Ridge v. Manker
| Decision Date | 05 September 1904 |
| Docket Number | 1,987. |
| Citation | 132 F. 599 |
| Parties | RIDGE v. MANKER et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
The Phoenix Loan Association, a corporation organized under the laws of Missouri, and having its domicile at the city of St Joseph, in that state, became insolvent, and ceased the transaction of active business. The state supervisor of building and loan associations proceeded against the corporation, and on July 15, 1889, it was adjusted to be dissolved by an order of the judge of a state court in St Joseph, its officers were enjoined from further managing or conducting its affairs, receivers of its property were appointed, and its business was directed to be wound up. This order was signed by the judge in vacation, and upon that ground its validity was attacked by proceedings in the Supreme Court of Missouri, with the result that the order was annulled, excepting so far as it related to the appointment of the receivers and committed to them the possession, care custody, and collection of the property of the association and the protection thereof from attack, as to which matters the order was confirmed. State v. Phoenix Loan Association, 159 Mo. 102, 60 S.W. 74; State v Woodson, 161 Mos. 446, 61 S.W. 252. After the appointment of the receivers by the judge of the Missouri state court, a stockholders suit was instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri for the winding up of the insolvent institution, and an order of that court was made appointing the same receivers. Thereupon the state court, which had charge of the property of the corporation, relinquished its jurisdiction and custody, and surrendered the property to the receivers of the federal court. These receivers afterwards resigned, and Ransom N. Ridge was by the same court appointed as their successor. Afterwards ancillary proceedings were instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa for the ultimate purpose of subjecting certain property there located to the operation of the decree of the parent jurisdiction. Ridge was appointed ancillary receiver in Iowa. Shortly thereafter, and on September 10, 1902, Ridge, as receiver, exhibited his bill to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa against George F. Manker and other borrowing members of the association to enforce the adjusted equities between them and the insolvent corporation of which they were stockholders, and for the foreclosure of mortgages upon real property in Iowa given by them as Manker and the other appellees in this court. Upon consideration of the pleadings and certain admitted facts that court entered a decree dismissing the complainant's bill, from which decree the appeal now before us was taken. The case of Manker is typical of that of each of the other appellees, and what is said herein and the conclusion reached will apply with equal force to all.
The undisputed facts presented to the court below are as follows Shortly after the appointment of the receivers by the judge of the Missouri state court, Manker instituted a suit in the district court of Taylor county, Iowa, against the Phoenix Association and the Missouri receivers to obtain a cancellation of the mortgage which he had executed to the association upon real property in that county. He alleged that deceit and fraud had been practiced upon him; that the mortgage and other instruments connected therewith were devices to evade the usury laws of the state; that usury had been exacted of him; and that the mortgage indebtedness had been fully paid. The association and the receivers appeared in the suit, and contested Manker's charges upon the merits. In their joint pleading they also embodied a cross-petition and sought the foreclosure of the mortgage which Manker was seeking to have canceled. The cause was tried upon its merits. The district court found that Manker's contentions were true, and that the Phoenix corporation was not in truth a building and loan association. A decree was rendered that the mortgage given by Manker be canceled upon the records. It does not appear in the pleadings or in the decree of that court that any leave to sue the Missouri receivers had ever been obtained or asked for. Nor does it appear that there was any objection on the part of the receivers to the jurisdiction of the Iowa court upon that or any other ground. The mortgage so canceled is the same mortgage involved in the appeal now before us. A few months after the decree of cancellation was rendered, the association and the receivers, who had just received their appointment from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri, and who had theretofore acted under the order of the judge of the state court, perfected their appeal from such decree to the Supreme Court of Iowa. In that court the decree of cancellation was contested by the receivers upon three grounds: First, upon the merits; second, that the court below was without jurisdiction of the subject-matter; and, third, that it was without jurisdiction of the receivers because leave to sue them had not been procured from the Missouri court. While this appeal was pending and undetermined, the federal court in Missouri allowed and ordered paid to the receivers their expenses in connection with the Manker suit in the Iowa district court and in the appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court, and also allowed and ordered paid the fees and expenses of attorneys and others who had rendered services therein. The fees and expenses were accordingly paid. And while the appeal from Manker's decree was pending and undetermined in the Supreme Court of Iowa the following occurred: Ransom N. Ridge succeeded the other Missouri receivers, and was also appointed ancillary receiver in Iowa. He instituted his suit for the foreclosure of the same mortgage in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa. He was defeated, and perfected the appeal now before us. While this appeal was pending before this court, the Supreme Court of Iowa rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the lower court against the association, and reversing it as to the receivers. It held that the procurement of leave to sue the receivers of another court was a jurisdictional matter, which must affirmatively appear of record. Manker v. Phoenix Loan Association of St. Joseph (Iowa) 96 N.W. 982. At the hearing before this court the appellant, Ridge, as receiver, tendered authentic evidence of the action of the Supreme Court of Iowa, and asked that...
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Franz v. Buder
...useless circuity of proceeding, and to preserve a jurisdiction lawfully acquired, is further announced by this court in Ridge v. Manker, 132 F. 599-601, 67 C. C. A. 596, and by the Supreme Court in Kline et al. v. Burke Construction Co., 43 S. Ct. 79, 260 U. S. 226, 67 L. Ed. 226, 24 A. L. ......
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City of Boston v. McGovern
... ... own protection and for the preservation of the ... [292 F. 719.] ... proper relations between federal and state courts. Ridge ... v. Manker, 132 F. 599, 67 C.C.A. 596, cited by this ... court in F.A. Mfg. Co. v. Hayden & Clemons (C.C.A.) ... 273 F. 374, 378 ... ...
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Vidal v. South American Securities Co., 69.
... ... 222, 225, 226, 5 Sup.Ct. 428, 28 L.Ed. 98; ... California v. San Pablo & Tulare Railroad, 149 U.S ... 308, 13 Sup.Ct. 876, 37 L.Ed. 747; Ridge v. Manker, ... 132 F. 599, 601, 67 C.C.A. 596. If we had concluded that the ... court had jurisdiction of the case it might have been our ... ...
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Burgess v. Lasby
...of litigation where the controversy between the parties has been settled, or for other reasons has ceased to exist.” Ridge v. Manker (C. C. A.) 132 F. 599, 601. It has been held that, in passing on questions of jurisdiction, an appellate court is not confined to the record and may consider ......