two private aircrafts. See Bill of Sale [86–9] at 1. Subsequently, the airport initiated a lease requirement for all such property at the airport. Plaintiff signed a lease for the hangar building and property under the roof of the hangar, but did not have the lease notarized until 2005. Plaintiff paid $190 per year on this lease, including the time period prior to its full execution. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for alleged mistreatment by Defendants related to his occupancy of airport property.

The Court now turns to the motions for summary judgment before it. The Plaintiff has claimed that he was mistreated by Defendants in various ways and maintains that this alleged mistreatment constituted FAA violations, as well as violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and various causes of action under state law.

The County of Montgomery is a political subdivision located in Mississippi and organized under state law. The City of Winona is a municipality and political subdivision in Montgomery County organized under Mississippi state law. Defendant Winona–Montgomery Airport and the Winona–Montgomery Airport Board are governmental entities that operate under the authority of Mississippi's Airport Authorities Law, Mississippi Code §§ 61–3–1, et seq.See Joint Agreement for the Operation of the Winona–Montgomery County Airport [78–3] at 14. The City of Winona and Montgomery County “place[d] the acquisition construction, operation, future expansion[,] and maintenance of the Winona/Montgomery County Airport under the control of ... the Winona/Montgomery County Airport Board, as authorized by [Mississippi Code] Section 61–5–35.” See Joint Resolution at 1. The airport board has “the power to make, promulgate, and amend such reasonable general or special rules, regulations[,] and procedures ..., which regulations when so made, approved and published, shall have the force and effect of law” and must not be “inconsistent with, or contrary to, any Federal or State laws or rules and regulations.” Airport Operation Regulations & Minimum Standards for Aeronautical Servs. for the Winona–Montgomery County Airport [82–10] at 13. Accordingly, the Winona–Montgomery Airport Board oversees the operation of the Winona–Montgomery Airport. The airport manager has the duty to enforce all laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to the operation of the airport. Joint Resolution at 3. The individually named Defendants were voting members of the airport board at the time of the alleged incidents. Although this Court acknowledges that absolute immunity of defendants is a threshold matter that should be determined as early as possible in a proceeding, see, e.g., Hulsey v. Owens, 63 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir.1995), the Court will assume that Defendants are subject to this suit on both Plaintiff's federal and state law claims, as summary judgment is proper on other grounds.

1. FAA Violations Claims

As an initial matter, the Court turns to Plaintiff's claims that Defendants conduct towards him constituted violations of the FAA's “rules, regulations, policies, practices, and/or customs” and “FAA Airport Improvement grant plans,” pursuant to the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (“AAIA”), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 47101, et seq. Pl.'s Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 21, 22, 31; Pl.'s Resp. to the City's MSJ [88] at 8. The Court notes at the outset that such claims are not properly before this Court.

If the FAA approves an airport's application for AAIA grant funds, the Section 47107 “grant assurances” become a binding contractual obligation between the federal government and the airport receiving the funds. Pac. Coast Flyers, Inc. v. San Diego, FAA Docket 16–04–08, 2005 WL 1900515, at *11 (July 25, 2005). Section 47107 mandates that the FAA ensure that airports receiving AAIA grant funds adhere to their grant assurance obligations. See49 U.S.C. § 47107(g). The FAA is authorized to initiate enforcement proceedings against airport recipients allegedly in breach of these obligations and issue orders against airport recipients found in breach. See49 U.S.C. § 47122.

Importantly, Plaintiff has conceded he has no evidence that the FAA pursued any action against Defendants for any alleged FAA violations. Plaintiff also did not file a formal complaint with the FAA. Instead, he brought the FAA violations claims in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law....

It is well settled that Section 1983 provides a cause of action...