Ridgeway v. State
Decision Date | 30 June 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 2-1079A319,2-1079A319 |
Citation | 422 N.E.2d 410 |
Parties | Ken O. RIDGEWAY, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
James R. Fleming, Kokomo, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Ken O. Ridgeway appeals from a jury finding of guilty on three counts of conspiracy to sell a Schedule II substance. He asserts four errors:
I. Multiple sentencing for the same offense;
II. Insufficiency of the evidence;
III. Admission of evidence of activity at locations other than that specified in his Notice of Alibi;
IV. Failure to require State to file more specific response to Notice of Alibi.
Ridgeway was a practicing physician in Howard County. In November of 1976 he began a relationship with Kathy McQuiston, his office assistant, which ended in August of 1977 about the time McQuiston was terminated from her employment. Ridgeway continued to see McQuiston occasionally, co-signed on her loan for a three or four thousand dollar trailer, and gave her other financial assistance.
In November of 1977 McQuiston requested Ridgeway for help with her trailer payments. He assisted with one payment but upon her next request claimed he did not have the money. At that point McQuiston and her boyfriend, Kent Huskins, decided to approach Ridgeway about writing quaalude (a Schedule II drug) prescriptions which could be "cashed in" at a pharmacy and the quaalude sold on the street. From November 1977 to January 1978 Ridgeway gave McQuiston prescriptions he wrote for quaalude which were all made out for her, Kent Huskins, or Larry Reed. Sometime prior to January 10, 1978 McQuiston told Ridgeway she was cashing these prescriptions and selling the drug.
January 10, 1978, at McQuiston's request, Ridgeway met with her and Huskins at her trailer. Ridgeway gave McQuiston three prescriptions written by him for sixty 300 mg. quaalude tablets. The prescriptions were written for: 1) Jan Moles, McQuiston's mother-in-law, dated 1-10-77 (Count I); 2) Kent Huskins, dated 1-10-77 (Count II); Larry Reed, dated 1-11-77 (Count IV). Ridgeway advised McQuiston to have the prescriptions filled at different stores and asked her what she would do if caught on the street with the pills.
On January 11, 1978 Ridgeway gave McQuiston a prescription for quaalude dated 1-11-77 made out to her. This prescription is the basis for Count III.
Approximately January 14, 1978 McQuiston phoned Ridgeway. He met her with more prescriptions for quaaludes made out in the name of McQuiston's friends dated January 16. Ridgeway advised Kathy not to "cash them" until the sixteenth. He also asked McQuiston if she could sell a lot of pills. McQuiston stated she could and at a later date they met and Ridgeway agreed to order a thousand (1,000) tablets for McQuiston to sell, with half the proceeds to be retained by her and the other half given to Ridgeway. Ridgeway placed the order but later cancelled it.
February 7, 1978 Ridgeway was charged with twelve counts of conspiracy to commit a felony, to wit: Delivery of a controlled substance, a Class B felony, later amended to seven counts. He filed a notice of alibi on all counts, alleging he was at his home, among other places, on January 10, 11, and 16 of 1978. The State's answer to the alibi notice placed all the events in Howard County and specified the time for Count I as January 10, 1978 between 12 A.M. and 11:59 P.M.; and Counts III and IV as January 11, 1978 between the hours of 12 A.M. and 11:59 P.M. Ridgeway filed a motion in limine to suppress evidence placing him at any place other than that stated in his alibi notice. After hearing, the motion was denied.
Trial was held and the jury returned a guilty verdict on Counts I, 1 III, 2 and IV. 3
The foundational question raised by this appeal is whether Ridgeway's multiple convictions are contrary to the protection against multiple punishment for the same offense guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy clause. Without admitting any offense, Ridgeway contends the evidence would support "only one conspiracy, one agreement, and one crime." This double jeopardy challenge turns on whether all the alleged criminal conduct was pursuant to one overall agreement or whether each offense was the result of a separate and independent conspiratorial agreement. The issue is whether several offenses are the multiple objects of a single agreement and consequently a single conspiracy, the separate object of several agreements and consequently multiple conspiracies, or some combination thereof.
Whether there is one conspiracy or several is a question for the jury. United States v. Morrow, (5th Cir. 1976) 537 F.2d 120; United States v. Varelli, (7th Cir. 1969) 407 F.2d 735; Cole v. State, (1975) 167 Ind.App. 310, 338 N.E.2d 651. In Cole, decided under the prior criminal code, the court held it was for the trier of fact to resolve "whether the defendants' acts constituted a single conspiracy to commit two burglaries or whether the acts constituted two separate conspiracies to commit separate burglaries." Cole at 314, 338 N.E.2d at 654. Unfortunately, the Cole court did not discuss what considerations are relevant to the determination of the factual question.
It is important to remember the gravamen of the offense of conspiracy is the agreement. The purpose of the offense is to protect against the special danger incidental to group activity.
The fact that a single agreement will support but a single offense of general conspiracy is well accepted.
Braverman v. United States, (1942) 317 U.S. 49, 53, 63 S.Ct. 99, 101, 87 L.Ed. 23. 4
"... (Citation omitted.)
People v. Skelton, (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 691, 167 Cal.Rptr. 636, 651. The danger is in confusing separate acts at separate times with separate conspiracies.
"Almost any venture, criminal or legitimate, is analyzable into a series of bits, each of which, in turn, is characterizable as an independent plan or goal. The standard for determining the existence of a single conspiracy, however,
'... is whether there was one overall agreement among the various parties to perform various functions in order to carry out the objectives of the conspiracy ....'
United States v. Hobson, 519 F.2d 765, 775 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931, 96 S.Ct. 283, 46 L.Ed. 261 (1975), quoting United States v. Ellsworth, 481 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1041, 94 S.Ct. 544, 38 L.Ed.2d 332 (1973)."
United States v. Kearney, (9th Cir. 1977) 560 F.2d 1358; cert. denied, (1977) 434 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 522, 54 L.Ed.2d 460.
A review of federal cases in the area reveals several factors may be considered in determining whether there is one agreement or several. These factors include: 1) "the character of the property and the nature of the criminal scheme," United States v. Bass, (5th Cir. 1977) 562 F.2d 967; 2) overlapping participants, United States v. Perez, (5th Cir. 1973) 489 F.2d 51; 3) time period involved, United States v. D'Antonio, (7th Cir. 1966) 362 F.2d 151; and 4) the quality, frequency, and duration of each conspirator's transactions, United States v. Zemek, (9th Cir. 1980) 634 F.2d 1159.
The evidence introduced at trial showed McQuiston contacted Ridgeway on several occasions over a period of several days to request prescriptions made out to her, her friends, and relatives. These facts are sufficient to support an inference by the jury that each meeting between Ridgeway and McQuiston resulted in a new agreement to act with a single purpose limited to that particular act. There is no evidence to support a reasonable inference that more than one conspiracy was formed (an agreement coupled with a purpose) 5 at any single meeting. The evidence reveals the Count IV prescription was given to McQuiston on January 10, 1978 at the same time as the prescription described in Count I. Therefore, Ridgeway's conviction on Count IV must be reversed.
Ridgeway contends the evidence is insufficient to prove Count I which alleges a conspiracy between McQuiston and himself on January 10, 1978. Claiming the uncontradicted evidence shows he had no contact with McQuiston on January 11, 1978, Ridgeway argues the evidence is insufficient to prove Count III which alleges a separate conspiracy on January 11, 1978.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence most favorable to the verdict, together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, and if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment will be affirmed. Weaver v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 404 N.E.2d 1180.
The statute defining the offense of conspiracy reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
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