Ridley v. Sioux Empire Pit Bull Rescue, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 August 2019
• Docket Number: 28668
• Citation: 932 N.W.2d 576
• Parties: Darlette Mae RIDLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SIOUX EMPIRE PIT BULL RESCUE, INC., Susan Tribble-Zacher and Harry Podhradsky, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

932 N.W.2d 576

Darlette Mae RIDLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.SIOUX EMPIRE PIT BULL RESCUE, INC., Susan Tribble-Zacher and Harry Podhradsky, Defendants and Appellees.

28668

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

ARGUED MARCH 26, 2019

OPINION FILED August 7, 2019

JAMI J. BISHOP, KIMBERLY J. LANHAM of Johnson Janklow Abdallah & Reiter, LLP, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.

PAUL H. LINDE, MICHAEL J. SCHAFFER of Schaffer Law Office, Prof., LLC, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellee, Sioux Empire Pit Bull Rescue, Inc.

MELANIE L. CARPENTER, ALEXIS A. WARNER of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, P.C., Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendants and appellees, Susan Tribble-Zacher & Harry Podhradsky.

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice

[¶1.] Darlette Mae Ridley was attacked and injured by a dog while walking in a state campground. The dog was a pit bull type belonging to Sioux Empire Pit Bull Rescue, Inc. (SEPR) and in the care of Susan Tribble-Zacher and Harry Podhradsky at their campsite. Ridley sued SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky claiming they were liable for her injuries. SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky filed separate motions for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. Ridley appeals. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] On the morning of August 9, 2015, Ridley and her family were camping at Newton Hills State Park in Lincoln County, South Dakota. At approximately 7:05 a.m., Ridley decided to take a walk around the campground. Zacher and Podhradsky were also camping at Newton Hills with their son, their dog, and a pit bull named Meadow. At the time, Zacher and Podhradsky were dog sitting for Meadow. As Ridley walked by Zacher and Podhradsky’s campsite, she claimed she heard a loud bark and turned to see Meadow tethered to a tree.

[¶3.] Ridley claims she saw Meadow rear up on her hind legs and lunge toward Ridley. As Meadow lunged, her dog collar unexpectedly broke, and she began to run free toward Ridley. Meadow knocked Ridley down onto the gravel road and allegedly bit her. Zacher called out for Meadow to return back to her and Meadow obeyed. The parties agree that Ridley did nothing to incite or provoke the attack.

[¶4.] As a result of the attack, Ridley sustained cuts on her elbow, left ring, and pinky fingers, and experienced pain in her lower back. Podhradsky assisted Ridley to a nearby bench and then into a campground bathroom to clean blood off of Ridley’s hand. Zacher then helped Ridley back to Ridley’s campsite and Ridley’s husband drove her to the emergency room. Ridley suffered a fractured finger

that required cleaning and stitches. She incurred medical expenses and lost wages as a result of the dog attack. She eventually sued SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky claiming they were liable for the injuries she sustained.

[¶5.] At the time of the attack on Ridley, Meadow was owned by SEPR. SEPR is an organization that accepts pit bulls from animal shelters, situations of abuse and neglect, and dog fighting rings. The organization does not have its own physical location, so rescued animals are placed with foster providers until a permanent home for the animals can be located.

[¶6.] Meadow was picked up by the Sioux City Humane Society sometime before July 2014. SEPR later took possession of Meadow and placed her with Jennifer Praske, a foster provider in Worthing, South Dakota. Meadow stayed with Praske from July 2014 to December 2014. SEPR then transferred Meadow to live with Desiree and Jon Adams in Platte, Nebraska. On March 1, 2015, when the Adams were attempting to introduce Meadow to their family dog, a fight ensued and both dogs were injured. In April 2015, Meadow was placed with Heather Boon, where she remained up until right before the attack on Ridley.

[¶7.] Shortly before the attack, Boon wanted to go out of town, so she notified SEPR to find temporary foster providers for Meadow. SEPR arranged for Zacher and Podhradsky to act as Meadow’s temporary caregivers. Zacher and Podhradsky had previously dog sat Meadow twice and had experience raising, fostering, and dog-sitting pit bulls. On July 31, 2015, Boon brought Meadow to Zacher and Podhradsky’s home. The pair were scheduled to take care of Meadow until Saturday, August 8, 2015. However, Boon contacted Zacher to notify her that her trip had been extended and that Boon would not return home until Sunday, August 9, 2015. Zacher and Podhradsky had already made plans to camp overnight at Newton Hills so they decided to take Meadow with them.

[¶8.] The parties disagree as to whether Zacher and Podhradsky violated SEPR’s policy by bringing Meadow with them to camp at Newton Hills. SEPR’s President, Rachel DeZell Leighton, testified in a deposition that SEPR requires that each animal undergo a two-week shutdown period after they are transferred to a new foster home. The two-week shutdown period requires that the new caregivers segregate a dog and bond the dog to only one caregiver.

[¶9.] During the two-week shutdown, a dog is kept separate from other animals and prohibited from leaving the caregiver’s home or yard. Leighton testified that "[t]he two-week shutdown allows an animal to decompress and begin to bond with a handler. It builds the relationship of trust" between the dog and the new foster care provider. Ridley claims that Zacher and Podhradsky violated SEPR’s policy because they did not perform a two-week shutdown period with Meadow before bringing her to the Newton Hills campground. Zacher, Podhradsky, and SEPR claim that the two-week shutdown policy was optional in this situation,

[¶10.] After Ridley sued SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky for her injuries, SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky filed separate motions for summary judgment arguing that there were no disputed material facts and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ridley resisted the summary judgment motions. A hearing was held on June 7, 2018. The circuit court granted the motions for summary judgment, holding that there was no evidence showing a lack of reasonable care on the part of SEPR, Zacher, or Podhradsky. Ridley appeals, asking this Court to determine issues that can be consolidated into the question of whether the circuit court erred in granting SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky’s motions for summary judgment.

Standard of Review

[¶11.] "In reviewing a grant or a denial of summary judgment under SDCL 15-6-56(c), we must determine whether the moving party demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and showed entitlement to judgment on the merits as a matter of law." Nicolay v. Stukel , 2017 S.D. 45, ¶ 16, 900 N.W.2d 71, 77-78 (quoting Gades v. Meyer Modernizing Co. , 2015 S.D. 42, ¶ 7, 865 N.W.2d 155, 157-58 ). "We view the evidence most favorably to the nonmoving party and resolve reasonable doubts against the moving party." Id. (quoting Gades , 2015 S.D. 42, ¶ 7, 865 N.W.2d at 158 ).

Analysis & Decision

[¶12.] Ridley claims the circuit court erred in granting SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky’s motions for summary judgement for two reasons. First, she claims the circuit court incorrectly weighed the evidence, viewing the facts of the case in a light most favorable to SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky as opposed to a light most favorable to Ridley. She also argues that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky breached their standard duty of care toward Ridley.

[¶13.] "Negligence is the breach of a duty owed to another, the proximate cause of which results in an injury." Lindblom v. Sun Aviation, Inc. , 2015 S.D. 20, ¶ 19, 862 N.W.2d 549, 555 (quoting Englund v. Vital , 2013 S.D. 71, ¶ 11, 838 N.W.2d 621, 627 ). Consequently, "[b]efore a defendant can be held liable for negligence, the defendant must have breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff." Locke v. Gellhaus , 2010 S.D. 11, ¶ 11, 778 N.W.2d 594, 597. "Whether a duty exists is a question of law; whether a defendant’s conduct constitutes a breach of a duty is a question of fact." Nicolay , 2017 S.D. 45, ¶ 16, 900 N.W.2d at 78.

[¶14.] Under South Dakota law, "[o]wners of domesticated animals may ... be held liable for harm caused by their pet ...." Gehrts v. Batteen , 2001 S.D. 10, ¶ 7, 620 N.W.2d 775, 777. "[I]n such a case against a dog owner, the plaintiff must establish that as an ordinary, prudent person, the owner should have foreseen the event that caused the injury and taken steps to prevent the injury." Rowland v. Log Cabin, Inc. , 2003 S.D. 20, ¶ 8, 658 N.W.2d 76, 78. "Such liability may arise depending upon the kind and character of the particular animal concerned, the circumstances in which it is placed, and the purposes for which it is employed or kept." Id. (quoting Gehrts , 2001 S.D. 10, ¶ 9, 620 N.W.2d at 778 ). "[I]f a plaintiff proves that the dog owner knew or had reason to know of the dog’s dangerous propensity the plaintiff will be deemed to have established the foreseeability element of negligence." Id. ¶ 9, 658 N.W.2d at 79. "[T]o establish foreseeability, a plaintiff in a dog bite case may either argue to the jury that the owner knew or should have known of the dog’s dangerous propensities or that, under the totality of the circumstances, injury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable." Id.

[¶15.] Here, both parties agree. The circuit court granted the motions for summary judgment on the basis that the injury to Ridley was not foreseeable. As to SEPR, Zacher, and Podhradsky’s knowledge of Meadow’s dangerous propensities, the circuit court stated that:

[I]t seems to me that there isn't any evidence to suggest that this dog had dangerous propensities. There wasn't any history of any kind of dangerous or aggressive behavior on the part of the dog. The closest thing that the plaintiffs can suggest is that the dog was the victim of an attack by another dog two and a half years prior, and I don't think we can draw any inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff that are beyond that ....

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