Ridley v. Gaffney
| Decision Date | 31 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | C/A 1:21-997-MBS |
| Parties | Richard D. Ridley, Plaintiff, v. Errin Gaffney, Facility Administrator; Dr. Michelle Dube, Clinical Director; and Nurse C. Nickles, Medical Director, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiff Richard D. Ridley (“Plaintiff”) is a resident of the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program (“SVPTP”), a facility of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health (“SCDMH”). On April 5, 2021, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants Errin Gaffney (“Gaffney”), Dr. Michelle Dube (“Dube”), and Nurse C. Nickles are violating his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Plaintiff contends the manner of operation of the SVPTP is violating the Anti-Slavery laws of the United States and South Carolina, as well as the South Carolina non-delegation doctrine. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.02 D.S.C., this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges for pretrial handling.
Pursuant to the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 44-48-10 et seq. (“SVPA”), the SCDMH and the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) entered into an interagency agreement by which residents are housed in a segregated maximum-security location within the Broad River Correctional Institution in Columbia, South Carolina. Plaintiff was civilly committed in 2014 pursuant to the SVPA. Defendants Errin Gaffney, Michelle Dube, and C. Nickles are or were employed by Wellpath. Wellpath provides licensed medical staff for the SVPTP, nursing services, sex offender treatment services, and access to physicians. Wellpath also provides psychiatric and psychological treatment to the residents of the SVPTP.
On April 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging Dube placed false information in his clinical record indicating Plaintiff had made sexual advances toward other residents and that he was subjected to retaliation as a consequence. For example, Plaintiff alleges he was denied a job within the SVPTP and the opportunity to be moved to a less restrictive wing of the SVPTP facility. Plaintiff alleges these actions occurred after he filed an ethical complaint against Dube. In addition, Plaintiff asserts a number of conditions of confinement claims. He states Defendants inadequately responded to the COVID-19 pandemic, the SVPTP does not maintain a sufficient staff of nurses, and he has been provided small portions of food. Plaintiff asserts that Wellpath is cutting costs, which renders him a slave because Wellpath is using his presence to generate profits. Plaintiff further contends that SCDMH violated the nondelegation doctrine by contracting with Wellpath to operate the system.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 1, 2021 (ECF No. 31). By order issued September 2, 2021, in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff was advised of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on October 18, 2021 (ECF No. 40). A second Roseboro order was issued on October 19, 2021. Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants' motion to dismiss on November 8, 2021 (ECF No. 45). Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on December 20, 2021 (ECF No. 51). On January 12, 2022, Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 55). Plaintiff filed a second response in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on April 29, 2022 (ECF No. 68), to which Defendants filed a reply on May 6, 2022 (ECF No. 70).
On May 18, 2022, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the district court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment, rendering Defendants' motion to dismiss moot (ECF No. 72). Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on June 16, 2022 (ECF No. 80), to which Defendants filed a reply on June 30, 2022.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The court reviews de novo only those portions of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which specific objections are filed and reviews those portions which are not objected to-including those portions to which only “general and conclusory” objections have been made-for clear error. Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983); Opriano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 77 (4th Cir. 1982). The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Magistrate Judge recounted that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude “except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. The Magistrate Judge noted that Plaintiff appears to challenge, generally, private, for profit incarceration. However, according to the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff has provided no case law or argument providing a basis for challenging his commitment.
In his objections, Plaintiff again argues that the language of S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-100(A) limits his confinement to being in the control, care, and treatment of either SCDC or SCDMH pursuant to an interagency agreement. Plaintiff contends that section 44-48-100(A) does not authorize SCDMH to commit sexually violent predators in a facility such as Wellpath, an entity that has the ability to make a profit off the possession of Plaintiff. To the contrary, the South Carolina Mental Health Commission exists as “a body corporate in deed and in law with all the powers incident to corporations[.]” S.C. Code Ann. § 44-9-90. A corporation has the same powers as an individual to make contracts. Id. § 33-31-302(7). Plaintiff's objection is without merit.
Plaintiff also asserts he is deprived of his rights under the Thirteenth Amendment because cost-cutting measures such as smaller meals and fewer staff allow Wellpath to increase its profit margin at the expense of Plaintiff's quality of life. Plaintiff states that a prisoner adds value to a corporation:
through both his own labor: for example, by cleaning his cell, laundering outfits, or serving meals, and his meager living conditions show how even a non-laboring prisoner is a slave, because his body is being used to enrich the corporate owner; See: Abolishing Private Persons: A Constitutional and Moral Imperative; University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 49 Iss. 3, Art. 2 (2020).
(ECF No. 68, 21) (emphasis in original).
When a person is confined pursuant to a presumptively valid judgment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against slavery or involuntary servitude is not violated. People v. Baldwin, 175 N.E.3d 1090, 1908 (Ill. 2020). However, as a civilly committed inmate, Plaintiff's custody status most closely resembles that of a pre-trial detainee. Hamm v. Alexander, Civil Action No. 9:15-4400-RMG-BM, 2016 WL 11431336, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2016). As such, Plaintiff does not fall within the exception to the prohibition of slavery or involuntary servitude, because he is not detained “as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Involuntaryservitude.
In Ruelas v. County of Alameda, 519 F.Supp.3d 636 (N.D. Cal. 2021), a class action was brought by incarcerated individuals, pretrial detainees, and detainees awaiting immigration proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged they and others similarly situated performed unpaid labor for an industrial food preparation services and cleaning for a private, for-profit company that sells food prepared by prisoners to third parties. Some plaintiffs alleged they were forced to work pursuant to threats of punishment, including lengthier sentences and solitary confinement, if they refused. The plaintiffs brought numerous causes of action, including a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. The Ruelas court ruled that plaintiffs who were forced to work before they were convicted - the same status as pretrial detainee that applies to Plaintiff - stated a claim for relief under the Thirteenth Amendment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
The court finds Ruelas to be distinguishable. Plaintiff's assertion that his mere existence generates profit for Wellpath does not rise to the level of forced, unpaid labor proscribed under the Thirteenth Amendment. Plaintiff's objection is without merit.
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