Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc.

Decision Date09 July 2012
Docket NumberNo. 11–2606.,11–2606.
Citation679 F.3d 1062
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
PartiesBrian RIDENOUR, Appellant, v. BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Pfizer, Inc., Pharmacia Corporation, and Pharmacia & Upjohn Company, LLC, Appellees.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Thomas Matthew Corea, argued, Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

James Christopher Martin, argued, Pittsburgh, PA, Joseph Michael Price, Scott A. Smith, Minneapolis, MN, Bruce R. Parker, Jason Charles Rose, Baltimore, MD, Steven Boranian, San Francisco, CA, Michael Kevin Brown, Los Angeles, CA, on the brief, for Appellees.

Before MURPHY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges, and ROSS,1 District Judge.

ROSS, District Judge.

Brian Ridenour filed suit against Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Pfizer, Inc., Pharmacia Corporation, and Pharmacia & Upjohn Company, LLC (collectively, BIP) alleging tort claims based upon BIP's marketing and sales of pramiprexole, a drug commonly prescribed as “Mirapex”. Ridenour took Mirapex from 2002 to 2007 to treat symptoms of Restless Leg Syndrome. Ridenour alleges that his use of Mirapex caused compulsive behaviors, such as gambling and hypersexuality. BIP moved for summary judgment, which the district court 2 granted. Ridenour appeals, and we affirm.

I.

In December 2002, while Ridenour was living in Maryland, his physician, Jamal F. Ali, M.D., began Ridenour on a therapeutic trial of Mirapex. In mid–2003, Ridenour and his wife moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. Ridenour's new physician, William Gramlich, M.D., continued his Mirapex regimen until October 22, 2007.

Ridenour alleges that from 2003 to 2007, Mirapex caused him to engage in compulsive behaviors, including excessive drinking, sexual thoughts and gambling. In October 2007, Ridenour saw a television advertisement regarding potential side effects of Mirapex. On October 22, 2007, Ridenour mentioned to Dr. Gramlich that he was experiencing compulsive behaviors and “thought” they might be due to Mirapex. Dr. Gramlich's office note from this visit stated: “Patient in for follow-up. Says he is having side effects from Mirapex. All sorts of compulsive behavior—Not at all clear this is related, but will dc the Mirapex for RLS and switch to requip.” Dr. Gramlich testified that his office note accurately reflected his real time communications with Ridenour. Ridenour claims that Dr. Gramlich advised him that there was no link between Mirapex and Ridenour's compulsive behaviors.

In October or November of 2009, Ridenour saw a television advertisement by a personal injury attorney regarding the connection between Mirapex and compulsive behaviors. After viewing this advertisement, Ridenour contacted law firms regarding his potential claim.

On March 8, 2010, Ridenour filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Texas alleging claims for strict liability (design, manufacturing, and warning), breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, negligence per se (violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 352 and 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56, 201.57, 202.1), negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act, Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. §§ 17.01, et seq. The action was transferred to the District of Minnesota on April 6, 2010, as part of the multi-district litigation. Ridenour amended his complaint on March 2, 2011, to eliminate the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim and add claims for violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md.Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 13–101, et seq., and the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 598.0903, et seq.

BIP moved for summary judgment before Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel, asserting the claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e).3 The parties agreed that the applicable statute of limitations period for all Ridenour's claims, with the exception of his strict liability claim, was two years. In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Noel recommended granting BIP's motion based upon the two-year statute of limitations bar. In his objections to the Report and Recommendation, Ridenour argued, for the first time, that Magistrate Judge Noel “incorrectly applie[d] a two-year limitations period to all of [Ridenour's] causes of action, while certain of them are actually governed by either a three or four-year statute of limitations.” Ridenour also objected that Magistrate Judge Noel “erroneously applied a two-year limitations period to [Ridenour's] defective pharmaceutical products liability claim, despite the fact that Nevada law mandates a plaintiff be allowed four years to file a lawsuit that concerns a defective pharmaceutical products liability claim.”

The district court adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation and granted summary judgment. The district court held that Ridenour could not raise new arguments regarding the longer statutes of limitations for the first time in his objections and there was no excuse for the procedural default in this case. Moreover, the district court noted that even if it were to consider Ridenour's new arguments, the arguments would fail on the merits because Nevada's two-year statute of limitations applied. 4

Ridenour appeals the adverse grant of summary judgment and argues that the district court's decision should be reversed and remanded.

II.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir.2011); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir.2011). Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rynders v. Williams, 650 F.3d 1188, 1194 (8th Cir.2011); Taylor v. St. Louis County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 625 F.3d 1025, 1026 (8th Cir.2010) (per curiam).

In its motion for summary judgment, BIP argued that Ridenour's causes of action began to accrue in October 2007, and thus the claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. In response, Ridenour asserted that his causes of action did not begin to accrue until October or November of 2009, when he saw a television advertisement and researched his claims.

The parties do not dispute that the law of Nevada applies to Ridenour's claims, with the exception of his claim under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that [t]he general rule concerning statutes of limitation is that a cause of action accrues when the wrong occurs and a party sustains injuries for which relief could be sought.” Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271, 792 P.2d 18, 20 (1990) (citing Nelson v. A.H. Robins Co., 515 F.Supp. 623, 625 (N.D.Cal.1981)); Bemis v. Estate of Bemis, 114 Nev. 1021, 967 P.2d 437, 440 (1998). An exception to this general proposition is the “discovery rule,” whereby the statutory period of limitations is tolled until the injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered facts supporting a cause of action. Petersen, 792 P.2d at 20 (citing Sorenson v. Pavlikowski, 94 Nev. 440, 581 P.2d 851, 853–54 (1978)); Bemis, 967 P.2d at 440 (holding that there was no evidence to suggest appellants had any knowledge that would have put them on “inquiry notice” to investigate claims they may have had against their father prior to his death); Massey v. Litton, 99 Nev. 723, 669 P.2d 248, 251 (1983)(“This rule has been clarified to mean that the statute of limitations begins to run when the [plaintiff] has before him facts which would put a reasonable person on inquiry notice of his possible cause of action[.]). “The focus is on the [plaintiff's] knowledge of or access to facts rather than on her discoveryof legal theories.” Massey, 669 P.2d at 252. “In a discovery based cause of action, a plaintiff must use due diligence in determining the existence of a cause of action.” Bemis, 967 P.2d at 440 (citing Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Nye, 80 Nev. 88, 389 P.2d 387, 390 (1964)); Massey, 669 P.2d at 252 (a plaintiff “discovers his legal injury when he knows or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have known of facts that would put a reasonable person on inquiry notice of his cause of action”).

Ridenour alleges that he first became aware of his claim when he viewed the personal injury attorney's television advertisement in October or November 2009. The undisputed evidence before the district court, however, indicates that Ridenour became aware of facts supporting a cause of action related to his use of Mirapex in October 2007.

Ridenour alleges that he began experiencing compulsive behaviors in 2003. Sometime in October 2007, Ridenour claims that he saw a television advertisement noting a possible link between Mirapex and compulsive behaviors. After seeing the advertisement, Ridenour told Dr. Gramlich he was experiencing compulsive behaviors and “thought” they might be due to Mirapex. Dr. Gramlich ordered Ridenour to discontinue his use of Mirapex.

These facts should have put Ridenour on inquiry notice that he had a possible cause of action related to his use of Mirapex in October 2007. Massey, 669 P.2d at 251–52. Although Ridenour claims that he did not understand the significance of these facts, he clearly was cognizant enough to ask his physician about a possible relationship between Mirapex and his compulsive behaviors. Given the facts of which Ridenour was aware, he had a duty under Nevada law to investigate his potential claims. A reasonable inquiry by Ridenour in late 2007 would have resulted in him learning of a body of scientific research regarding a potential link between Mirapex and compulsive behaviors, as well as a significant number of lawsuits regarding the same. Thus, the district court correctly determined that Ridenour's claims accrued as of October 2007, and thus the statute...

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