Ridgeway v. CSX Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 July 1998 |
| Citation | 723 So.2d 600 |
| Parties | Al RIDGEWAY, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Debbie Ridgeway, deceased v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., and the Town of Thorsby. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
William Dudley Motlow, Jr., Don L. Hall, and W. Perry Webb of Porterfield, Harper & Mills, P.A., Birmingham, for appellant.
David L. McAlister of Lusk, Fraley, McAlister & Simms, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee CSX Transportation, Inc. (Mr. McAlister signed CSX's brief as "Attorney for National Railroad Passenger Corporation").
Timothy P. Donahue and John C. Webb V of Bradford & Donahue, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee Town of Thorsby.
The plaintiff Al Ridgeway, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of his wife Debbie Ridgeway, appeals from summary judgments for the defendants CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"), and the Town of Thorsby, in an action to recover damages for personal injury and wrongful death.1 We affirm.
A summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P. In determining, on a summary judgment motion, whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all reasonable doubts against the moving party. The burden is initially on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If it makes that showing, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence creating a material factual issue for resolution by a jury, so as to avoid the entry of a judgment. Hilliard v. City of Huntsville Electric Utility Board, 599 So.2d 1108 (Ala.1992).
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff Al Ridgeway, indicates the following: Debbie Ridgeway suffered severe personal injuries on March 8, 1995, when the vehicle she was driving collided with an Amtrak passenger train at the Concordia Avenue railroad crossing in the Town of Thorsby, in Chilton County. The accident occurred as Ms. Ridgeway travelled east on Concordia Avenue and across the track and as the train was proceeding north. The stretch of track that crosses Concordia Avenue is owned by CSX. CSX had no ownership interest in, and did not operate, the train. The collision occurred at approximately 12:30 p.m.; the weather was cold, and visibility at the crossing was good. The track is straight and flat on both sides of the crossing, and there were no obstructions, of vegetation or of any other kind, to Ms. Ridgeway's view of the train as it approached Concordia Avenue. The track is slightly elevated at the crossing, so that motorists crossing the track encounter a hump. Ms. Ridgeway approached the crossing from the west—the left side of the track as viewed from the perspective of the train's crew. Approaching the crossing, Ms. Ridgeway encountered a railroad "crossbuck"—a large "X" made of two crossed pieces of wood or metal, painted white, with the words "RAILROAD" and "CROSSING" written across the overlapping pieces in black paint—and a faded "stop" sign. Just east of the crossing, Concordia Avenue intersects with Highway 31, which at that point runs parallel with the railroad track. A traffic light at that intersection regulates access from Concordia Avenue to Highway 31. That traffic light, which was green in the direction of Concordia Avenue at the time of the accident, was visible to Ms. Ridgeway as she approached the crossing. Ms. Ridgeway, a longtime resident of Chilton County, was familiar with the area around the crossing (she shopped regularly at a grocery store near the crossing), and she knew that the railroad track crossed Concordia Avenue at this point.
Two eyewitnesses observed the collision: Mike Smith, the engineer of the train; and Greta Schoolar, the driver of another motor vehicle. Ms. Schoolar had stopped her vehicle at the traffic light at the intersection of Concordia Avenue and Highway 31. She was heading south on Highway 31. She heard the train sounding its horn and looked up to see the train as it approached the crossing. She then noticed Ms. Ridgeway's vehicle as it approached the crossing. She testified:
Mike Smith, the train's engineer, testified that the train was traveling at approximately 45 miles per hour just before the collision; this speed was within the maximum speed limit for that stretch of track. He began sounding the train's horn as the train passed the "whistle board";2 the train's headlights were on and there were no mechanical problems with the train's brakes. When asked about Ms. Ridgeway's actions as she approached the crossing, Smith stated that her vehicle "never did slack up."
Al and Debbie Ridgeway sued CSX and the Town of Thorsby, alleging negligence and wantonness. Specifically, the Ridgeways alleged that CSX had, among other things, negligently or wantonly failed to install active warning devices, such as lights, bells, or gates, at the crossing.3 They alleged that the Town of Thorsby had negligently or wantonly failed to properly maintain the crossing. Specifically, they alleged that the town had failed to maintain the stop sign that was located beside the crossing and facing the eastbound lane of Concordia Avenue, and that the town had otherwise failed to install adequate warning signs, pavement markings, or warning devices at the crossing. Debbie Ridgeway sought compensatory and punitive damages as a result of the severe personal injuries she had suffered when the train hit her vehicle; Al Ridgeway sued derivatively for loss of consortium. Debbie Ridgeway died from her injuries while this action was pending; Al Ridgeway, after being appointed personal representative of her estate, amended the complaint by adding a claim seeking damages for wrongful death. The trial court entered separate summary judgments for CSX and the Town of Thorsby.
The following issues are dispositive of this appeal:
With respect to the first issue, both CSX and the Town of Thorsby contend that Ms. Ridgeway was herself negligent and that her own negligence was the proximate cause of the accident that resulted in her death. They argue that Ms. Ridgeway failed to stop, look, and listen at the Concordia Avenue crossing, in violation of Ala. Code 1975, § 32-5A-150, and that that failure was unquestionably the proximate cause of her death. Mr. Ridgeway contends that a fact question was presented as to whether Ms. Ridgeway acted reasonably under the circumstances.5 He argues that a jury could find that the layout of the various intersecting roads adjacent to the Concordia Avenue crossing, the faded stop sign, and the traffic light at the intersection of Concordia Avenue and Highway 31, when considered together, created a confusing and hazardous situation that Ms. Ridgeway, all the while exercising due care, was attempting to deal with at the time of the accident.
Section 32-5A-150 provides in pertinent part:
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...the surrounding circumstances; and 3) failed to exercise reasonable care, by placing himself in the way of danger.”Ridgeway v. CSX Transp., Inc., 723 So.2d 600, 606 (Ala.1998). The issue of contributory negligence is generally one for a jury to resolve. Id. See also Savage Indus., Inc. v. D......
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...the surrounding circumstances; and 3) failed to exercise reasonable care, by placing himself in the way of danger." Ridgeway v. CSX Transp., Inc., 723 So. 2d 600, 60 6 (Ala. 1998). The issue of contributory negligence is generally one for a jury to resolve. Id. See also Savage Indus., Inc. ......