Riding v. Kaufmann's Dept. Store

Citation220 F.Supp.2d 442
Decision Date08 August 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 99-2035.,CIV.A. 99-2035.
PartiesNancy RIDING, Plaintiff, v. KAUFMANN'S DEPARTMENT STORE and May Department Stores Company, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

April L. Boyer, James B. Lieber, Lieber & Hammer, Pittsburgh, PA, for plaintiff.

Philip J. Murray, III, Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, Pittsburgh, PA, Betty Thorne Tierney, May Department Stores, St. Louis, MO, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEE, District Judge.

Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment by defendants, the Kaufmann's Department Store and May Department Stores Company (collectively referred to as "Kaufmann's"), seeking judgment in its favor on Nancy Riding's five-count complaint for damages, reinstatement and other legal and equitable relief for alleged gender and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation and constructive discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951 et seq. Specifically, plaintiff claims she was discriminated against on the basis of gender and pregnancy on May 28, 1998, when she was demoted from salaried manager of the fashion studio of Kaufmann's advertising department to fashion photographer, an hourly position; in November, 1998, when she was demoted from fashion photographer to merchandise photographer, while on extended maternity leave; and that Kaufmann's retaliated against her for complaining about discrimination and hostile work environment on May 28, 1998 and in November, 1998, and, ultimately, constructively discharged her in December, 1998.

After careful consideration of defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's response thereto, the memoranda of law in support and in opposition, and the extensive deposition testimony, performance evaluations and other supporting documents and materials produced by the parties, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to essential elements of each of her claims. The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of defendants, and dismiss the case.

Summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is appropriate "`if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Woodside v. School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir.2001), quoting Foehl v. United States, 238 F.3d 474, 477 (3d Cir.2001) (citations omitted). An issue of material fact is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must "view the evidence ... through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" to determine "whether a jury could reasonably find either that the plaintiff proved his case by the quality and quantity of the evidence required by the governing law or that he did not." Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.2002), quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party's burden can be "discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the District Court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

If the moving party has carried this burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party who cannot rest on the allegations of the pleadings and must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993). To meet its burden at this point, the non-moving party must present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), and cannot rely on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions. Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir.1989), citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Instead, the non-moving party must point "to sufficient cognizable evidence to create material issues of fact concerning every element as to which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. Of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n. 3 (3d Cir.1998), quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 n. 1 (3d Cir.1994).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts, in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe v. County of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir.2001); Woodside, 248 F.3d at 130; Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir.1999). Further, the court must not engage in credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage. Simpson, 142 F.3d at 643 n. 3, quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762 n. 1.

Undisputed Background Facts

The parties have submitted Joint Stipulations of Fact ("J.S.") for trial which set forth the following undisputed facts. Plaintiff, Nancy Riding, is an experienced photographer who was hired by defendant May Department Stores Company, d/b/a Kaufmann's Department Store ("Kaufmann's") on or about May 26, 1992, to work in the photo studio of its advertising department in Pittsburgh. J.S., ¶¶ 1-9. Ms. Riding is married and has two children, her first being born in November 1995, when she took family medical leave for the birth, and her second on September 19, 1998. J.S., ¶¶ 13-14. Ms. Riding took family medical leave beginning in June 1998, in connection with the pregnancy of her second child. J.S., ¶ 16.

At relevant times, the hierarchy in Kaufmann's advertising department consisted of: Jerry Eccher, Senior Vice President of Advertising/Sales Promotions; Mary Ann Brown, Vice President Advertising; Ann Corbett, Vice President and Creative Director; Erika Kirwin, Division Vice President and Director of Special Promotions; and Joanne Pagnanelli, Vice President and Director of Fashion Merchandise. J.S., ¶ 10. Joanne Pagnanelli reported directly to Jerry Eccher, as did the other officers. J.S., ¶ 11. Ann Corbett replaced the previous Vice President and Creative Director Barbara Mihopulos, in 1996. J.S., ¶ 12.

From May 1992 until May 1996, Ms. Riding worked as the studio manager/fashion photographer, in which capacity she managed both components of the photo studio, the fashion studio and the home studio, and also worked as a fashion photographer. J.S., ¶¶ 17-18. As studio manager/fashion photographer, plaintiff reported to the creative director (first Barbara Mihopolous, then Ann Corbett). J.S., ¶ 19.

Michael Kupniewski became assistant home studio manager in 1993. J.S., ¶ 20. In May 1996, Ms. Riding was relieved of responsibility for the home studio and her title changed to fashion studio manager/fashion photographer. J.S., ¶ 21. Also in May 1996, Edward "Rock" Machen became home studio manager at Kaufmann's; he reported directly to Joanne Pagnanelli, as did Ms. Riding. J.S., ¶¶ 22-23. On May 28, 1998, Mr. Machen was promoted to photo studio manager and Ms. Riding was informed she was being demoted, effective June 1, 1998. J.S., ¶¶ 24-25. "As a result of the demotion, Ms. Riding's responsibilities and title were changed and she became an hourly employee." J.S., ¶ 24.

On or around October 19, 1998, plaintiff sent a letter to a Steve Hersh in Human Resources, requesting information about the position to which she would be returning from her family medical leave. Mr. Hersh requested that Andrew Melissinos, also of Human Resources, respond to Ms. Riding's request. J.S. ¶ 26. Mr. Melissinos spoke with Ms. Riding on November 23, 1998, and informed plaintiff she would be returning as a "Merchandise Photographer." J.S., ¶ 27. Plaintiff found that change to her job title and her duties as a merchandise photographer unacceptable, and rejected this position in December, 1998. Plaintiff did not return to work for Kaufmann's.

Ms. Riding claims she was demoted by Kaufmann's in May 1998 from fashion studio manager to fashion photographer because of her pregnancy and/or her sex. Kaufmann's denies plaintiff was discriminated against in any way, and asserts it demoted Ms. Riding in May 1998 for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. Ms. Riding also claims she was further demoted in November 1998 from fashion photographer to merchandise photographer, and because of that intolerable demotion and other discriminatory conduct, was constructively discharged because of her pregnancy and/or her sex and/or in retaliation for having complained to Kaufmann's about pregnancy and sex discrimination. Kaufmann's denies it discriminated or retaliated against Ms. Riding in any way, and further asserts she was not demoted in November 1998 nor was she constructively discharged. Joint Stipulation With Regard to Brief Statement of Claims and Defenses for Use in Preliminary Instructions to Jury and With Regard to Expert Witnesses (Document No. 61), at 1-2.

Disputed Background Scenario

Practically every other fact and inference in this case is disputed, reflecting a fundamental difference of perception and opinion about Ms. Riding's employment history and performance as a manager at Kaufmann's.

According to Kaufmann's, almost from the beginning Nancy Riding was a "difficult employee who caused numerous personality conflicts with her colleagues and subordinates. As a result, she was a poor manager of the Studio." Defendants' Memorandum in...

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