Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service

• Decision Date: 30 March 1942
• Docket Number: 36529.
• Citation: 8 So.2d 49,200 La. 341
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: RICKS v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CIVIL SERVICE et al.

8 So.2d 49

200 La. 341

RICKS v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CIVIL SERVICE et al.

No. 36529.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

March 30, 1942

Rehearing Denied April 27, 1942. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Kemble K. Kennedy, of Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Charles E. Dunbar, Jr., and Monte M. Lemann, both of New Orleans, for appellees.

Eugene Stanley, Atty. Gen., A. M. Suthon and Cicero C. Sessions, Sp Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees State Treasurer and State Auditor.

Cawthorn & Golsan, of Mansfield, William J. Guste, of New Orleans, H. F. Madison, Jr., of Monroe, Charles A. McCoy, of Lake Charles, and Dart & Dart, of New Orleans, amici curiae.

PONDER Justice.

O. Dolan Ricks, a resident and taxpayer of the Parish of East Baton Rouge, brought this suit, attacking the constitutionality of Act 172 of 1940, known as the 'State Civil Service Law.' In the alternative, he seeks to have Act 381 of 1940 decreed unconstitutional on the ground that it was illegally submitted to the voters as a proposed constitutional amendment; in the further alternative, in the event that Act 172 of 1940 is not declared unconstitutional, that Section 48 of the Act be decreed inoperative until July 1, 1942; and in the further alternative, to have Item No. 55 of Section 2 of Act 44 of 1940, State Civil Service Commission and Department of Civil Service Appropriation, decreed unconstitutional. The plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief against the Department of State Civil Service, its members and each of them, to restrain the withdrawal or the expending of funds appropriated under Item No. 55 of Section 2 of Act 44 of 1940. The plaintiff also seeks to restrain the State Auditor, L. B. Baynard, and the State Treasurer, A. P. Tugwell, from accepting or honoring any or all warrants drawn upon the funds appropriated under Item 55 of Section 2 of Act 44 of 1940.

A rule to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted was issued in the lower court. The defendants interposed exceptions of no right and no cause of action which were referred to the merits. Upon trial of the rule, it was agreed that the case should be considered on its merits. The lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendants, rejecting the plaintiff's demands, overruling the exceptions, and dismissing the suit. The plaintiff has appealed.

The plaintiff contends that Act 172 of 1940 is violative of Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution in that it embraces more than one object. Counsel for the plaintiff is under the impression that an additional object is created under Paragraph 9 of Section 6 of the Act, and the failure to mention this object in the title of the act is also violative of the constitutional provision. The provision complained of, Paragraph 9 of Section 6 of the Act, provides that it shall be the duty of the State Civil Service Commission to select and appoint commissioners as provided in the City Civil Service Law. Section 5(b) of Act 171 of 1940, the City Civil Service Law, provides that two of the three members of the City Civil Service Commission shall be appointed by the State Civil Service Commission. The plaintiff further contends that Act 172 of 1940 is broader than its title in that the Director or the State Civil Service Commission is permitted to employ independent counsel to enforce the act. In support of these contentions, counsel for the plaintiff relies upon Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution and various decisions of this court interpreting this constitutional provision.

The constitutional provision relied upon has been entertained by this court on numerous occasions. The expressions of this court relative thereto in some of the most recent cases are to the effect: 'It is not the purpose of this article to require that the title be an index to the contents of the act, or that every end and means convenient or necessary for the accomplishment of the general object of the act be set out at length in the title, but it is deemed sufficient, under the article, that the act contain but one object and that the object be fairly stated, although it be expressed in general terms, in the title of the act. All things proper or necessary to carry out the general object, so stated in the title, are deemed to be within the scope of the title. Thornhill v. Wear, 131 La. 479, 59 So. 909; State v. Hincy, 130 La. 620, 58 So. 411; Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La.Ann. 329.' State ex rel. Porterie, Atty. Gen. v. Housing Authority of New Orleans et al., 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725, 736, quoting from Southern Hide Co., Inc., v. Best et al., 176 La. 347, 145 So. 682. 'The title of an act is not required to be a complete index to every section [of the act], but it is sufficient if the title in general terms directs attention to the purposes of the law.' Wm. M. Barret, Inc., v. First National Bank of Shreveport, 191 La. 945, 186 So. 741, citing State v. Hincy, 130 La. 620, 58 So. 411. 'The * * * rule [is] that, whatever is germane and incidental to the purpose may be set out in the title, but if the body of the act embraces cognate matter not strictly within the text of the title, such matter will, nevertheless, be covered by the title. Since the means adopted to carry out a law is not an object of the law, such means need not be mentioned in the title. Marr's Crim.Juris. vol. I, pp. 11, 12. * * * Section 16, Article 3 of the Constitution of 1921 provides that: 'Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of such object.' Under corresponding sections in preceding constitutions, it was required that the object of the law be 'expressed' in its title. The effect of the changing of the wording of the constitutional provision was to relax the previous requirement that the statute must 'express' its object, so now all that is required is that the title of the statute should be 'indicative' of its object. The constitutional provision must be construed broadly rather than narrowly with a view of effectuating, not of frustrating, the legislative purpose. This is the rule prevailing everywhere for the construction of such a constitutional provision.' Jackson v. Hart, 192 La. 1068, 1073, 190 So. 220, 222. 'The pronouncements of this court are legion to the effect that the provisions in the body of a law, which are germane to the object of the legislation need not be expressed in the title and that the title is not required to be a complete index to every section of the statute. It is sufficient if the title in general terms directs attention to the purpose of the enactment.' Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So.2d 508, 516.

In order to judicially determine whether the statute is violative of Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution, which provides that every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object and shall have a title indicative of said object, it is necessary to first examine the body of the act in order to ascertain its purpose or aim. Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So.2d 508.

From a reading of the act as a whole, it cannot be disputed that its aim or purpose is to establish a classified civil service to administer, control and regulate employment in the service of the State of Louisiana.

In the case of Hope et al. v. City of New Orleans et al., 106 La. 345, 30 So. 842, 843, this court in defining civil service stated: "Civil Service,' in its enlarged sense, means all service rendered to and paid for by the state or nation or by political subdivisions thereof, other than that pertaining to naval or military affairs. 'Civil service reform' is defined by the lexicographers to be the substitution of business principles and methods for the spoils system in the conduct of the civil service, especially in the matter of appointments. Everything pertaining to the civil service is germane to the subject with which the act under discussion deals, and is embraced within the scope of its object. When, therefore, the legislature embodied in the act the repeal of section 110 of the present city charter, it did not inject into the act another object. That section is to the effect that no officer or employ� of the city shall be a member of or delegate to any political convention, and comes clearly within the regulation of the civil service. Consequently, it came within the scope of the one object of Act No. 89 to reaffirm it or repeal it.'

In the case of Ward v. Leche, 189 La. 113, 179 So. 52, 55, it is also stated: 'The term 'civil service,' in its accepted sense, 'includes all functions under the government except military functions. In general it is confined to functions in the great administrative departments of state. In its enlarged sense the term means all service rendered to and paid for by the state, or nation, or by political subdivisions thereof, other than that pertaining to naval or military affairs; all offices and positions of trust or employment in the service of the state or of such civil division or city, except offices and positions in the militia and the military departments.' Corpus Juris, Vol. 11 p. 815.'

It is true that the two acts, 171 of 1940 and 172 of 1940, are interrelated insofar as the appointment of two of the City Civil Service Commissioners is concerned, but this could not be considered a separate object, independent of civil service; in fact, the purpose of both acts is to establish civil service and to place State and City employees under a merit system of employment. The single purpose or object of the act, irrespective of the extent of its application to State or City employees, is to establish a civil service system. Only recently, in the case of Peck v. City of New Orleans, supra, we upheld an...