Ridge v. Pa. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 May 1899
• Citation: 43 A. 275,58 N.J.E. 172
• Parties: RIDGE v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

43 A. 275

58 N.J.E. 172

RIDGE

v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

May 5, 1899.

Railroads—Nuisance.

Where a railroad acquires land for terminal purposes in the heart of a city, it cannot use such land in disregard of the comfort and property of others. It must adjust its operations so as to produce the least annoyance possible.

Bill by James M. Ridge against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Heard on bill, answer, and proofs. Decree for defendant.

The complainant owns a three-story brick house fronting on Mickle street in the city of Camden. A part of the first floor of this house is used as a drug store, and the room above, fronting on Mickle street is used by complainant as a physician's office. This house is 30 feet north from the southeast corner of Third and Mickle streets. One hundred feet north of Mickle street, and parallel with it is Bridge avenue. Along Bridge avenue are laid three tracks of the Pennsylvania Railroad, leading to its yard and station on the east side of the Delaware river. Mickle street is 60 feet wide, and is closely built upon both sides at this point. Second street is the next street to Third street, towards the river and yard of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Between Second street and the river, the yard and station lie. The bill charges that the right to use the tracks of the railroad for strictly yard purposes, namely, for making up trains, shifting cars, etc., is confined to the limits of the yard, lying between Second street and the river. The bill charges that for a long time past the company has unlawfully used the three tracks along Bridge avenue, north of Second street, for the purpose of distributing cars and making up trains, and using engines there for shifting and coupling, and detaching cars near the dwelling of the complainant; that at frequent intervals during every day and night the engines stop and keep standing near said house from 1 to 30 minutes, and discharge large volumes of smoke, soot, cinders, and gases, which are carried into the rooms of the said house; that cars loaded with cattle and manure are kept standing there; and that the noise of bumping cars, the shouting of men in drilling cars, the ringing of bells, blowing of whistles, hissing of steam, and the groaning of cattle are a nuisance. The bill states that at Third street, at its point of crossing, Bridge avenue is obstructed. An injunction is prayed for. The answer sets up that the company is in possession of the tract of land for terminal purposes, including a strip of land eastward of Second street, on the north side of Bridge avenue, to Fourth street. Fourth street crosses Mickle street, north of complainant's residence. The answer states that the defendant has purchased all the property fronting on Bridge avenue between Fourth street and the river, from No. 1 to No. 19 on the south side, and from No. 1 to No. 16, inclusive, on the north side, of Bridge avenue, by which purchases it acquired the fee in the soil covered by said avenue, lying west of Fourth street; that that part of Bridge avenue on a line 40 feet from the south house line was vacated; that the 60-foot strip thus vacated, upon which the three tracks are laid, together with the property purchased on the north side of Bridge avenue, were acquired for terminal purposes, and constitute the throat of the yard, and have been used in connection with this terminal. The answer denies the general allegation of the bill in respect to the standing of cattle and manure cars; and in respect to the emission of smoke, gas, and noises, it states that it is one of the incidents of defendant's business, and that it is the result of the necessary use of the property so acquired for the purpose of drawing cars upon it, in order to clear the switches in front of the passenger station, or to run them upon the storage tracks, and to draw freight cars to place them upon their proper tracks to be made up into trains. It claims the right to so purchase and use the land under the charter of the Camden & Amboy Railway & Transportation Company.

John L. Semple, for complainant.

Joseph Gaskill, for defendant.

REED, V. C. (after stating the facts). In support of the complainant's case, the doctrine enunciated by the court of appeals in the case of Railroad Co. v. Angel, 41 N. J. Eq. 316, 7 Atl. 432, is vouched. The bill is admittedly modeled after the pleadings in that case. That was a suit brought against the same' corporation by a resident on the southerly side of Bridge avenue, between Second and Third streets, who complained that the company had created a nuisance by the use of its railroad in front of his house in a manner similar to that now charged by the present complainant. The court in that case held the defendant was guilty of maintaining a nuisance, on the ground that it had no right to use its tracks north of Second street for any purpose other than the passage of its trains, while in fact it had used them for terminal purposes. If the right of the railroad company to use the three tracks mentioned has not been enlarged since the decision of that case, the complainant is clearly entitled to an injunction; for it is not denied by the defendant that it has habitually used the same portions of its road for terminal purposes. The first question, then, is whether it has acquired any rights that it did not possess at the time of the former litigation. Then its tracks north of Second street were laid upon a street, and the court held that neither by legislation nor municipal grant had it acquired any right to use those tracks as a part of its terminal yard. Since then the company has acquired the fee in the land covered by these tracks, and 60 feet of the street has been vacated; leaving the fee in the company, disincumbered of the public easement. Upon this vacated strip the company has placed its three tracks, and this strip of land, together with the property north of it, the company has shown to be necessary for the operation of its terminal yard. The act of 1855 (Acts 1855, p. 118; Revision, p. 919, § 65), cited in the opinion in Railroad Co. v. Angel, supra, conferred upon the railroad company power to purchase and hold so much land...