Riddle v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 15 November 2016
• Docket Number: Record No. 1953-15-3
• Parties: CHRISTIAN LUKE RIDDLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

CHRISTIAN LUKE RIDDLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 1953-15-3

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

NOVEMBER 15, 2016

UNPUBLISHED

Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Humphreys and Alston

Argued at Lexington, Virginia

MEMORANDUM OPINION^* BY JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY

John T. Cook, Judge

Joseph A. Sanzone (Sanzone and Baker, L.L.P., on brief), for appellant.

Victoria Johnson, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Christian Luke Riddle ("Riddle") appeals the November 5, 2015 decision of the Circuit Court for Campbell County (the "circuit court") convicting him of one count of possession with intent to distribute an imitation Schedule I/II controlled substance, in violation of Code § 18.2-248. Riddle's single assignment of error is that the circuit court erred by finding that there was sufficient evidence to convict Riddle when there were no representations regarding the nature of the substance, no evidence that Riddle possessed the substance, and Riddle's statements to law enforcement officers about his intent were conditional and hypothetical.

"When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must affirm the decision below unless the trial court's decision was plainly wrong or lacked evidence to support it." Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 322, 330, 767 S.E.2d 741, 745 (2015). "In examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts will review theevidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing at trial and consider any reasonable inferences from the proven facts." Powell v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 579, 583, 750 S.E.2d 229, 230 (2013) (quoting Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 290, 718 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2011)).

"Circumstantial evidence . . . is offered to prove a fact not directly in issue, from which a fact in issue may reasonably be inferred." Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 512, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003). "There is no distinction in the law between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence." Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia has expressly stated that "[c]ircumstantial evidence, if convincing, is entitled to the same weight as direct testimony." Gov't Emp's. Ins. Co. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 281 Va. 647, 656, 708 S.E.2d 877, 882-83 (2011) (quoting Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 573, 667 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008)). Moreover, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is not viewed in isolation. While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in itself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion." Hudson, 265 Va. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 785. Thus, "[t]he finder of fact is entitled to consider all of the evidence, without distinction, in reaching its determination." Id. at 512-13, 578 S.E.2d at 785.

First, Riddle argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he represented the substance in question, Himalayan salts, to be MDMA (otherwise known as "molly").¹ Pursuant to Code § 18.2-248, it is a felony to possess with the intent to distribute an "imitation controlled substance." "Imitation controlled substance" is a defined term in Code § 18.2-247(B):

(i) a counterfeit controlled substance or (ii) a pill, capsule, tablet, or substance in any form whatsoever which is not a controlled substance subject to abuse, and:

1. Which by overall dosage unit appearance, including color, shape, size, marking and packaging or by representations made, would cause the likelihood that such a pill, capsule, tablet, or substance in any other form whatsoever will be mistaken for a controlled substance unless such substance was introduced into commerce prior to the initial introduction into commerce of the controlled substance which it is alleged to imitate; or

2. Which by express or implied representations purports to act like a controlled substance as a stimulant or depressant of the central nervous system and which is not commonly used or recognized for use in that particular formulation for any purpose other than for such stimulant or depressant effect, unless marketed, promoted, or sold as permitted by the United States Food and Drug Administration.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Riddle was apprehended subsequent to a search of the vehicle he had been operating. After Officer E.G. Ramirez ("Officer Ramirez") of the Lynchburg Police Department ("LPD") discovered marijuana in the glove compartment, Riddle and Jefferson, his compatriot in the vehicle, were searched. "Three small individually wrapped baggies containing a crystal-like substance" were found on Jefferson by Officer J.M. Pavia ("Officer Pavia") of the LPD. At trial, Officer Pavia testified that based on his training and experience he thought the substance was "a new drug going around called 'molly.'" Riddle admitted that he and Jefferson bought the Himalayan salts together and packaged it. Additionally, he admitted to Officer Pavia that it was "funny" how similar the Himalayan salts looked like molly. Therefore, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Commonwealth established that the substance, by appearance and packaging, would likely be mistaken for MDMA, otherwise known as molly. See Powell v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 20, 30, 766 S.E.2d 736, 741 (2015) (holding the evidence was sufficient for the factfinder to find that the substancewould likely be mistaken for crack cocaine based on the detective's testimony that the substance looked like crack cocaine to...