Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co.

• Decision Date: 30 July 2002
• Docket Number: (AC 20491)
• Citation: 801 A.2d 902,71 Conn. App. 321
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD v. EPPOLITI REALTY COMPANY, INC. JOHN J. GIROLAMETTI ET AL. v. EPPOLITI REALTY COMPANY, INC.

71 Conn. App. 321

801 A.2d 902

TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD v. EPPOLITI REALTY COMPANY, INC.

JOHN J. GIROLAMETTI ET AL. v. EPPOLITI REALTY COMPANY, INC.

(AC 20491)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 26, 2002.

Officially released July 30, 2002.

Lavery, C. J., and Schaller and Peters, Js. Paul L. Bollo, for the appellant (defendant in both cases).

Patricia C. Sullivan, for the appellee (plaintiff in the first case).

Robert A. Fuller, for the appellees (plaintiffs in the second case).

Opinion

LAVERY, C. J.

The defendant, Eppoliti Realty Company, Inc., in each of two cases consolidated for trial appeals from the judgments of the trial court determining that the entire parcel of land at issue was dedicated by the defendant and accepted properly as a public highway by the plaintiff town of Ridgefield (town) and enjoining the defendant from obstructing the other plaintiffs'¹ access to that highway. The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) concluded that the entire parcel of land at issue was dedicated and accepted as a public highway, (2) failed to conclude that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrines of laches, unclean hands and equitable estoppel, (3) failed to order that the plaintiffs John J. Girolametti and Dorothy Girolametti comply with an earlier stipulated judgment and (4) failed to conclude that the judgments in this case were void for lateness. We disagree with those claims and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant's appeal. The parcel of land at issue is a long and narrow one-half acre strip located in the town of Ridgefield, running north from a major thoroughfare. The southernmost portion of the parcel is situated to the west of commercial property owned by the defendant, and to the east and southeast, respectively, of properties owned by the Girolamettis and the plaintiffs Navio J. Ligi and Ridea R. Ligi. The Girolametti property houses shops and an apartment building, and the Ligi property is residential. Further north, the parcel is bordered on both sides by other residential properties. The parcel is composed of a central paved portion that long has been used for travel by the public, and the narrow strips of land running along both sides of the paved portion. It is known to area residents as "Roberts Lane." It is undisputed that the defendant owns the fee to the entire parcel. The parties differ as to that portion of the parcel over which the defendant dedicated an easement to the town for use as a public highway. The plaintiffs contend that the entire parcel was so dedicated and, thereafter, accepted by the town, while the defendant argues that the public highway consists of only the paved, traveled portion and not the strips to either side thereof.

The disputed dedication resulted from a stipulated agreement between the defendant, the Girolamettis and the town (stipulation), executed and reduced to judgment in January, 1980. The stipulation was intended to settle a lawsuit brought by the defendant against the Girolamettis regarding drainage from the Girolametti property onto the defendant's property. The stipulation states in relevant part "[t]hat ... John J. Girolametti and Dorothy Girolametti shall dedicate to the extent allowed by zoning and planning regulations for its buildings that portion of their property abutting Roberts Lane to be a portion of the public highway" and "[t]hat the... Town of Ridgefield shall call a meeting for the acceptance of Roberts Lane as a public road within a reasonable time, and that the First Selectman of Ridgefield recommend acceptance of the road."²

A map filed in the town land records in 1967 depicts the parcel and the adjoining properties. The boundaries of the parcel are shown in metes and bounds. Within and generally parallel to those boundaries are two dotted lines representing the paved, traveled portion of the parcel. The parameters of the paved, traveled portion are not shown in metes and bounds. Inscribed between the two dotted lines is "ROBERTS LANE."

On December 3, 1980, after notice to residents, the town's board of selectmen held a meeting at which the first selectman recommended that "Roberts Lane" be accepted as a town road.³ No opposition was raised to that recommendation, and the board voted in favor of it. The town continued to maintain the paved portion of the parcel, as it had even prior to the stipulation.

In 1995 or 1996, the defendant erected a fence along the western border of the parcel, completely fencing off the Girolamettis' property. There is an opening in the fence suitable for pedestrians located on abutting property to the north of the Girolametti property. The defendant later constructed brick pillars immediately adjacent to the paved portion of the parcel and placed signs on the pillars indicating that the road was private.

The town thereafter brought an action against the defendant seeking a judgment determining the rights of the parties to the parcel, and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief declaring the entire parcel a public highway and authorizing the town to remove any obstructions thereto. The defendant filed a counterclaim requesting a judgment declaring that the town has an easement for public use over only the paved and traveled part of the parcel. Subsequently, the Girolamettis and the Ligis brought a separate action, claiming that the entire parcel had been dedicated and accepted as a public highway, and that the defendant's fence was obstructing and interfering with their private easement rights to access the highway. See footnote 1. They requested monetary damages and an injunction preventing the defendant from blocking their access to the highway.⁴ The defendant counterclaimed, alleging that the Girolamettis had failed to adhere to the terms of the stipulation in that they never had dedicated any of their land to the town and the town never had accepted the same, and requesting an order requiring full compliance with the stipulation. The defendant further alleged several special defenses.

The two actions were consolidated and tried before the court, Mihalakos, J., in January, 1998. In a memorandum of decision dated December 1, 1999, the court concluded that the entire parcel had been dedicated and accepted as a public highway, and rejected the defendant's special defenses and its claim that the Girolamettis did not comply with the stipulation. The court permanently enjoined the defendant from obstructing access to the highway and ordered it to remove the fence along the boundary line. On December 6, 1999, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgments as void for lateness under General Statutes § 51-183b. After a hearing, the court, Radcliffe, J., denied that motion, finding that the parties had waived any objection to the lateness of the judgments. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be provided where necessary.

I

The defendant claims first that the court improperly concluded that the entire parcel of land at issue was dedicated by the defendant and accepted by the town as a public highway. We disagree.

"From early times, under the common law, highways have been established in this state by dedication and acceptance by the public.... Dedication is a appropriation of land to some public use, made by the owner of the fee, and accepted for such use by and in behalf of the public.... Both the owner's intention to dedicate the way to public use and acceptance by the public must exist, but the intention to dedicate the way to public use may be implied from the acts and conduct of the owner, and public acceptance may be shown by proof of the actual use of the way by the public.... Thus, two elements are essential to a valid dedication: (1) a manifested intent by the owner to dedicate the land involved for the use of the public; and (2) an acceptance by the proper authorities or by the general public.... No particular formality is required in order to dedicate a parcel of land to a public use; dedication may be express or implied.... Whether there has been a dedication and whether there has been an acceptance present questions of fact." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Drabik v. East Lyme, 234 Conn. 390, 394, 662 A.2d 118 (1995). "Likewise, the determination of the extent to which there has been an acceptance of a street involves a question of fact." Whippoorwill Crest Co. v. Stratford, 145 Conn. 268, 272, 141 A.2d 241 (1958).

"Our review of the factual findings of the trial court is limited to a determination of whether they are clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.... Because it is the trial court's function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Drabik v. East Lyme, supra, 234 Conn. 394-95.

The court in this case based its findings that there had been a dedication and acceptance of the entire parcel on the terms of the stipulation and the other evidence presented. "A judgment rendered in accordance with the stipulation of the parties is to be construed and regarded as a binding contract.... Construction of such an agreement is an issue of fact to be resolved by the trial court as the trier of fact, and subject to our review under the clearly erroneous standard.... The construction and interpretation of the agreement necessarily depends upon the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the agreement." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Albrecht v. Albrecht, 19 Conn. App. 146, 152, 562 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 813, 565 A.2d 534 (1989)....