Riddle v. Cockrell

• Decision Date: 15 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-10813.,00-10813.
• Citation: 288 F.3d 713
• Parties: Granville RIDDLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Janie COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

288 F.3d 713

Granville RIDDLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Janie COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 00-10813.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 15, 2002.

Warren Lee Clark (argued), Amarillo, TX, Sam L. Ogan, Asst. Fed. Pub. Def. (argued), Dallas, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Edward Larry Marshall (argued), Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

Granville Riddle ("Riddle") appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2001). Because we find that the district court did not err, we AFFIRM.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Riddle was charged with intentionally causing Ronnie Hood Bennett's ("Bennett") death while in the course of committing the offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft. On October 9, 1988, Riddle and a friend, Brad Bybee ("Bybee"), went out drinking. The two proceeded to drive to the home of Bennett. Bybee remained in the car. There is no dispute that Riddle entered Bennett's home and used a tire iron to strike Bennett about the head at least fifteen times and that these blows caused his death.

In his initial statement to police, Riddle stated that he entered the premises through a screen window, which he pried open with the tire iron. Riddle explained that Bennett became angry at him for damaging his property and, in an effort to defend himself, Riddle hit Bennett in the knee with the tire iron. When this angered Bennett even more, Riddle proceeded to hit him over the head until he died.

During the course of the trial, however, Riddle maintained that he had consent to enter Bennett's home when the murder occurred.¹ He testified that he took a tire iron with him, which he intended to use to pry the screen off the kitchen window; however, when he arrived, he found a sliding door unlocked.² Riddle testified that Bennett made sexual advances toward him and when he refused, Bennett grabbed him, pulled him down, put his lips on Riddle's ear and a hand on his buttocks. According to Riddle, he then hit Bennett with the tire iron repeatedly, causing his death. He averred that after he realized that Bennett was dead, he tried to make the home look burglarized in an attempt to cover up for his actions.

Bybee testified that Riddle called him into the home, pointed to a few items piled on the floor, and informed him that the items were theirs to keep. Bybee also testified that Riddle remarked that he wanted "to see how strong [Bybee's] stomach [was]," and Riddle hit Bennett in the head once more, imbedding the tire iron into Bennett's skull. Bybee then surreptitiously left. It was at this point, according to Riddle, that he panicked, grabbed Bennett's wallet and his truck, and left.

Danny Hill ("Hill"), the Potter County District Attorney, served as chief prosecutor during the trial. In an effort to explain several of his attempts to escape from prison³ while incarcerated pending trial, Riddle testified that he was afraid because Hill had told him after his first arraignment that "he was going to do his damnest [sic] to make sure [he] got the death penalty."⁴ To rebut this testimony, Hill called several witnesses.⁵ Hill also took the stand.⁶ Subsequently, he continued to prosecute the case. At closing argument, the assistant prosecutor argued that Riddle should be viewed as incredulous, because Hill had shown, through his testimony, that Riddle was a liar.

On November 3, 1989, Riddle was convicted for the capital murder of Bennett. He was sentenced to death. Automatic appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was taken and his conviction and sentence were upheld. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. On August 25, 1995, the federal district court stayed Riddle's execution. It then appointed Riddle counsel and ordered that a petition for habeas corpus relief be filed or that the court be notified of the intent to apply for state habeas relief. On January 22, 1996, Riddle filed a notification of his intent to return to state court to seek state habeas corpus relief. On August 21, 1996, the district court denied Riddle's "Motion to Hold Proceeding in Abeyance to Continue Appointment of Currently Appointed Federally Funded Counsel and to Permit Federally Appointed Counsel to Work on Exhaustion of Unexhausted Claims in the State Court of Texas." Subsequently, on November 7, 1996, the district court dismissed the cause and lifted the stay of execution. On October 10, 1996, Riddle filed an application for state writ of habeas corpus, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied. On March 4th and 5th of 1997, respectively, Riddle filed motions with the district court for the appointment of counsel and to proceed in forma pauperis. These motions were granted. On September 5, 1997, Riddle filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. On March 19, 1998, the district court granted Riddle's motion to file a supplemental memorandum of law in support of his request for an evidentiary hearing. The State filed an answer to the writ of habeas corpus and a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. On September 14, 1998, Riddle filed a pro se motion for an evidentiary hearing, which was also denied. Riddle appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment against him and from the denial of habeas relief. He again requests an evidentiary hearing.

DISCUSSION

This Court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus for a defendant convicted under a state judgment unless the adjudication of the claim by the state court "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2001).⁷ "A state court's decision will be contrary to clearly established federal law when it reaches a legal conclusion in direct opposition to a prior decision of the United States Supreme Court or when it reaches a different conclusion than the United States Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Kutzner v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 605, 608 (5th Cir.2001). Moreover, "[a] state court's decision will be based on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it is objectively unreasonable." Id.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test for deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient." Id. To prove deficiency, a defendant "must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, a defendant must show that the deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A showing of prejudice requires the defendant to prove that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id.

Strickland and its companion case, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), gave specific guidance on finding prejudice. In Strickland, the Court stated that in certain limited circumstances, prejudice may be presumed. 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In Cronic, the Court identified three distinct situations in which a presumption of prejudice is appropriate. First, prejudice may be presumed when the defendant is completely "denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Second, per-se prejudice occurs if there has been a constructive denial of counsel. This results when a lawyer "entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," thereby making "the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." Id. Third, the Court identified certain circumstances where "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial." Id. at 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Absent these narrow circumstances where prejudice may be presumed under Cronic, a defendant must show actual prejudice under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666 & n. 41, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Actual prejudice requires the defendant to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Riddle argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because of his trial counsel's failure to object to Hill's testimony during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial and his continued prosecution of the case. He asserts that his counsel's performance was defective and that prejudice should be presumed. In the alternative, he asserts that if prejudice cannot be presumed, then he should be afforded an evidentiary hearing to develop his claim.

A. Deficiency

Riddle asserts that his trial counsel's performance was akin to that analyzed in Harding v. Davis, in which the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial counsel's performance was deficient because he remained completely silent at trial and allowed the trial judge to direct a verdict...