Ridenour v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 14 December 2021
• Docket Number: 2:20-cv-13272
• Parties: CHAD EVERETT RIDENOUR, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

CHAD EVERETT RIDENOUR, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 2:20-cv-13272

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

December 14, 2021

HON SEAN F. COX, DISTRICT JUDGE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NOS. 15, 17 19)

PATRICIA T. MORRIS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Chad Ridenour challenges the Commissioner of Social Security regarding a final decision denying his claim for supplemental security income (“SSI”). The case was referred to the undersigned for review. (ECF No. 4); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(b)(3). For the reasons below, I recommend GRANTING Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 17), DENYING the Commissioner's motion, (ECF No. 19), and remanding the decision.

II. REPORT

A. Introduction and Procedural History

Plaintiff first filed an application for SSI and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) on April 17, 2015, alleging that he became disabled on December 1, 2009. (ECF No. 12, PageID.140.) Plaintiff was denied at the initial level and requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id.) On August 22, 2017, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at PageID.137, 152.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on April 23, 2018. (Id. at PageID.157, 161.)^[1]

Plaintiff protectively filed another application for SSI, but not DIB, on July 5, 2018. (Id. at PageID.82, 177.) He alleged that he became disabled on August 23, 2017. (Id.) The Commissioner denied these claims on August 29, 2018. (Id. at PageID.82, 176.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before another ALJ, which occurred on November 12, 2019. (Id. at PageID.98.) The ALJ issued a decision on December 18, 2019, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at PageID.93.) The Appeals Council denied review on October 16, 2020. (Id. at PageID.60.) Plaintiff sought judicial review on December 11, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and briefing is complete. (See ECF Nos. 15, 17, 19-20.)^[2]

B. Standard of Review

The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). The District Court's review is restricted solely to determining whether the “Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Sullivan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 595 Fed.Appx. 502, 506 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance.” Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. . . . It means-and means only-‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

The Court must examine the administrative record as a whole, and may consider any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the ALJ. See Walker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court will not “try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.” Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, “it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

C. Framework for Disability Determinations

Disability benefits are available only to those with a “disability.” Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). “Disability” means the inability

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve] months.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2012). The Commissioner's regulations provide that disability is determined through the application of a five-step sequential analysis:

(i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you are doing substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled.

(ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement . . . or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are not disabled.

(iii) At the third step, we also consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are disabled.

(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled.

(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience to see if you can make an adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are disabled.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2021); see also Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001). “Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by [his or] her impairments and the fact that [he or] she is precluded from performing [his or] her past relevant work.” Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). The claimant must provide evidence establishing the residual functional capacity, which “is the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations, ” and is measured using “all the relevant evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1) (2021).

The burden transfers to the Commissioner if the analysis reaches the fifth step without a finding that the claimant is not disabled. Combs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006). At the fifth step, the Commissioner is required to show that “other jobs in significant numbers exist in the national economy that [the claimant] could perform given [his or] her RFC and considering relevant vocational factors.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g) (2021)).

D. ALJ Findings

Following the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (ECF No. 12, at PageID.93.) At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since “July 5, 2018, the application date.” (Id. at PageID.84.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: narcolepsy, cataplexy, major depressive disorder, adjustment disorder, and anxiety. (Id. at PageID.84-85.) None of these impairments met or medically equaled a listed impairment at step three. (Id. at PageID.85-87.) Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”):

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except the claimant can only frequently crouch, crawl, kneel, balance, stoop, and climb ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He cannot work around hazards such as unprotected height or unguarded, moving machinery. The claimant cannot operate a motor vehicle. He is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and make simple work-related decisions. The claimant will be off task ten percent of the [workday].

(Id. at PageID.87.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as an automobile accessories installer or an automobile body repairer. (Id. at PageID.92.) Finally, at step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy, including work as an office clerk, a cashier, and a bench assembler. (Id. at PageID.92-93.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at PageID.93.)

E. Administrative Record

i. Medical Evidence

Plaintiff developed narcolepsy at forty-three years of age. (Id. at PageID.106.) Due to his narcolepsy, Plaintiff sleeps for “ten to [twelve] hours per day” and still “wakes up feeling unrefreshed.” (Id. at PageID.88.) Plaintiff complains that he is seldom adequately rested and that this inhibits his ability to think, “process problems”, concentrate, and “make good decisions.” (Id.) Plaintiff also suffers from depression and anxiety, and reports that he is “short-tempered, ” often becoming “irritable and angry.” (Id.)

The state agency, non-examining psychologist, Doctor Joe DeLoach opined that Plaintiff could perform unskilled work consisting of “simple tasks” performed “on a sustained basis.” (Id. at PageID.173.) Doctor DeLoach explained that he adopted the prior ALJ's findings after determining that the record did not contain “new and material evidence” that Plaintiff's conditions had changed since the prior ALJ's decision. (Id.) However, although the prior ALJ did not find that Plaintiff had any social functional limitations, Doctor DeLoach opined that Plaintiff's social functioning was moderately impaired. (Id. at PageID.145, 148, 173.) Accordingly, Doctor DeLoach believed...