Ridgell v. United States., 524.

• Decision Date: 28 August 1947
• Docket Number: No. 524.,524.
• Citation: 54 A.2d 679
• Parties: RIDGELL v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

54 A.2d 679

RIDGELL

v.UNITED STATES.

No. 524.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Aug. 28, 1947.

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Criminal Division.

James A. Ridgell was convicted of negligent homicide, and he appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Richard L. Merrick, of Washington, D. C., and Thomas H. King, of Baltimore, Md., for appellant.

John P. Burke, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Washington, D. C. (George Morris Fay, U. S. Atty., and William S. McKinley, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.

CAYTON, Chief Judge.

Appellant Ridgell was found guilty and sentenced upon a charge of negligent homicide. Code 1940, 40-606. He was charged with having caused the death of one Roger Lewis in an automobile accident on November 24, 1946. Ridgell and Lewis were both employed at a filling station at Alabama Avenue and Good Hope Road. On the night in question the station closed at midnight or shortly afterwards. Ridgell admitted he had had ‘a few’ beers before closing time. As they started out, there were in addition to Ridgell and Lewis, six people (four men and two women). One of these men, Richard DeButts, had his car at the station, as did Ridgell. They all left the station shortly after midnight-Lewis going in Ridgell's car, which Ridgell admittedly was driving at that time, and the rest following in DeButts' car.

At a stop sign, just outside the station, Ridgell's car stalled. DeButts slowed down to about 5 miles per hour at this sign, and passed Ridgell's car. DeButts testified that he saw no activity around the stalled car at this time. About a block and a half (330 feet) past the stop sign, on Naylor Road, the Ridgell car passed DeButts who was then going about 25 miles per hour. As they went uphill DeButts again passed the Ridgell car. Going down the other side of the hill Ridgell's car passed DeButts, shortly before the intersection of Naylor Road and 25th Street. Speeds were apparently increasing as DeButts testified that Ridgell's car was traveling between 35 and 40 miles per hour when it last passed him. At the intersection of Naylor Road and 25th Street, Ridgell's car went down Naylor Road, while DeButts started down 25th Street. DeButts could still see the Ridgell car, and saw it swerve. He circled the block to his left and came back to Naylor Road. There he found the Ridgell car overturned close to the intersection of Naylor Road and 24th Place.

Shortly after passing the intersection with 25th Street (which runs due north and south) Ridgell's car hit the north curb of Naylor Road (which here runs northwest). Whoever was driving the car apparently lost control of it. It smashed into a car parked on that side of Naylor Road, and from there careened diagonally across the road for slightly more than 100 feet, where it struck a telephone pole. The car ended up, overturned, on Naylor Road, just north of its intersection with 24th Place, and facing south toward 24th Place.

When DeButts and the others came upon the scene, they found the car as described above. The right or passenger door was open; the left door was jammed shut. Ridgell was found lying just in front of his car, near the curb of Naylor Road. Lewis' body was found some distance east of the car, in 24th Place, partly on the curb, his head toward Naylor Road. This may have indicated to the jury that he had been thrown clear of the automobile before it finally overturned.

Ridgell and Lewis were taken in an ambulance to Casualty Hospital shortly after the accident, Ridgell sitting beside the ambulance driver. One of the passengers in DeButts' car said Ridgell seemed dazed and not aware of what he was saying, both at the scene of the accident and at the hospital.

At the hospital, a police officer heard Ridgell ask one of the women passengers in DeButts' car, who had been driving his car at the time of the accident. She said she did not know; whereupon he said he would say that he had been driving.

Appellant was asked at the hospital to give a specimen of his urine, to determine whether or not it contained alcohol. One officer did not remember whether he warned that the results of the test might be used against Ridgell; but another officer testified that he warned Ridgell that the result might be used for or against him. Ridgell then gave the specimen. In his own testimony, at the trial, he said that he remembered giving it.

After Ridgell was treated and his head bandaged, he was taken to police headquarters where he gave a statement to the officers, about two hours after the accident. Before giving the statement, he asked how Lewis was, ‘and someone answered, I don't know who, and said he is O.K.’ In the statement he gave a rather full account of what had happened and said he was certain he had been driving the car. After Ridgell had signed the statement, he was told that Lewis was dead. He then said that he wanted to change his statement-that in truth Lewis had been driving at the time of the accident. He was asked why, if this were so, he had made the earlier statement. He said that he was ‘covering up’ for Lewis who was drunk at the time of the accident, and who had a family and was having trouble with his wife. Ridgell had no family. Ridgell was then booked. In the afternoon, one of the officers went to see him at the cell block in No. 1 Precinct. Ridgell there explained that he and Lewis had changed seats when they stalled at the stop sign, Lewis having asked to drive. Then followed the prosecution, and the conviction from which this appeal has been taken.

Appellant assigns seven grounds of error. These, for the sake of clarity, we will group and consider under three headings.

1. Admission of defendant's signed confession.

2. Admission of testimony as to specimen of defendant's urine.

3. Exclusion of defendant's honorable discharge certificate, offered to show his good character.

Appellant argues that the confession should not have been received because defendant was not immediately taken before a committing magistrate and arraigned. He cites McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819, and Akowskey v. United States, App.D.C., 158 F.2d 649, 650. In the Akowskey case the court quoted the following language used by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140:

‘Inexcusable detention for the purpose of illegally extracting evidence from an accused, and the successful extraction of such inculpatory statements by continuous questioning for many hours under psychological pressure, were the decisive features in the McNabb case which led us to rule that a conviction on such evidence could not stand.’

No such objectionable conduct can be attributed to the police in this case. The uncontradicted evidence shows that defendant gave his statement voluntarily immediately after he was taken to headquarters, and that there were no threats or psychological pressure of any kind. There was testimony that he was ‘dazed’ and ‘foggy’ while at the hospital; but none that he was not aware of what he was saying and doing when he gave and signed the statement, about two hours after the accident.

Appellant makes the further point that the confession should not have been admitted until the government had established the corpus delicti of the crime by evidence aliunde. In support of this contention he cites a number of state cases. ¹ We do not think these cases sustain his view of the law. They go no further than to hold that a conviction cannot be predicated solely on an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession. Such also is the law in this jurisdiction. Forte v. United States, 68 App.D.C. 111, 94 F.2d 236, 127 A.L.R. 1120; Ercoli v. United States, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 131 F.2d 354. In the Ercoli case the court carefully summarized the applicable law as follows:

1. There can be no conviction on an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession.

2. Such corroboration is not sufficient if it tends merely to support the confession without also embracing substantial evidence touching and tending to prove each of the main elements or constituent parts of the corpus delicti.

3. The corroborating evidence need not establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, independent of the confession.

4. It is sufficient if there is substantial evidence of the corpus delicti, independent of the confession and the two together are convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.

Since the confession was admissible it was within the discretion of the trial judge to decide on the order and time of its admission; and it was not error for him to have received it before rather than after proof of the corpus deliciti. ²

Appellant says there was no evidence apart from the confession that he was driving the car at the time of the fatal accident. But as was held in the Forte case, supra, identity of the actor is not a necessary part of the corpus delicti. ³ The same rule was followed in the Ercoli case, supra, which involved the same offense as that charged here; and there the Court ruled that the elements of the corpus delicti in such a case are: (1) The death of a human being; (2) by the instrumentality of a motor car; (3) operated at an immoderate rate of speed, or in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner. From this it seems quite clear that the government was not required to establish the identity of the driver by any evidence apart from the confession. Our primary inquiry must be whether there was substantial evidence to meet the three tests just described. We think it is clear beyond question that all these elements were established by evidence which, insofar as this phase of the case is concerned, was neither contradicted nor disputed.

But appellant argues, correctly enough, that if he was not driving the automobile there was no crime at all, for the only other possible...