Riddle v. Ledbetter

• Decision Date: 22 November 1939
• Docket Number: 523.
• Citation: Riddle v. Ledbetter, 216 N.C. 491, 5 S.E. 2d 542 (N.C. 1939)
• Parties: RIDDLE v. LEDBETTER, Treasurer.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

5 S.E.2d 542

216 N.C. 491

RIDDLE v. LEDBETTER, Treasurer.

No. 523.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 22, 1939

Plaintiff instituted this action as a citizen and taxpayer of the City of Charlotte to restrain the payment of any money by the defendant City Treasurer to the person named as commissioner of police of the city, on the ground that the city was without power to create such office or position and to provide compensation therefor.

Plaintiff alleged that the city council had adopted a resolution that "it is to the best interests of the city to appoint a commissioner of police, whose duties shall be to co-ordinate the various functions of the police department, to develop greater efficiency so that the service of the defendant may be improved," and had thereupon created this office or position and directed the city manager to appoint some suitable person to perform its duties. The complaint further alleged that the city council subsequently adopted another resolution, in amplification of the former resolution prescribing that the duties of the commissioner of police or safety should be to "investigate and study the budget and various functions of the police department of the city and to advise and recommend to the mayor and city council and to the city manager and chief of police as to the best methods of creating efficiency in said department and of improving the service of said department. *** All duties to be performed by said commissioner of police or safety or which may be imposed hereafter shall be done and performed under the supervision and direction of the mayor and city council."

The former resolution was reenacted and affirmed. It was alleged that the salary for the person filling the position was fixed at $4,200 per annum. It was alleged that neither by the city charter nor by general law was the city empowered to create and compensate the position of commissioner of police or safety.

The defendant demurred on the ground that it appeared from the complaint that the commissioner of police was appointed pursuant to resolution of the city council, and that it did not appear that this action of the city was beyond its power under the law.

The demurrer was sustained and the plaintiff appealed.

E Riggs McConnell, Clayton L. Burwell, and John James, Jr., all of Charlotte, for plaintiff, appellant.

J M. Scarborough, of Charlotte, for defendant, appellee.

DEVIN Justice.

The only question presented by this appeal is whether the City of Charlotte had power to create the office of commissioner of police or safety, and to provide for the compensation of the incumbent from the city treasury. No point is made as to the form of the action. There is no allegation of want of good faith or of abuse of discretion, or that the creation of the position is not in the public interest. The validity of the action of the city council is assailed only on the ground of want of power.

A municipal corporation has only such powers as are granted to it by the General Assembly in its specific charter or by the general laws of the state applicable to all municipal corporations, and the powers granted in the charter will be construed together with those given under the general statutes. State v. Bridgers, 211 N.C. 235, 189 S.E. 869; Burt v. Biscoe, 209 N.C. 70, 183 S.E. 1; Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N.C. 732, 130 S.E. 861; Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.), sec. 237.

It is an established principle of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise only those powers expressly granted and those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, or those essential to the declared purposes of the corporation. 1 Dillon, sec 237. But it is also true that a municipal corporation...