Rider v. Stansberry

Decision Date04 April 2012
Docket NumberNos. 11–1430,11–1431.,s. 11–1430
Citation87 So.3d 989
PartiesNelwin RIDER v. Jack STANSBERRY, et al.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Homer E. Barousse, Jr., John Franklin Craton, Barousse & Craton, L.L.C., Crowley,LA, John Franklin Weeks, II, T. Allen Usry, Ursy, Weeks & Matthews, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants/Appellants, Acadia Parish Sheriff's Department, Wayne Melancon, Acadia Parish Sheriff, Frank Privat, Acadia Parish Sheriff Deputy, Eby Henry, Former Warden, Acadia Parish Justice Center, Princeton Excess and Surplus Lines Ins. Company.

J. Wendel Fusilier, Jacob B. Fusilier, J. Wendel Fusilier, APLC, Ville Platte, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Nelwin Rider.

Court composed of OSWALD A. DECUIR, JIMMIE C. PETERS, and J. DAVID PAINTER, Judges.

PETERS, J.

[3 Cir. 1]This litigation stems from the September 20, 2007 escape of Jack Stansberry, a prisoner in the custody of the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Department. Four days later, the plaintiff, Nelwin Rider, sustained physical injuries when the escapee hijacked a vehicle in Ville Platte, Louisiana, and, when fleeing the scene, struck her with the vehicle. Ms. Rider brought this action to recover for her damages and named Stansberry as a defendant, along with Wayne Melancon, Sheriff of Acadia Parish; the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Department; Acadia Parish Deputy Frank Privat; and the Sheriff's liability insurer, identified in the petition as XYZ Insurance Company 1 (we collectively refer to all of the defendants except Stansberry as “the law enforcement defendants). The matter is now before us because the trial court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Ms. Rider, finding that the law enforcement defendants were one hundred percent at fault in causing her injuries. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

There is little dispute concerning what occurred between the time of Stansberry's escape and the incident wherein Ms. Rider sustained her injuries. On September 20, 2007, at 7:05 p.m., Stansberry was in the custody of the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Department and was being transported by ambulance from the Acadia Parish Justice Center to the American Legion Hospital in Crowley. Warden Eby Henry followed the ambulance to the hospital and turned Stansberry's custody over to Deputy Frank Privat after arriving at the hospital. Stansberry had been transported without being handcuffed or otherwise restrained, and he remained unrestrained during the entire time at the hospital. After the hospital [3 Cir. 2]emergency room staff released Stansberry to Deputy Privat, the deputy contacted the Sheriff's office requesting transportation back to the Justice Center. While the deputy and Stansberry waited for the arrival of transportation, Stansberry asked to use the restroom. After he exited the restroom, Deputy Privat instructed him to wait while he also used the restroom facilities. While Deputy Privat was occupied in the restroom, Stansberry walked out of the hospital.

Stansberry made his escape from Crowley by going to a close-by restaurant, stealing a vehicle from the restaurant parking lot, and driving to Lake Charles, Louisiana. Four days later, on September 24, 2007, he left Lake Charles in the stolen vehicle intending to travel to Opelousas, Louisiana. Instead, the vehicle overheated, and Stansberry obtained a ride from a passing motorist to Ville Platte, Louisiana. After he arrived in Ville Platte, he stole a second vehicle from the parking area near the Ville Platte Medical Center walking track. The owner of the vehicle, Georgianna Fontenot, and Ms. Rider were just leaving the walking track when Stansberry approached them and forced Ms. Fontenot to provide him with the keys to her vehicle. Ms. Rider sustained her injuries when she was struck as Stansberry backed the vehicle out of the parking space.

In this newest stolen vehicle, Stansberry returned to Lake Charles. Four days later, on September 28, 2007, the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office apprehended him in Lake Charles.

Ms. Rider instituted a personal injury suit in Evangeline Parish on July 21, 2008, and later, on September 28, 2008, instituted the same suit in Acadia Parish. The Evangeline Parish suit was met with an exception of improper venue and, ultimately, on January 27, 2009, was transferred to Acadia Parish as well. These two suits were consolidated for trial purposes.

[3 Cir. 3]Among other defenses asserted, the law enforcement defendants asserted that they had no liability because Stansberry had completed his escape by the time Ms. Rider sustained her injuries. They then filed a motion for summary judgment on that argument. Ms. Rider responded by filing a motion for partial summary judgment addressing the issue of liability only and asserting that she was entitled to judgment finding the law enforcement defendants solely at fault in causing her injuries. The trial court agreed with Ms. Rider's argument and, after a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, rejected the law enforcement defendants' motion and granted Ms. Rider's motion. That grant of partial summary judgment to Ms. Rider is the basis of the appeal now before us.

The law enforcement defendants raise three assignments of error on appeal:

1.

The trial judgment committed reversible error in determining that the summary judgment record and evidence (particularly Stansberry's sworn statement) established prima facia evidence that Stansberry was still in the process of escape at the time he injured Appellee and thus entitled her to partial summary judgment as to Appellants' liability.

2.

In finding simply that Appellants were “liable” to Appellee in the three judgments he signed, the trial judge committed two distinct errors. First, he failed to separately assess the appropriate percentage of fault to Warden Henry and to Deputy Privat—the only two actual tortfeasors in this case affiliated with the Sheriff's Office.

3.

Additionally, to the extent these Judgments can be interpreted as the trial judge's final determination of all fault that contributed to Appellee's injuries, the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to consider and allocate any portion of fault to Stansberry. His intentional and egregious fault is readily obvious and undeniable from the summary judgment record and justifies allocating a majority of the fault to him.

[3 Cir. 4]OPINION

In reversing the trial court grant of summary judgment, we need only address the law enforcement defendants' first assignment of error. Additionally, in doing so, we do not conclude that Stansberry was no longer in the process of escaping at the time Ms. Rider sustained her injuries but that there are genuine issues of material fact as to this assertion.

Summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a trial on the merits when no genuine issue of material fact exists in a matter. Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So.2d 27 (1963). Its procedure is “designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,” except in certain domestic actions; the “procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2); Racine v. Moon's Towing, 01–2837 (La.5/14/02), 817 So.2d 21. Appellate courts review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as that used by the trial court. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93–2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730. The burden of proof rests with the movant. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2). Judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B).

A “genuine issue” is a “triable issue.” Toups v. Hawkins, 518 So.2d 1077, 1079 (La.App. 5th Cir.1987) (citing Brown [ v. B & G Crane Service, Inc., 172 So.2d 708, 710 (La.App. 4 Cir.1965) ] ). More precisely, [a]n issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree. If on the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue. Summary judgment is the means for disposing of such meretricious disputes.” W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 481 (1983). In determining whether an issue is “genuine,” courts[3 Cir. 5]cannot consider the merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony or weigh evidence.Simon v. Fasig–Tipton Co. of New York, 524 So.2d 788, 791 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writs denied,525 So.2d 1048, 1049 (La.1988); Pace v. Zilka, 484 So.2d 771 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,488 So.2d 691 (La.1986); Mecom v. Mobil Oil Corp., 299 So.2d 380, 386 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,302 So.2d 308 (La.1974). “Formal allegations without substance should be closely scrutinized to determine if they truly do reveal genuine issues of fact.” Brown, 172 So.2d at 710;Sally Beauty Co. v. Barney, 442 So.2d 820, 822 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983).

A fact is “material” when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577, 583 (La.1989). [F]acts are material if they potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect a litigant's ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute.” South Louisiana Bank v. Williams, 591 So.2d 375, 377 (La.App. 3d Cir.1991), writs denied,596 So.2d 211 (La.1992). Simply put, a “material” fact is one that would matter on the trial on the merits. Any doubt as to a dispute regarding a material issue of fact must be resolved against granting the motion and in favor of a trial on the merits. Sassone v. Elder, 626 So.2d 345, 352 (La.1993); Industrial Sand and Abrasives, Inc. v. Louisville and Nashville...

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