Ridgewood Homeowners Ass'n v. Mignacca

• Decision Date: 14 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2001-289-M.P.,2001-289-M.P.
• Citation: 813 A.2d 965
• Parties: RIDGEWOOD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. David MIGNACCA et al. RIDGEWOOD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. Zoning Board of Review of Cranston et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

813 A.2d 965

RIDGEWOOD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. David MIGNACCA et al.

RIDGEWOOD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. Zoning Board of Review of Cranston et al.

No. 2001-289-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 14, 2003.

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Alan P. Gelfuso, Cranston, Richard Tallo, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Lepizzera, Jr., William R. Guglietta, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

Can David and Kathy Mignacca (Mignaccas), two of the defendants in this case, keep their miniature horse on their residential property in the Ridgewood Estates subdivision in the City of Cranston? We answer in the negative. The Ridgewood Homeowners Association and certain members of the association individually (collectively, the association or plaintiffs) sought to prevent the Mignaccas from keeping the horse on their property. The defendant Zoning Board of Review of Cranston granted a zoning variance that allowed the horse, even though the Mignaccas did not own the ten acres required by the City of Cranston Zoning Code for raising and keeping animals. The plaintiffs appealed that decision and also brought a separate action seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant that they claimed prevented the Mignaccas from sheltering the horse in Ridgewood Estates. Following the entry of judgmentagainst the association in both the zoning appeal and the restrictive covenant action, the plaintiffs appealed and filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we issued. We sustain the appeal and reverse the judgment of the Superior Court in the covenant action, and we grant the petition and quash the judgment of the Superior Court in the zoning appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

In July 2001, the Mignaccas' miniature horse, which the record sometimes refers to as "Sonny," stood thirty and one-half inches high, one or two inches less than its eventual full height. The horse was not trained for riding but was shown competitively. The Mignaccas' son, Christian, whose "therapeutic" needs led his parents to the purchase, has won numerous ribbons by showing the horse at competitions. The horse requires approximately one-quarter to one-half acre for its exercise and an outdoor shed for shelter. The Mignaccas' property consists of four acres, comprising two adjoining lots in Ridgewood Estates, a subdivision of two-acre lots.

Concerned that the zoning code required a minimum of ten acres for them to keep their horse, the Mignaccas filed an application for a variance with the Cranston Zoning Board of Review (board) for permission to keep a miniature horse and to build and shelter the animal in a ten-foot by twelve-foot stable on their lot. They specifically sought relief from Sec. 30-8 of the City of Cranston Zoning Code (zoning code) titled Schedule of uses, under zoning code Sec. 30-28, entitled Variances. Section 30-28 requires that all applications be transmitted to the Cranston Planning Commission (commission) for its review and recommendation to the board, which then decides whether to grant the variance. On April 3, 2001, the commission issued findings of fact based on the Mignaccas' application, including a finding that the zoning code required a minimum of ten acres to keep the miniature horse. The commission "voted to make no specific recommendation" on the Mignaccas' request for a variance, however. Afterexamining exhibits and hearing both opposing and supportive testimony on the request, on April 11, 2001, the board granted the Mignaccas a variance with conditions.

The association appealed the board's decision to the Superior Court, where plaintiffs filed a second suit seeking to enjoin the Mignaccas from keeping the horse on their land on the basis of restrictive covenants in the deeds to all the properties in Ridgewood Estates. The plaintiffs specifically argued that restrictive covenant 8 ("Livestock and Poultry") barred the Mignaccas from maintaining the horse and from building a stable on their property.¹ The Superior Court justice consolidated the two cases for trial on the merits. The justice, sitting without a jury, heard extensive testimony and conducted a "view" of the Mignaccas' property to observe the horse and the surrounding lots in the subdivision. Based on testimonial evidence and on the view, the association amended its complaint during trial to allege that the Mignaccas also violated Ridgewood Estates' restrictive covenants by keeping three dogs, four ducks, and two rabbits on their property, as well as a boat, a go-cart, five all-terrain vehicles, an industrial dumpster, an industrial loader, and a fence erected without the association's approval. The Mignaccas filed a counterclaim during trial, challenging the keeping of any animals by plaintiffs, other than cats and dogs. All claims were consolidated.

On July 13, 2001, the justice entered judgment on all claims, accompanied by a written decision. Addressing the zoning issue, the trial justice remanded the case to the board, directing it to declare that "because the Mignaccas have well in excess of 20,000 square feet on which topermit [their horse] to amble and graze, Cranston Ordinance 4-2.1 precludes the necessity of granting a dimensional or any other variance to the Mignaccas, as that ordinance allows the keeping of a horse, even in a built-up area, so long as the owner has more than 20,000 square feet for use as a pasture." Additionally, the justice refused to enforce any of the restrictive covenants cited in the claim, counterclaims, and plaintiffs' amended complaint. In so doing, he found that covenant 8 did not apply to the Mignaccas' horse and that the association could not enjoin the Mignaccas from keeping it because of plaintiffs' own violations of certain restrictive covenants. He declared that the Mignaccas could keep the horse on their property and complete the ten-foot by twelve-foot stable they had begun to build for housing the animal.

The plaintiffs filed a petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari with respect to the zoning decision and appealed the justice's decision not to enforce covenant 8. This Court issued the writ and consolidated the appeal with the petition. The Mignaccas have not appealed the trial justice's decision denying their counterclaim, and plaintiffs did not appeal the denial of the additional claims in their amended complaint. Pending the resolution of the dispute by this Court, we granted the association's motion for a stay of the decision, enjoining the Mignaccas from keeping the horse on their property.²

Additional facts will be presented in discussing the issues on appeal.

Restrictive Covenants

The plaintiffs argued on appeal that the Superior Court justice erred in finding that the miniature horse was not barred by covenant 8, based on his finding that the covenant was ambiguous, that it was enforced arbitrarily, and that the equities of the situation did not supportan injunction against the horse's presence on the Mignaccas' property. In addition to covenant 8, plaintiffs had pointed to restrictive covenants 5 ("Nuisances") and 6 ("Temporary Structures") in their suit to enjoin the keeping and maintaining of a horse on the Mignaccas' land in Ridgewood Estates. The three covenants are listed in the Declaration of Restrictions and Protective Covenants (declaration) that are imposed on all lots in the Ridgewood Estates subdivision. Phillips Associates, Inc., the developer of Ridgewood Estates, recorded the declaration with the City of Cranston in 1987. The limitations, restrictions, covenants, and uses enumerated in the declaration were intended to be "covenants running with the land * * * for the benefit of and limitation on all future owners" of land in the subdivision.

The declaration explicitly allows any property owner in Ridgewood Estates "to institute and prosecute any proceedings at law or in equity against [any] person or persons * * * attempting to violate any such covenant or restrictions * * *." Moreover, this Court has recognized that owners may enforce restrictive covenants on land burdened by the same restrictions as their land, when the purpose of the covenants is to maintain a common scheme of development, as is the case with these covenants, and in particular, with covenant 8. Emma v. Silvestri, 101 R.I. 749, 751-52, 227 A.2d 480, 481 (1967). This Court's objective in interpreting restrictive covenants is to achieve the delicate balance in favor of "the free alienability of land while still respecting the purposes for which the restriction was established." Gregory v. State Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, 495 A.2d 997, 1000 (R.I.1985). In so doing, we give the words of a restrictive covenant "their plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent is discernable from the face of the instrument." Id. at 1001. Because the specific effects of applying restrictions can vary, depending on the land and covenants involved, "casesinvolving the interpretation of restrictive covenants must be decided on a case-by-case basis * * *." Id. at 1000-01.

The key restrictive covenant at issue here is covenant 8, entitled "Livestock and Poultry," which provides:

"No animals, livestock or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred or kept on any lot, except that two (2) dogs and/or two (2) cats may be kept provided that they are not kept, bred or maintained for any commercial purpose. No kennels or other structure for the keeping of such pet shall be maintained on the premises."

The trial justice found that this covenant was ambiguous and concluded that

"the intent of the drafter of Restrictive Covenant 8 was to provide the residents and potential residents of the Ridgewood development from having a neighbor or neighbors engage in the business of keeping and raising animals in a farm-like setting for commercial purposes, i.e., the raising of chickens for their eggs and meat, the raising of cattle for dairy...